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CHAPTER 1: ABSTRACT
ANOTHER NEGOTIATOR’S DILEMMA: NEGOTIATING AGAINST A COUNTERPART
WITH A BAD REPUTATION
BY
JEFF SCHATTEN
April 25, 2016

Committee Chair:

Edward Miles

Major Academic Unit: Managerial Sciences

Since the publication of Albert Carr’s controversial article from 1968, “Is Business
Bluffing Ethical?” there has been a flurry of interest, both from researchers and
practitioners, into the use of deception in negotiation. Far from being a hypothetical
question, the use of deception in negotiation has been shown to be a common
negotiation tactic. Aquino and Becker (2005) suggest that deception occurs in 55% of
negotiations. Deception has been used in negotiation contexts as wide-ranging as
supply chain management, contracts, use car sales, mergers and acquisitions, and
trade agreements between sovereign nations.
Scholarly research has thus far established two streams of research to explain
when deception is likely to occur. The first line of inquiry claims that negotiator
characteristics are the proximal cause of unethical behavior, such as deception. Such
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authors point to personality characteristics, tendencies, and traits that are unique to
the individuals who use deception. This group of scholars point to evidence that certain
individuals, regardless of the situation, rely on deception to achieve their goals. A
second line of research has emerged that claims that the predominant factor is the
negotiation situation. Thus, departing from an individual characteristics angle, these
authors have argued that certain negotiations, such as when the stakes are high or
when one negotiator is far more powerful than the other, present dynamics in which
deception is more likely to take place. When considered together, these two research
streams give a rich account of deception in negotiation.
However, in this series of three essays, I argue that a third, equally valid
perspective ought to be explored: the role of a counterpart’s reputation. I explain that
the characteristics of one’s negotiation counterpart could be important factors in
explaining why someone might resort to deception. I argue that the most relevant
characteristic is that of a negative or bad reputation. To make these theoretical
contributions, I draw on equity theory and prisoner’s dilemma. I argue that a negative
reputation will lead a negotiator to believe that his or her counterpart might act in a
deceptive manner and that to restore this inequity, the negotiator might be more likely to
use deception. Further, I argue for important mediators and moderators in this process.
The first essay is a theoretical exploration of the relationship between a
counterpart’s reputation, the use of deception and negotiation outcomes. I look at the
role that deception plays in negotiation and how the threat of a counterpart’s use of
deception might impact how a negotiator thinks of deception. In this paper, I develop
propositions that will be tested empirically in the second and third essay. One of the
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main contributions of the theoretical piece is the movement away from the two current
theories that belie the current deception literature, negotiator characteristics and
negotiation situation. In this essay, I draw on equity theory to suggest that the drive to
make a negotiation equitable might best explain the phenomena. Further, I lay the
theoretical foundation for propositions that recommend that deception might lead to
positive distributive outcomes but negative integrative outcomes.
The second essay looks specifically at a model that tests the relationship
between counterpart reputation and the use of deception. In this essay, I develop a
moderated mediation model, in which counterpart reputation leads to the assessment of
unfairness and that this assessment leads to the use of deception. In my model, the
relationship between counterpart reputation and negotiator use of deception is
moderated by prosocial motivation, negotiation self-efficacy, Machiavellianism, and
Schwartz values. I report two different studies to test this model.
The third essay hones in on the relationship between principal use of deception
and negotiation outcomes. I use leakage theory, which suggests that some who use
deception inadvertently “leak” clues to the fact that they are acting deceptively, as a
basis to look at the relationship between the constructs. I argue that political skill and
emotional intelligence are key moderators of this process. I use a negotiation
experiment to test this model.
This three-essay dissertation achieves the goal of exploring a very important
aspect of deception in negotiation. As it stands, this gap in the literature presents a
picture of deception that is potentially missing an entire branch of causality: the role of
the counterpart in a negotiator’s use of deception. This project will hopefully spur new
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research and interest into understanding, more broadly, how a counterpart impacts
ethical or unethical decision making in negotiation. For practitioners, these studies
might be able to illustrate that the use of deception is not only about the one who
deceives. Rather, a negotiator must also understand how other people might illicit
behavior from the negotiator, both behaviors that are honest and deceptive. In addition,
the practitioner might be in a better position to understand how his or her own reputation
might impact a counterpart’s use of deception.
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Chapter 2: Essay 1

ANOTHER NEGOTIATOR’S DILEMMA

ABSTRACT

Previous research has pointed to two factors, negotiator characteristics and
negotiation situation, to explain when deception occurs in negotiation. In this theoretical
development, I argue for the need for an analysis into the way in which a negotiator’s
use of deception is impacted by a counterpart’s reputation. I draw on equity theory and
prisoner’s dilemma to claim that, when a counterpart has a bad or negative reputation,
the primary negotiator is more likely to use deception. I also describe propositions for
moderating variables.
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“You must be a great liar and hypocrite. Men are so simple of mind and so much
dominated by their immediate needs, that a deceitful man will always find plenty who
are ready to be deceived.”
Machiavelli, The Prince

General Introduction
Because negotiators have conflicting interests and the ends that they desire are
interdependent, there are many opportunities for conflict and ultimately deception. Each
negotiator is interested in pursuing his or her own self-interests, which, if actualized, can
act as a direct detriment to the other party. The negotiation process is based on
information dependence, such that typically an effective negotiator must simultaneously
assess a counterpart’s ends and objectives and hide one’s own preferences (Kelley &
Thibaut, 1969). Thus, the extent to which a counterpart knows what a principal wants
and the bottom line reservation price that a principal is willing to accept, the more
disadvantaged the principal is. As a result, if a principal is too open or too honest, a
counterpart might have the opportunity to take advantage of the situation (Paese,
Schreiber & Taylor, 2003). Studies have shown that many negotiators use deception
precisely because they can do so without being detected (Schweitzer, DeChurch &
Gibson, 2005; Bond, 2006), and that those who successfully use deception do so to
leverage the subsequent information imbalance to increase their odds of achieving
higher outcomes for themselves or their organizations (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013;
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Bazerman, Curhan, Moore & Valley, 2000). At its core, negotiation contains
elements of both competing and cooperating. Because each negotiator is uncertain
when the other is competing or cooperating, deception is inherently difficult to detect
(Lax & Sebenius, 1985). Lax and Sebenius (1985) refer to this difficulty as the
“Negotiator’s Dilemma.”
Research has, in great detail, documented the prevalence of deception. Broadly
speaking, DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) found that the average
person tells between one to two lies per day. In terms of negotiation, when there were
high incentives to lie, researchers found that over 55% of negotiators use active forms
of deception (Aquino & Becker, 2005). Further, Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, &
Pillutla (1999) found that over a third of negotiators with high levels of experience used
deception in a single negotiation. Deception has been found to exist in negotiations that
are as wide ranging as labor negotiations, corporate mergers, salary negotiations and
global climate change negotiations (Ma & Parks, 2012), just to name a few.
The social science literature has relied on two key theoretical perspectives to
explain deception in negotiation. The first stream of literature explains deception by
claiming that the situation drives behavior. Situational factors, such as when there is
one party who has more power (Olekalns, Horan, & Smith, 2014), one party faces
specific and unmet goals (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999), when a negotiator is negotiating
against a group rather than an individual (Lewicki, Poland, Minton, & Sheppard, 1997),
or when the stakes are high (Tenbrunsel, 1998), can lead to an increase in the use of
deception. Second, the literature points to individual characteristics as an explanation
for the use of deception. Some examples of these findings include low trustworthiness

12
(Olekalns et al., 2014), high anger (Tenbrunsel, 1998), envy (Moran & Schweitzer,
2008), low expectation of feeling guilty (Ruedy, Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013), or
personal standards (Perry and Nixon 2005).
However, largely absent from this important discussion has been the effects of a
counterpart reputation. One might think of reputation as the “combination of salient
personal characteristics and accomplishments, demonstrated behavior, and intended
images presented over some period of time” (Ferris, Treadway, Perrewe, Brouer,
Douglas, & Lux, 2007, p213). In social science research, an individual’s reputation has
been shown to have broad reaching effects. Drawing on social exchange theory, which
suggests that relationships operate similarly to economic exchange, in that they can be
seen in terms of their costs and benefits (Blau, 1964), Blickle, Schneider, Liu, and Ferris
(2011) argue that reputations are often leveraged to reap positive rewards from those in
authority or dominant positions. In this case, those with positive reputations are given
positive reinforcements and those with negative reputations are given negative
reinforcements. Reputation also has the capacity to showcase competence and garner
respect from others (Ferris et al., 2007). Reputation has a direct effect on the behavior
of others, but this occurs because reputation acts as a signaling mechanism that
reduces the uncertainty about the way in which another person might behave (Spence,
1974). In essence, a reputation is formed based on past behavior, which leads to a
cognitive shortcut in the belief about the way in which an individual will behave in the
future. A positive reputation can lead to lasting benefits such as high liking by others
(Johnson, Erez, Kiker, & Motowidlo, 2002), the perception of being skilled (Gioia &
Sims, 1983) and even positive career outcomes (Cooper, Graham, & Dyke, 1993).
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Because of the centrality of reputation in understanding individual behavior in
general, there is a potentially important gap in the literature in explaining why some
people use deception in negotiation while others do not. By demonstrating that the
reputation of an opponent is a key driver in determining the use of deception,
researchers will have a far more full picture of what determines the use of deception.
Tinsley, O’Connor, & Sullivan (2002) noted that even though negotiators are aware of
their own reputations, the research literature understands “very little about the dynamics
of reputations’ influence on negotiation” (p. 622). The authors suggest that one reason
why there could be a low level of research into reputation could be a general lack of
interest into “social” information, as in negotiation factors that are social in nature such
as likeability, rapport or reputation. This research will help fill in this gap in the literature,
in pointing to the centrality of reputation in explaining deceptive practices. For
practitioners, this will be important because it might suggest that simply understanding
themselves as individuals (i.e. personality) and the negotiation scenario, will not be
enough to predict if they will be likely to engage in deception. Likewise, practitioners will
be better equipped to handle their own reputation, positive or negative, and how that
reputation might lead an opponent to use deception or to act in a more honest manner.
Finally, this research will allow negotiators to better predict when their reputation might
lead a counterpart to use deception.
In this research, I draw on the equity theory literature to show that principals
might choose to use deception or to tell the truth based on their counterpart’s
reputation. Specifically, I offer that when the counterpart has a reputation for what is
considered unethical or dubious behavior, it increases the chance that the negotiator
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will use deception. I show how a principal might use deception or truth telling to
create a more balanced environment, one in which deception is more likely to be
matched with deception and honesty is more likely to be matched with honesty.
Further, as a second theoretical lens, I suggest that prisoner’s dilemma provides a
unique perspective to understand why individuals might choose to use deception. I also
suggest that personal values and individual characteristics act as moderators of this
process. Finally, I discuss some of the ethical considerations of this process.

Deception in Negotiation
Deceit is a common negotiation tactic that principals use to try and gain the
upper hand on a negotiation counterpart (Aquino, 1998; Giordano, Stoner, Brouer, &
George, 2007; Olekalns & Smith, 2007; Stawiski, Tindale, & Engblade, 2009). Some
have gone so far as to suggest that deceit and bluffing are fundamental parts of the
game of business—expecting principals to do otherwise is tantamount to asking football
players to refrain from tackling (Carr, 1968). Thus, it is not surprising that deceptive
practices have been noted to occur in arenas as wide-ranging as car sales, political
agreements, employee contracts, and nonprofit management (Gneezy, 2005), just to
name a few.
There has been a rich history of research that explains when someone might
engage or refrain from engaging in deception in negotiation. At its core, both honest
disclosure and deceit carry heavy risks to a negotiator. Divulging too much information
in a negotiation context can lead to information asymmetry, in which a principal stands
the risk of being taken advantage of or exploited by a counterpart (Murnighan, Babcock,
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Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999). This can result in failed outcomes in which negotiation
objectives are not realized. On the other hand, if counterparts detect deception, they
can become hostile (Aquino & Becker, 2005) and distrustful (Olekalns, Horan & Smith,
2014). This too can lead to a breakdown in negotiation, leading to principals reaching
agreements that fail to reach optimal outcomes. For these reasons, we see principals in
a precarious situation in which the optimal strategy often involves nuanced approaches,
such as framing and partial disclosure, which results in the principal to using neither
outright deception nor telling “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”
Deception in negotiation is summed up appropriately by Rubin and Brown (1975,
p.14), “To the extent that the other party knows both what the first wants as well as the
least that he will accept, he (the other) will be able to develop a more effective, more
precise bargaining position than would be possible in the absence of this information
about the other’s preferences, while at the same time disclosing minimal (or misleading)
information about his own position.”
Research has largely explained the decision to tell the truth or use deception in
terms of pragmatism and self-interest, not as a question of ethics or morality.
Elangovan and Shapiro (1998) argue that should one’s opposition detect even a small
degree of dishonesty, the result could be detrimental to a principal’s long-term interests.
Counterparts who detect deception can act in an angry or retaliatory manner (Boles,
Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). Therefore, astute negotiation might warrant truth-telling
on account of the negative ramifications of getting caught in a lie.
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Negotiator Situation and Negotiator Characteristics
There have been two mature streams of research that predict the use of
deception in negotiation: negotiator situation and negotiator characteristics.
Negotiation researchers have traditionally distinguished between the way in
which individual differences and situational factors predict the use of deception. In this
first stream of research, the literature suggests that certain situations lead to the use of
deception. According to Olekalns et al. (2014), those who are high in power are more
likely to exploit their power by using deception, thus taking advantage of counterparts
who have lower power. In addition to power differentials, principal goals can also predict
deceptive behaviors. Schweitzer and Croson (1999) found that when principals have
goals that are both specific and unmet, they are less likely to be truthful and will use
deception to meet their goals. This occurs in such situations because negotiators feel
that without the use of deception they will fall short of their goals. The literature also
point to the importance of external forces. For example, outcome uncertainty and
negotiation with a group, as opposed to an individual, creates situations in which the
principal might feel that he or she is dealing with a more abstract entity, which can lead
to the use of deception. In contrast, when negotiating with an individual, the use of
deception decreases (Lewicki et al., 1997). Further, Tenbrunsel (1998) found that high
stakes can predict deception. In a controlled experiment, she found that people are
more likely to lie to win larger dollar values ($100) than smaller dollar values ($1).
Research has also shown that negotiator characteristics can help predict use of
deception in negotiation. Deception is used more frequently by those who, in general,
are low in trustworthiness (Olekalns et al., 2014). Likewise, this pattern applies to
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principals who are pro-self, rather than prosocial. Affective processes, such as anger
(Tenbrunsel, 1998) and envy (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008) help to predict deception. In
addition, one who expresses negative emotions during a dyadic negotiation can lead to
the use of deception (Olekalns & Smith, 2009). Finally, if a principal does not expect to
feel guilty about the use of deception, the chance of lying is increased (Ruedy et al.,
2013).

Characteristics of the Counterpart
To date, research has largely explained deception in terms of the negotiation
situation, and the individual characteristics of the negotiator. As discussed above,
negotiators are more likely to use deception when they feel that they have no other
option or if they perceive that the power differential is in their favor and they can take
advantage of the situation. In terms of individuals, research shows that certain personal
characteristics might lead one to use deception. However, little research has been
conducted in regards to the characteristics of the counterpart. For example, while
researchers have shown that deception can be triggered when a counterpart asks
indirect questions (for example, a potential buyer asks a used car salesman, “tell me
about the car?”), as opposed to direct questions (“Is there something wrong with the
transmission?”) (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999), such analysis still primarily investigates a
situational variable (indirect vs. direct questioning), but not a characteristic that is
intrinsic to the counterpart (i.e. counterpart affect or counterpart reputation).
As negotiation occurs between people, there is surprisingly little known about
how the characteristics of a negotiator’s counterpart might illicit deception. Specifically,
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research has ignored a potentially important variable, the reputation of one’s
counterpart. In my literature search, I could only find research that shows that a
principal is more likely to lie when the counterpart is wealthy (Gino & Pierce, 2009).
Yet there is reason to believe that counterpart reputation might have a significant
impact on negotiator behavior. The literature from the social sciences supports the idea
that reputations have a dramatic effect on how people perceive and ultimately act
toward those with a given reputation. Research suggests that positive reputations can
lead to higher levels of trust (Whitmeyer, 2002), and that higher trust can lead to better
integrative negotiation outcomes (Kong, Dirks & Ferrin, 2014; Kong, 2015). Individuals
use reputation as a cognitive shortcut to assess others and act on the basis of those
assessments. Thus, if I can show that counterpart reputation significantly contributes to
the use of deception, it will greatly enhance our understanding of this third pillar of the
literature. This will enable researchers to fill in an important void in the literature, and
practitioners will be in a better position to understand how their own reputation might
affect a counterpart’s decision to use deception and likewise how they might respond to
a counterpart’s reputation.

Theoretical Development
Use of Deception in Negotiation. The central quality that defines lying is the intent to
deceive. Absent deceptive intention, a lie is reduced to something that was stated
incorrectly, or might be considered a mistake. Bok suggests that lying occurs when “the
intention to mislead is obvious, where the liar knows what he is communicating is not
what he believes and where he has not deluded himself into believing his own deceits”
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(1978, p.16). Shapiro and Bies (1994) suggest that principals lie in order to tilt the
power differential in their favor. This occurs because information is at the center of
negotiation and information asymmetry can create an imbalance of power. Lewicki &
Hanke (2012) distinguish between six different types of potentially deceptive practices
within negotiation.


Competitive bargaining— not telling walkaway price, making an “inflated
opening offer.”



Emotional manipulation—pretending to be angry or disappointed.



Misrepresentation—giving false information.



Misrepresentation to peers—destroying a counterpart’s reputation.



Unethical information gathering—using bribes to get information.



Bluffing—making threats or promises on which an agent does not intend
to follow through.

For example, Lewicki and Litterer (1985) indicate that a common example of
deception in negotiation is of a representative who is prepared to pay union members
$15 an hour but explicitly states that all he can afford is $14. In this case, the
representative is deliberately misrepresenting information. In this study, I will only be
concerned with this type of deceit, misrepresentation of information. While the other
types of deceptive practices are interesting from a theoretical and practical standpoint, it
is important that I limit the scope of this inquiry. I chose to focus on misrepresentation
of information for several reasons. First, misrepresentation of information has been
shown to be the most common form of deception (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). In terms of

20
misrepresentation, previous research has differentiated between passive and active
forms of deception (Olekalns & Smith, 2007), otherwise known as sins of omission and
sins of commission. Active deception (sins of commission) occurs when a negotiator
gives false information; whereas passive deception occurs when a negotiator withholds
information that would be pertinent to disclose (sins of omission). Second, the literature
has shown that misrepresentation of information is an important variable in negotiation,
and has been linked to an increase in power (Shapiro & Bies, 1994), negotiation
outcomes (Aquino, 1998), and information imbalance (Bazerman et al., 2000). Because
misrepresentation of information has the most real-world use, and its centrality to the
conversation thus far in the literature, I am choosing to use it as my focus for this
exploration.
In a study of MBA students, Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue (2000) found that
participants consider it acceptable for principals to use tactics that are deemed “tough
but fair,” such as stating that they have a small budget, or exaggerating their best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). These “more acceptable” forms of
deception coincide with the above-mentioned concepts of competitive bargaining and
emotional manipulation. However, participants found it less acceptable to engage in
tactics that are considered outright lies, such as false promises and misrepresentation
of information. The authors suggest that the majority of negotiators do not expect their
counterparts to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but they do expect their
counterparts to refrain from misrepresentation, misrepresentation to peers, unethical
information gathering and bluffing.
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While deception occurs frequently in negotiation, there is still no consensus as
to whether it is acceptable. As discussed previously, Carr (1968) suggested that
deception within negotiation is similar to bluffing in poker—that it is an integral part of
the game and not a violation of it. In contrast, some scholars have stated that one
ought to refrain from lying in negotiation (Dees & Cramton, 1991). Still, many have
distinguished between which types of lies are acceptable and which should be avoided.
For example, Strudler (1995) concludes that misrepresentation about one’s bottom line
price is not problematic, but deception concerning material facts crosses the line.
However, while the acceptability of deception is debated, the fact that it is commonly
used is not. In fact, in a study on undergraduate students, O’Connor and Carnevale
(1997) suggest that deception occurred 28% of the time in dyadic negotiations.
Specifically, the authors noted that deception was most likely to occur when negotiators
had motives that were individualistic in nature.

Distributive and integrative outcomes.
We must take a moment to distinguish between distributive and integrative
outcomes for the purpose of this discussion. Distributive negotiations are the type in
which there is a “win-lose” paradigm, such that one party’s gain is at the behest of a
counterpart’s loss. These types of negotiations are often once-off in nature, such as a
buyer-seller negotiation over a used bicycle, in whichever extra dollar gained by the
seller is a dollar lost by the buyer. In contrast, an integrative negotiation is one in which
there are opportunities for “win-win” tradeoffs, such that both parties are better off. An
example of this might be an employer and job applicant in which the job applicant highly
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values time off and the employer highly values offering a lower salary. In this, the job
applicant can push for more time off and the employer might meet the needs of the
prospective employee by negotiating a lower salary. In the end, by finding a mutually
agreeable solution, both parties are better off. Integrative negotiations are more
common in business, especially in supply chain negotiations and job offer negotiations.
The negotiation literature has paid careful attention to both distributive (for specific
articles, see the meta-analysis, Huffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014)
as well as integrative negotiations (De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon, 2000). For the purpose
of this paper, I will be interested in both distributive and integrative negotiations.

Once-off negotiations. While it is common to have negotiations that occur once and
negotiations that occur multiple times, for the purpose of this essay I will be focusing on
once-off negotiations. As once-off negotiations tends to be the standard in the literature
(see Olekalns & Smith, 2009; Miles & LaSalle, 2008; Fulmer, Barry & Long, 2008), I
have decided to limit the scope of this essay to considering deception in once-off
negotiations.

Ethical standpoint. The discussion in this essay will take an ethically neutral point of
view, one that centers on negotiator strategy, not negotiator ethical choice. To better
understand this, we should think of Cramton and Dees’ (1993) concept of a fictional
world called Metopia. In this world, everything is the exact same as our world, except
people only operate in pure self-interest. In Metopia we can understand if someone will
or will not adopt a particular behavior based on the author’s definition of self interest:
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“an action is in a party’s self-interest if, given the party’s beliefs at the time of
decision, the action yields greater expected utility for the party than any other available
action.”

Does deception work? Schweitzer and Croson (1999) found that those who use sins
of omission in negotiation achieve greater distributive outcomes than those who refrain
from using deception. However, the authors suggest that those who use sins of
commission outperform both those who use sins of omission and those who act
honestly. This would suggest that the use of sins of commission would be the dominant
strategy in a single negotiation in which the parties will not enter into a recurring
negotiation relationship. On the whole, those who use deception have been shown to be
successful in negotiation, because their counterparts often do not find out that they have
been using deception (Lewicki & Hanke, 2012). Thus, people often use deception
because they correctly believe that it is more likely to generate what they want.
When caught, more skilled negotiators diffuse the potentially damaging situation
by using various verbal strategies to regain trust and prevent the negotiation from
failing. Lewicki and Hanke (2012) suggest that some deceivers will utilize verbal
strategies such as “It was an accident” or “I’m really sorry; I got carried away, and I will
never do this again.” If the deceiver convinces his counterpart to believe that such
apologies or explanations are genuine, then the damage to the deceiver might be
minimized. Interestingly, in multiple experiments, Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, (2004)
found that the dominant negotiation strategy for those caught in a lie was to accept
responsibility when there was irrefutable evidence that the negotiator had lied but deny
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responsibility if there was any evidence of innocence. Further, the authors suggest
that negotiators ought to apologize for mistakes involving competency but deny fault for
integrity violations. Thus, the authors suggest that repairing trust after being caught in
deception is a difficult task—the strategies that one should use depends on the nature
of the misdeed and the amount of evidence present that the deception took place.

Reputation
Much of the social science literature has conceived of reputation as occurring at the
group level, either between organizations or between nations. For example, a recent
meta-analysis looked at the broad reaching consequences of corporate reputation (Ali,
Lynch, Melewar, & Jin., 2015). However, I want to ensure that the focus of this
discussion is on reputation as it operates at the individual level. As mentioned earlier,
for the purpose of this theoretical exploration, reputation will be thought of as the
“combination of salient personal characteristics and accomplishments, demonstrated
behavior, and intended images presented over some period of time” (Ferris, et al., 2007,
p. 213).
In general, people do not begin negotiation in a blank slate scenario, in which
one person is agnostic about trust in another. Rather, most people begin relationships
with a high level of default trust (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996), which varies based
on how each party assesses their counterpart’s reputation. In addition, genetics
(Sturgis, Hatemi, Zhu, Trull, Wright, & Martin, 2010) and individual orientation (Bianchi &
Brockner, 2012) can impact an individual’s dispositional trust.
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Reputation is the combined perception of others in regard to an individual’s
characteristics, accomplishments and behavioral tendencies (Ferris et al., 2003) and
can be thought of as, according to Sabater and Sierra (2005), “the opinion or view of
someone about something.” These assumed characteristics, assigned by a
combination of groups and individuals, serve as a cognitive shortcut in assessing the
totality of another person (Origgi, 2012). Reputation can exist for individuals, teams,
groups or ethnicities (Nakai, 2014). Ultimately, an individual’s reputation can act as a
substitute for actually knowing and assessing a person. As it is not possible to
understand all the component parts of someone else’s character and how that character
leads to behavior, reputation allows others to reduce a complex character into a certain
set of generalized behaviors. The lasting effects of reputation have been well
documented in the literature. Examining reputation through the lens of confirmation
bias, a recent study of student evaluations of their professors found that professor
reputation before the course began significantly impacted student’s experience of the
course and evaluation of the professor (McNatt, 2010). Baumeister and Jones (1978)
suggest that reputation acts in a cyclical manner: consistent behavior leads to
reputation, and reputation acts to solidify consistent behavior. In the end, reputation
acts to reduce the uncertainty of other’s behavior (Spence, 1974). Interestingly, this ties
into Goffman’s concept of face theory (1967), in which he posits that reputation is
somewhat fluid, in that in some contexts an individual might be acting as a good friend,
while in another they might be playing the part of being an expert witness. It is not that
these are contradictory, but rather that they explain how the same person can act
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differently under different circumstances and how someone might ultimately attain a
different reputation among different groups.
In their examination of the reputation effect in negotiations, Tinsley, O’Connor,
and Sullivan (2002) found that those who maintain trustworthiness and reliability in a
negotiation will enjoy repeated interactions and maximized outcome potential.
Connected with agency theory, it has been suggested that having a positive reputation
leads others to trust the person more, and consequently, lower the amount of
monitoring that would otherwise take place (Whitmeyer, 2002), thus reducing the
transaction costs associated with business relationships. Also, by lowering costs and
increasing communication, a positive reputation can have a positive impact the
integrative outcomes of a negotiation (Tinsley et al., 2002). In the end, trust in one’s
negotiating counterpart can arise from the belief that the counterpart has acted honestly
in the past (Brockner & Siegel, 1996) and the belief that such past actions will predict
behavior in current negotiations.
In negotiations, both sides are aware that deception could be used by a
counterpart. Thus, the negotiator will look for insights or characteristics that might be
evidence that deception is more likely to be used. Reputation can act as a shortcut in
the assessment of potential deception.
How others respond to reputation. In social and business contexts, individuals use
the reputation of others in order to generalize expected behavior, and act on such
generalized assessments. Reputation acts as a time and attention-saving shortcut,
enabling individuals to avoid the limitless amount of information that is potentially
available about a given person’s character, which results in an efficient assessment of

27
character. For those who deviate from social norms, the result can be a negative
reputation (Castelfranchi, Conte & Paolucci, 1998). Origgi (2012) suggests that the
Internet has made reputational assessments even more quick and efficient. As
reputation is inherently connected to sharing of information about another person, the
advent of Google and similar outlets has seen exponential growth in the capacity for
sharing reputation-relevant information. However, while digital access has enabled
individuals to establish quickly the reputation of others, it has also created the possibility
that false information can lead quickly to undeserved reputations. There is also the
issue that seemingly minor or irrelevant connections, issues or events can end up on
the first page of a Google search. Nonetheless, search engines such as Google have
been shown to be essential in the estimation of trust in others (Josang, Ismail & Boyd,
2006).

Equity Theory
In organizational research, equity theory posits that rather than focusing on
specific outcomes that come about from the result of work or effort, people instead hone
in on balancing the ratio of inputs and outcomes so that they are fair in comparison to
other individuals (Adams, 1963). For example, one should feel that their inputs (i.e.
quality of work, effort, time spent, etc.) reflects the outcomes that they receive (i.e.
payment, office location, job title, etc.) These results are compared to comparison
others, including people who are deemed comparable (i.e. coworkers). When equity is
out of sync, those who are overpaid or overcompensated will respond by reducing their
output, but increasing the quality of their output, while those who are underpaid or
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undercompensated will look to balance their equity situation by increasing their output
but decreasing the quality of their output (Griffeth, Vecchio & Logan Jr., 1989). People
have an innate desire to limit psychological tension (Festinger, 1957). Because inequity
creates an internal feeling of tension, the act of restoring equity can lead to a decrease
in felt tension (Harder, 1991). When someone feels that they have been taken
advantage of or manipulated, one way that the individual can restore equity is by
harming the one who the individual believes is responsible for the inequity (O’Leary &
Dengerink, 1973).
Research suggests that one important predictor of who will try to change an
inequitable situation is the degree to which an individual believes that his or her actions
will actually bring about the desired change (Mowday, 1991). For example, if someone
believes that they do not have the power or the influence to change an inequity, they
are unlikely to take the risk to do so (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1986). For example, in a study
of almost 5000 employees across various sectors, researchers found that employees
who felt that the company had taken advantage of them were more likely to engage in
counterproductive work behavior, such as theft, as a means to reverse the feeling of
perceived injustice (Hollinger & Clark, 1983). Such behaviors tilt the perceived balance
of power back into the hands of the individual and might lead to a feeling of restored
equity. The idea of restoring equity through retaliatory measures is not a new idea. In
the law literature, Shafer (1960) suggests that the drive to curb inequity through
retaliatory measures has been around as early as Hammurabi’s code, which gave us
the phrase “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”
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In developing the idea of a mutual trust principle and addressing the violation
of trust, Dees and Cramton (1991) suggest that it might be justified to engage in what
would otherwise be considered unethical behavior if you believe your counterpart is
acting unethically. However, they suggest that one central goal in negotiation should be
the establishment of mutual trust, which can decrease the desire to use deception by
both parties. The authors acknowledge the limits of moral commitments, namely, that
they are dependent on a counterpart sharing such a commitment. Thus, when equity is
breached through deception, or the belief that one is being deceived, one would expect
that individuals would counter with deception. Dees and Crampton (1993) note that “a
sense of fair play can motivate individuals with strong ethical commitments to engage in
what they would otherwise consider unacceptable behavior” (p. 2).

Fairness heuristics. The process by which an individual assesses whether something
is fair or unfair has been explained as fairness heuristic theory (Van Den Bos, Lind &
Wilke, 2001). The theory stems from the proposition that trusting others or giving
authority over to others can result in opportunities for exploitation (Lind, Allen & Tyler,
1988). In response to this potential threat, people quickly and efficiently develop an
assessment of the fairness of the other party and act in alignment with this prognosis. If
the opposition appears to be acting in a manner that is exploitative in nature, the
principal is likely to disobey the wishes of the person in question or act in opposition to
him or her (Lind, Allen, & Tyler, 1988). Likewise, if a counterpart is acting in what
appears to be a legitimate or forthright manner, it is less likely that it will be interpreted
as exploitative, and the focal negotiator will be more likely to act cooperatively.
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According to Van Den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wike (1997), the development of
fairness assessment is information dependent, such that individuals will access only the
information that is available at the time that they go through the fairness assessment.
Thus, the fairness heuristic process can act as a cognitive shortcut to the fairness
assessment. Once fairness assessments have been established, they are used as a
heuristic, relied upon as a shortcut for the actor in question (Van den Bos et al., 1997).
As Rodell and Colquitt (2009) explain, the heuristic process acts as a “cognitive shortcut
used to help determine whether to cooperate” (p. 991) with someone who is or is not
acting in a perceived just manner. Such cognitive shortcuts allow an individual to
assess quickly fairness perceptions and establish fast responses to perceived
challenges (Lind, 2001). In fact, Loi, Yang & Diefendorff (2009) suggest that past
regular interactions provide cognitive shortcuts that allow individuals to engage in
behavioral responses that are not simply bound by affective states, such as emotions or
moods.
One of the most important elements that enables one to believe that outcomes
are fair is the ability to have a voice, or make an appeal, to an authority or to a
counterpart. When the information is taken into consideration and used to help change
or modify the process, the individual in the matter is more likely to interpret the overall
process as being fair (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993). However, in many
negotiation contexts, there is rarely such an opportunity. If the opposition is believed to
be dishonest, it is unlikely that the principal will be able to modify the process in
response to a belief that the other side is unscrupulous. Instead, one may merely back
out of the negotiation altogether. However, in many negotiations, the party might decide
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not to end the relationship. In some negotiations, backing out is not an option or it
might be believed that doing so would be a strategic blunder. If this is the case, then
the principal might decide to take dramatic action, which might include the use of
deception. In this sense, the effects of the negative reputation will be even more
enhanced on account of fairness heuristics and equity theory. Fairness heuristic theory
posits that people want to know if they can trust other people who might have power or
influence over them. To make such assessments, an individual will look at whatever
information one has at his or her disposal (Arnadottir, 2002). Taking the above
information into consideration, I believe that counterpart negative reputation will impact
the principal, such that the principal will believe that equity theory is out of balance and
will thus view the counterpart as being an unfair negotiator.

Proposition 1: Principals negotiating against counterparts with a negative
reputation are more likely to view their counterpart as an unfair negotiator than are
principals negotiating against counterparts with a neutral reputation.

Revenge and preemptive strikes. There are many reasons why an individual who
thinks that he or she will be lied to, might choose, in turn, to act in a deceptive manner.
As discussed above, a feeling of leveling the playing field, attributed to equity theory,
can help explain why one might use deception. One further explanation comes from the
law literature and political science. According to Cahn (1949), justice is “the active
process of remedying or preventing that which would arouse the sense of injustice” (p.
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13). According to Cahn, we would expect to see both resulting (revenge) and
anticipatory (preemption) actions against a potential deceiver.
The doctrine of preemption has largely been developed in the realm of
international relations. For example, in 2002, President George W. Bush focused on
the notion of preemption as a justification for war against Iraq, claiming through The
Bush Doctrine, that the potential threat posed by Iraq warranted a “compelling the case
for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves (White House Archives, 2002).”
Likewise, the phrase “preemptive war” was used in 1967 in the Six-Day War, in which
Israel attacked first against Egypt, sparking a conflict in which Israel doubled the size of
its territory.
Preemptive actions have not only occurred in the world of international affairs.
Such actions appear also to be relevant between individuals. In an interesting
economic investigation on preemptive strikes, Simunovic, Mifune and Yamagishi (2013)
set up a game-theory experiment in which two players have the opportunity to inflict
damage on one another, even though doing so would be a suboptimal strategy for both
themselves and their counterpart. However, by acting in a preemptive manner, the “first
mover” is able to block aggressive behaviors by his or her counterpart. Such behaviors
suggest that individuals, in fact, think of potential aggressors as legitimate threats,
which sometimes warrant preemptive action, or acting first in anticipation of aggressive
behaviors on the part of a counterpart. In competitive environments between
individuals, preemptive actions can occur, not just on the threat of attack in economic
affairs, but even when an individual feels that his or her honor might be under threat
(VanderMeer, 2014).
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A second explanation of deceptive action comes from a retaliatory perspective.
The extent to which someone believes that someone else is going to or has lied to the
principle agent, it is expected that the individual might want to retaliate and use
deception in response. It has been suggested that those who feel wronged or taken
advantage of in negotiation often feel manipulated or angry (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985).
When people believe that they have been wrongfully harmed, one of the ways that they
might react is by “getting even” through actions of revenge. In management contexts,
employees have sought revenge for perceived injustices, which can lead to a
restoration of self-esteem on the part of the aggrieved (Bies & Tripp, 1998). Revenge
behaviors have likewise been linked to a reversal in treatment to the aggrieved, such
that revenge can act as a means for restorative justice. Bies and Tripp (1997) suggest
that individuals often engage in acts of revenge anticipation of aggressive counterpart
behavior. In terms of this study, the most interesting form of revenge relates to revenge
enacted as a response to lies or deceit. Aquino, Tripp and Bies (2006) found that
individuals are more likely to seek revenge when they feel that rules are violated and
that the justice climate is unfair.

Prisoner’s Dilemma
As discussed previously, prior research, personal experience and intuition can
offer good reason why one might use deception in negotiation: it provides a potential
advantage for the one who uses it. This appears to be the case especially in once-off
negotiations, in which long-term trust or lengthy relationships are unlikely to occur. In
these cases, the potential negative reputational effects that can occur from the use of

34
deception are minimal. As noted by Goffman (1967), in this context one does not
need to be concerned with presenting a face consistent with previous reputation or
consistent with a desired future reputation.
The prisoner’s dilemma has been used extensively to model cooperative and
competitive behavior in economics (Raiffa, 1982; Rasmusen, 1990) and psychology
(Dawes, 1980). Examples of prisoner’s dilemma have been suggested to include
oligopoly pricing, auction bidding, political bargaining and arms races (Rasmusen,
1990). Moreover, Gibson (2003) argues that prisoner’s dilemma can happen any time
you have a social interaction between two or more decision makers, in which the
outcome depends on the choices of all the players, and every player has preferences
among the possible outcomes.
The two-party version is the most common version used. Each party has to
choose independently between two options: cooperation or defection. In all versions of
prisoner’s dilemma, the payoff of one party depends upon the choice made by the other
party. In most standard prisoner’s dilemma examples, no matter what one party does,
the other can always increase her or his payoff by defection, choosing the option that
betrays or harms the counterpart.
The basic scenario is as follows (Campbell, 1985): You and a fellow criminal are
arrested on robbery charges and are brought into questioning. You and your
accomplice are split up into different rooms and are investigated separately. The
investigator tells you, “there is enough evidence that even if you both remain silent,
each of you will still spend a year in jail. However, if you confess to the crime, and help
us convict your silent accomplice, we will let you go free. But if you stay silent and he
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confesses, then you will serve 10 years in jail and your accomplice will go free. If
both of you confess, then you will both spend 9 years in prison. So what will it be?”
The decision is summed up here:

Table 1: Prisoner’s dilemma decision nexus
Accomplice stays silent
You stay silent
You-1 year; Accomplice1 year
You confess
You- go free;
Accomplice-10 years

Accomplice confesses
You-10 years;
Accomplice-go free
You-9 years; Accomplice9 years

In this classic economic thought experiment, no matter what the opposing side
does, each of the accused is better off confessing to the crime. In the condition that the
accomplice stays silent, you are better off confessing and going free. Should the
accomplice confess, you are better off confessing and serving 9 years in jail, instead of
10 years in jail. Likewise, the accomplice faces the same pay-off schedule, so he or
she is also better off confessing under both conditions. The result is a suboptimal result
for both, with both of the accused ending up with 9 years in prison, instead of both
facing just 1 year in prison, should both parties stay silent.

Deception in negotiation and prisoner’s dilemma. While prisoner’s dilemma was
established in the field of economics, the question remains whether we could use
prisoner’s dilemma to better understand deception in a negotiation context. Could it be
that, from a purely pragmatic perspective, that once-off negotiation is the perfect context
for a prisoner’s dilemma? To explore this possibility, I will offer an example for guidance.
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For this example, we should assume that both negotiators are expert deceivers, who
are certain not to be detected by their counterpart.
Let us suppose that there is a principal negotiator and counterpart. The principal
has been granted a job offer by the counterpart, and the two must negotiate salary. The
principal does not have any other job offers, but believes that he might negotiate a
higher salary if he says that he is considering other alternatives. The counterpart does
not have any other qualified candidates to choose from, but believes that she might
negotiate a lower salary if she says that she is choosing among several applicants.
Both the principal and counterpart consider the fact that their opposition might tell the
truth and that they might lie.
Considering the options, the principal thinks to himself, “Imagine that my
counterpart tells the truth, I will be at a distinct advantage if I use deception. However,
should my counterpart lie, I should certainly use deception myself, lest I be taken
advantage of. By deceiving, I will level the playing field.” Similarly, the counterpart will
face the same trade-off considerations, and will likely choose to use deception in either
case.

Table 2: Prisoner’s dilemma as truth or lie
Counterpart tells the truth
P Truth
Neutral
P Lies

Principal- advantage;
Counterpartdisadvantage

Counterpart lies
Principal- disadvantage;
Counterpart-advantage
Neutral

As we can see, both the principal and the counterpart are at no point better off
telling the truth, thus using prisoner’s dilemma, we might expect both parties to use
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deception. Should either the principal or the counterpart decide not to use deception,
he or she will be at a distinct disadvantage and will reach further suboptimal results.

Ethical decision making against an unethical counterpart
The crux of the issue for one deciding to use deception in negotiation or to act in
an honest manner can be thought of as a two-layered process, in which the individual
first considers what the counterpart might do, then decides how to respond. We can
imagine in a typical negotiation context that P might consider what the payoff structure
would be under 1) the counterpart lying or 2) the counterpart telling the truth. The
principal might consider, “If I think that my counterpart might lie, then I ought to lie,” or “If
I think that my counterpart might lie, I ought to tell the truth.” Likewise, the principal
might have a similar thought about the condition in which his or her counterpart tells the
truth.
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The saturated decision tree would thus look as follows:

Figure 1: Saturated decision tree

Opponent
Behavior

Principal
Behavior
Honest

Honest

Lie

Honest
Lie
Lie

In this case we can imagine four different situations, in which the principal must
decide how he will respond if he thinks that the counterpart will be honest or if he
believes the counterpart will be truthful. However, the information and implications that
are associated with the negative reputation condition fundamentally changes the way in
which the principal is likely to approach the situation. How is the choice to use deception
different for someone who thinks the other will be lying (treatment) versus someone who
does not know one way or the other (control)? In traditional prisoner’s dilemma, both
individuals move at the same time, but their actions impact the result of their
counterpart. However, in this example, reputation effects alter the scenario, such that
the counterpart essentially moves first. In this, the principal, on the basis of a
counterpart’s reputation, is lead to believe that the counterpart will act in a certain
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manner. This prompts the negotiator’s response. Let us suppose that the principal
believes the counterpart will lie. The decision tree is thus changed as follows:

Figure 2: Decision tree when the principal believes the counterpart will lie

Opponent
Behavior

Principal
Behavior
Honest

Lie

Lie

In this case, the principal has good reason to believe that the counterpart will lie
to him, and thus the principal’s ethical decision making comes from a very different
perspective. Might we expect that the principal will think it is appropriate to use
deception once he or she believes that the counterpart will be using it as well? In
prisoner’s dilemma, I argued that when the principal believes that the counterpart will
act in an aggressive manner (by defecting), the principal is more likely to defect.
Likewise, in negotiation, we might expect that the principal will act deceptively if the
principal believes that the counterpart is going to act in an unethical manner. However,
the decision tree might be reversed should the counterpart have a positive reputation.
The following is the decision tree for the principal, with the counterpart in the positive
reputation condition:
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Figure 3: Decision tree when the principal believes the counterpart will tell the truth

Opponent
Behavior

Principal
Behavior
Honest

Honest

Lie

In the positive reputation condition, the principal is likely to believe that the
counterpart is going to act in an honest manner. Because of the fairness heuristic and
equity theory, the principal is more likely to act in an honest manner. However, some
will choose to defect to maximize their own benefit (Prisoner’s dilemma principle). This
is supported by Cox (1991) who found that individualist oriented people tend to act
opportunistically when they think the other party will cooperate in prisoner’s dilemma
games. Monteverde, Paschke, and Tedeschi (1974) claim people will punish others for
acting exploitatively. They found that individuals who claim, in a PD game, that they will
act cooperatively, who then act exploitatively, elicit revenge behavior from their
counterpart. Thus, an overarching fear in acting in a deceitful manner could be that
one’s opposition will act in a retaliatory manner.
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Taken together, previous theoretical development on equity theory, prisoner’s
dilemma and reputation imply:
Proposition 2: Principals who negotiate with a counterpart with a negative
reputation will be more likely to use deception than principals who negotiate with
counterparts with a neutral reputation.

Political science and prisoner’s dilemma. Much of the prisoner’s dilemma context
has been explored through the lens of political science and international relations. One
key theory has been developed, claiming that states have two preferences 1) to
maximize individual gains and 2) minimize gaps in gains favoring partners. Realist
theory states that states assess their own level of achievement in any domain of activity
by comparison to the performance of other states (Grieco, 1988). In such a competitive
environment, states don’t ask “will both of us gain” but “who will gain more?” (Waltz,
1979). For example, a nation might achieve preference 1 by growing its GDP by 4%
annually, but fail at achieving preference 2 if the nation’s competitor (e.g. United States
versus Russia) has GDP growth of 6%. This relativism streak is seen in corporate
competition as well, documented by the tendency of companies to look toward both the
bottom line and gaining market share (Porter, 1998).
Since there is no central authority to govern behavior in international relations, a
dynamic occurs in which individually rational behavior results in a collectively
suboptimal outcome (Busch & Reinhardt, 1993). For this reason, we often see
collective actions that are in neither party’s best interests such as arms races and
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escalation of conflict. If enforceable binding agreements are not possible, states will
not cooperate (Snidal, 1985).
This connects to individual action through ultimatum games, in which party one is
able to set the distribution of money at their own choosing (i.e. party one gets $9, party
two gets $1). However, in ultimatum games the second party is able to reject the entire
offering for both parties. Guth, Schmittberger & Schwartz (1982) found that individuals
usually reject anything less than 20% offered in an ultimatum game, even though pure
rationality would suggest that the second party should accept whatever offer party one
makes. We can see from international relations and the results from ultimatum games
that actors will often act in an irrational manner, being willing to sabotage one’s own
best interests to prove a point.

Other Effects
At this point, I will move the discussion from the main effects that stem from the
relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of deception to that of
moderating factors that impacts this relationship.
Machiavellianism. Certain individual characteristics are likely to impact whether an
individual decides to act in a deceptive manner. I use the definition, established by
Wilson (1996), of Machiavellianism (Mach) as a “strategy of social conduct that involves
manipulating others for personal gain” (p. 295). It has been shown that high Machs
(individuals higher in this characteristic) are more likely to engage in criminal activity
and are more likely to be con artists (Tang, Chen & Sutarso, 2008). This damaging
personality trait that promotes self-gain above all else has been tied to patterns of lying
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and of deviating from the truth. High Machs are also more likely to be convincing and
avoiding detection when engaging in deception (Geis & Moon, 1981). Some of the
tendencies toward manipulation and lying stem from a “mistrust in human nature, lack of
conventional morality, opportunism, and lack of affect in interpersonal relationships”
(Drory & Gluskinos, 1980).
In an experiment that allowed individuals in a negotiation context to act in a
manipulative way, Christie and Geis (1970) found that those who are high in
Machiavellianism were found to be more likely to make attempts at manipulation and
endure at manipulation for longer periods. The authors distinguished between three
different elements that are central to Machiavellianism: cynicism about human nature,
manipulativeness, and detachment from norms and values. With regard to negotiating,
the most significant elements of the scale are connected with manipulation, which is
captured by items such as “The best way to handle people is tell them what they want to
hear,” “Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so,”
and “Honesty is the best policy in all cases” (reverse coded). They also found that
Machs acted more opportunistically in negotiation, were more likely to achieve higher
distributive outcomes, and to “take initiative” to ensure that they benefited from the
negotiation. In the study the authors used a bargaining game in which two people out of
a group of three will get to share $20. The results showed that high Machs averaged
$11.14, medium Machs averaged $6.28, while low Machs averaged $2.58. The authors
suggested that the high Machs’ overall success in the game was due to the unrelenting
push to get the other players to make a deal. In a connected area, it is suggested that
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high Machs are significantly more likely to believe that cheating is an acceptable
means to achieve one’s goals (Bloodgood, Turnley & Mudrack, 2008).
Interestingly, the pattern of Machiavellian behavior begins at a young age. In a
study on 10-year-old children, Braginsky (1970) offered to pay participants $0.05 for
each bitter cookie they could get another child to eat. High Machs averaged 6.46
cookies while low Machs averaged 2.79. The strategies that the high Machs employed
were lying, bribery and coercion, something that low Machs avoided.
From this pattern of findings, it should follow that those high in Machiavellianism
are more likely to use deception in negotiation.
Proposition 3: Negotiators who are high in Machiavellianism are more likely to
use deception in negotiation than are those who are low in Machiavellianism.

Schwartz values. Schwartz set out to transform the conversation concerning crosscultural research from that of the group and group values to that of the individual. In
doing so he established that “values (a) are concepts or beliefs; (b) pertain to desirable
end states or behaviors; (c) transcend specific situations; (d) guide selection or
evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance”
(Schwartz, 1992, p. 4). These values, which act as guiding principles in individuals’
lives, exist on a “circular motivational continuum” (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz’s values
include Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism,
Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security. According to Schwartz and Bilsky
(1987), values emerge from three basic human needs, the needs of:
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– Individuals as biological organisms
– Coordinated social interaction
– Survival of groups

In delineating the tendencies of individuals to act in a self-enhancing or selftranscendent manner, Schwartz suggested that individuals fall on a continuum between
self-transcendence and self-enhancement (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). This
discrepancy represents an internal conflict in people between promoting one’s own
interests and the interests of others. According to Schwartz (1992, p.11) selftranscendence is a cluster value that combines the two values of benevolence,
“preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent
personal contact,” and universalism, “understanding, appreciation, tolerance and
protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.” This gives rise to individuals who
transcend self-enhancement and act to benefit other individuals and groups. In
contrast, self-enhancement is made up of the values achievement and power.
Individuals high in self-enhancement, value superiority, and esteem (Sawyerr, Strauss &
Yan, 2005) and act in a manner that serves their own self interest, even when doing so
comes at the expense of others. Those who are high in self-enhancement are more
likely to control and take power positions over others (Schwartz, 1992).
The distinction between self-transcendence and self-enhancement motivated
Roccas (2003) to test the relationship between these two value sets and how they
predict identification with group status. She found that those who are self-enhancement
oriented are more likely to identify with groups that are higher in status in comparison
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with those who are high in self-transcendence. In fact, Schwartz (2010) found that
those who are high in self-transcendence are more likely to engage in altruistic activities
such as working to save the environment and fight poverty.
It should be noted, that I exclude from this discussion Schwartz’s concept of
conservation, which encapsulates values that surround order, self-restriction and
preservation of the past, as well as openness to change, which covers values brought
about by independence of thought, action and readiness for change (Schwartz, 2012).
Schwartz’s orthogonal value system suggests that the difference between his concept
of conservation and openness to change centers on varying perspectives on whether
change is ideal or whether one ought to try and “maintain things as they are” (Lipponen,
Bardi & Haapamaki, 2008, p. 242).
Taken together, I suggest that those who are higher in self-transcendence are
more likely to care for their counterpart and are less likely to act in a deceptive manner.

Proposition 4a: Negotiators who are high in self-transcendence are less likely to
use deception in negotiation than are those who are low in self-transcendence.

Proposition 4b: Negotiators who are high in self-enhancement are more likely to
use deception in negotiation than are those who are low in self-enhancement.

Prosocial motivation
The organizational and psychology literature suggests that those with prosocial
motivation engage in helping behavior because it is enjoyable, as it “feels good” to “do
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good” (Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005; Grant, 2008; Williamson & Clark,
1989). Consequently, those with prosocial motivation enjoy spending time and energy
in the effort to help other people (Batson, 1987) and are more likely to work in
environments that have opportunities to help (Grant, 2008). Grant and Mayer (2009)
conducted two studies that supported their hypotheses that employees who are
prosocially motivated engage in organizational citizenship behaviors. They maintain
that there are three key reasons why prosocial motivation is connected with behaviors
that help others. First, they suggest that prosocial oriented individuals are more likely to
put their attention outward toward others, rather than inward toward themselves. For
this reason, they are more likely to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors.
Second, these motives explain why such individuals are largely concerned for other
people. Third, because they are concerned for others, those with prosocial motivations
are capable of choosing to help others even at the expense of themselves.
This concern for others extends to negotiation. Drawing on dual concern theory,
Pruitt (1998) suggests that prosocial negotiators are high in concern for others.
However, prosocial motivation is contrasted with a proself orientation, a motivation in
which concern for the other party is low. The primary distinction between these two
motivations is a matter of perspective. Those who are prosocially motivated, see
negotiation as a process that is based on trust and naturally leads to integrative
outcomes; whereas, proself individuals see negotiation as an exchange relationship,
which leads to a focus on distributive outcomes (McClintock, 1988).
Those who are proself in orientation tend to seek self-maximizing distributive
outcomes in negotiation (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). In fact, in
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order to gain an upper hand, those who are proself use more aggressive negotiation
strategies, such as accosting or threatening a counterpart (De Dreu, Weingart & Kwon,
2000). In contrast, the prosocially oriented act in a more cooperative manner, seek
integrative outcomes and are more likely to reach agreement with their counterparts
(McClintock, 1988; Harinck & De Dreu, 2011).
Proself negotiators have been found to be more likely to take part in behaviors
that are considered competitive (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006). Such
actions, in addition to the tendency to showing less concern for their counterparts,
suggests that negotiators might be more likely to use deception in order to add further to
their chances of maximizing their own outcomes. Camac (1992) suggested that proself
negotiators frequently seek methods to take advantage of the other negotiator.
Olekalns and Smith (2003) suggest that one way that a proself negotiator might attempt
to take advantage of others is by engaging in sins of omission, by keeping important
information from their counterpart.

Proposition 5: Negotiators who are high in prosocial motivation are less likely to
use deception in negotiation than are those who are low in prosocial motivation.

Negotiation self-efficacy
Bandura’s (1977, 1982) self-efficacy theory is a social-cognitive approach to
explaining behavior that specifically includes the concept of constraints. Bandura
suggests that self-efficacy predicts the level of motivation and effort that will be placed
toward overcoming challenges and adversity. Self-efficacy is an individual’s belief that
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he or she will be able to perform successfully the behavior required to produce
desired outcomes (Bandura, 1977). Therefore, the strength of an individuals’ efficacy
will influence whether he or she will attempt to cope with particular situations: “Efficacy
expectations are a major determinant of people’s choice of activities, how much effort
they will expend, and of how long they will sustain effort in dealing with stressful
situations” (Bandura, 1977, p. 194), and are theorized to influence motivation and affect,
and consequently behavior (Bandura, 1986). People who have high levels of efficacy
will persevere in their coping efforts despite constraints, whereas those who have
doubts about their capabilities may reduce their efforts or cease the behavior (Bandura,
1982).
Self-efficacy has been connected to performance both in and outside of the
realm of negotiation. For example, Eden and Kinnar (1991) suggest that employees
who can achieve gains in self-efficacy are likewise able to make improvements in their
job performance. Such confidence in one’s abilities is expected to have an impact that
applies to various situations (Bandura, 1982), including negotiation (O’Connor & Arnold,
2001). Higher belief in one’s abilities leads to increased distributive and integrative
outcomes (Miles & LaSalle, 2008). Self-efficacy shares many attributes with internal
locus of control, in that those who are high in internal locus of control believe that the
ability to impact one’s situation lies with internal, as opposed to external forces (Wilson,
2013: Sierra, 2014). In fact, in a study on cheating behavior, Srull and Karabenick
(1975) found that those who were high in internal locus of control were more likely to
cheat when they believed skill determined outcome, but that they did not have sufficient
skill to accomplish a task, and that externals cheated more when they believed that luck
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determined outcomes.
During negotiation, it is expected that there will be episodes of tension and
uncertainty, which could impact the use of deception. Thus, those who are stronger in
negotiation self-efficacy will have, as a whole, higher beliefs in their ability to succeed in
negotiation. From this discussion, I expect those high in negotiation self-efficacy will be
more likely to focus on their own abilities and draw on their negotiation skills, rather than
resort to deception.
Proposition 6: Negotiators who are high in negotiation self-efficacy are less likely
to use deception in negotiation than are those who are low in negotiation self-efficacy.

Thus far I have explored some of the key moderators that might have an impact
on the relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of deception.
Conceptually, I have argued that certain characteristics, namely values, prosocial
motivation, Machiavellianism and negotiation self-efficacy moderate the relationship
between counterpart reputation and the use of deception in negotiation. It is important,
at this point, that I turn the discussion to evaluating the relationship between the use of
deception and negotiation outcomes. In the following sections, I will argue that
deception will predict an increase in distributive outcomes, but a decrease in integrative
outcomes. In addition, I will look at the moderating effects of political skill and emotional
intelligence.

Deception and Outcomes
While the above discussion illustrates why an individual might act or not act in a
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deceptive way, it is essential to understand how such decisions might influence
negotiation outcomes. Opportunism is at the heart of the decision to use deception.
Lewicki and Stark (1996) suggest that in addition to opportunism, negotiators use
deception when they feel desperate. When negotiators use deception, they experience
an increase in perceived power over their counterparts (Shapiro & Bies, 1994),
suggesting that their counterparts, even if they do not detect the deception, might
nonetheless feel that they are at a disadvantage in terms of power. Deception in
negotiation, while ethically dubious, is one act, of many, that fall into the category of
acting in a competitive manner. In negotiation, participants commonly use other
competitive methods that are considered acceptable, such as putting in a low opening
offer, and being opaque about one’s bottom line (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). Those
who do so effectively are at a distinct advantage against their counterparts. Therefore,
both ethically sound and ethically dubious negotiation tactics would fit in with Kelley and
Thibaut’s (1969) suggestion that, at its heart, central to negotiation is the notion that it
takes place through information asymmetry. To the extent that one can gain a
competitive advantage, there should be increased distributive outcomes.
Those who use deception often attain greater outcomes for themselves. In an
experiment with MBA students looking at ethical organizational climate and the use of
deception in negotiation, Aquino (1998) found that those who used deception had
greater distributive outcomes than did those who did not use deception. Aquino tested
for sins of commission and sins of omission in a single-negotiated scenario based on
the price of aluminum hoods from a manufacturer. From an ethically agnostic
perspective, the author argues that, by strategically withholding information, negotiators
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end up having the upper-hand against a counterpart. Bacharach and Lawler (1988)
found that the use of deception leads to a significant power imbalance, which is further
supported by Bazerman et al. (2000), who concluded that negotiators who control
information are at an advantage against those who do not. This is supported by Kelly
and Thibaut (1969), who suggest that a significant aspect of negotiation success boils
down to a principal’s ability to know the true intentions and preferences of his or her
counterpart while concealing his or her own objectives.
While it is expected that negotiation outcomes will be greater for those who use
deception, I suggest that there will be stark differences between distributive and
integrative outcomes. As deception might increase distributive outcomes for an
individual, it has been shown to erode trust (Olekalns, Kulik & Chew, 2014), which is
connected positively to integrative outcomes (Kong, Dirks & Ferrin, 2014; Kong, 2015).
However, the use of deception has been suggested to increase one’s share of joint
outcomes, but at the expense of one’s counterpart (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997)
Thus, the use of deception could lead to a decrease in integrative outcomes, such that
negotiation results have a decreased chance of reaching Pareto optimality.
For this discussion, I would like us to consider the difference between distributive
and integrative negotiation outcomes. In an integrative negotiation, there are
opportunities for join-gains or “win-win” solutions. For example, if two nations are
engaging in a negotiation centered on a trade agreement, for one nation the vital
interest might be reduction of carbon emissions while the other nation values a
reduction in international trade tariffs. Through questions and perspective taking, the
two nations might naturally discover trade-offs in which both are able to achieve the
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specific objectives that they have set out. In contrast, in a distributive negotiation, the
stakes are zero-sum or “win-lose,” such that there are no opportunities for joint gains.
An example of this would be a negotiation between two neighbors over a property line.
Each inch that is given up by one neighbor is an inch that is gained by the other.

Proposition 7a: Negotiator use of deception is positively related to distributive
outcomes.
Proposition 7b: Negotiator use of deception is negatively related to integrative
outcomes.

Now that I have explored the direct effects that negotiator deception might have
on negotiation outcomes, I will now turn my attention to the relevant moderators of this
relationship.

Political skill
There has been significant research into the relevance and impact of political skill
in organizational contexts. Political skill is considered “the ability to effectively
understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in
ways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizational objectives” (Ferris, Blass,
Douglas, Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2005, p. 127). Those with high political skill are able
to use their innate understanding of human beings to enhance their own objectives, as
well as that of an organization (Ferris et al., 2005). Political skill has connections to
relevant aspects of negotiation. With ambiguity and scenarios of low procedural justice,
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political skill becomes even more important in relation to performance (Andrews,
Kacmar & Harris, 2009). Those who have strong political skills have strong awareness
of the needs, wants, and desires of others, and are able to use this knowledge to
influence others. They are able to use power and influence to encourage others to be
on their side (Ferris, Treadway, Perrewe, Brouer, Douglas & Lux, 2007). Further, when
influencing others, they are often able to come across as genuine and honest (Ferris,
Davidson, & Perrewe, 2005).
Further attesting to the idea that those who are high in political skill are able to
hide their intentions, Harris and Harris (2007) showed that high politically skilled
individuals were better able to engage in impression management. The use of
impression management is at its core similar to deception in that it involves
concealment of what is authentic (Barocas & Christensen, 1968; Roulin, Bangerter &
Levashina, 2014). Because those with political skill are better able to frame and
manage high-stress relationships (Perrewe, Zellars, Ferris, Rossi, & Kacmar, 2004), it is
expected that those who do engage in deception in negotiation will be less likely to be
detected. For example, those with high political skill taking part in ingratiation are more
likely to be viewed as likable and less likely to be viewed as manipulative (Treadway.
Ferris, Duke, Adams, & Thatcher, 2007). Such detection avoidance will make it more
likely that politically skilled individuals will better achieve their own self-enhancement
ends in a negotiation context.
Proposition 8: Negotiators who are higher in political skill will execute deception
more effectively than those lower in political skill.
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Emotional intelligence. While political skills address the general ability to use
influence on others, emotional intelligence is “the ability to carry out accurate reasoning
about emotions and the ability to use emotions and emotional knowledge to enhance
thought” (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008, p. 21). Emotional intelligence can be
thought of as containing four components (Wong & Law, 2002):


Self-emotional appraisal: the ability to understand one’s own emotions and
express such emotions.



Others’ emotional appraisal: the capacity to understand the emotions of
others.



Regulation of emotion: the ability to control one’s emotions.



Use of emotion: the capacity to use one’s emotions to increase one’s
performance or outcomes.

Emotional intelligence is an ability, much in the same way that one has the ability
to read or to analyze data through regression. Because of this, researchers have
suggested that emotional intelligence can be measured through problems (Mayer,
DiPaolo, Salovey, 1990). In a survey, emotional intelligence can be measured most
accurately by asking participants to solve emotional problems as presented in a story.
Emotional intelligence can also be tested through self-report survey responses (Mayer,
Salovey, & Caruso, 2002).
Each of the above four elements contribute to emotional intelligence, which has
been shown to contribute to task performance (Cote ́ & Miners, 2006; O’Boyle et al.,
2011) as well as general outcomes in negotiation. Fulmer (2004) suggests that
emotional intelligence leads to greater negotiation outcomes, because emotional
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intelligence is linked to “information acquisition, decision making, and tactical
choices.” Those who are able to recognize and strategically respond to the emotions of
others, as well as control their own emotions in such a way that acts as an advantage to
the negotiator, should be able to perform better in negotiation contexts. By tapping into
and understand other people, or in this case the needs, wants, and desires of a
counterpart, an individual with high emotional intelligence ought to be in a better
position to use deception effectively to navigate the negotiation process. Part of this
connects to the idea put forth by Wagner and Sternberg (1985), who suggested that by
intuitively making sense of others, those who are high in emotional intelligence are
better able to connect with others and understanding their drives and motivation. In
addition to understanding the motivations of others, those high in emotional intelligence
are likely to be high in problem solving skills (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Thus, for those
who decide to use deception in a negotiation scenario, it could logically follow that a
general response might be lower levels of detection for those whose high emotional
intelligence includes better problem solving skills. This might enable such negotiators to
read their counterpart and use problem solving skills to avoid detection in deception.
This scenario stands in contrast to the negotiator using deception who is low in
emotional intelligence.

Because this individual does not have the ability to read others

emotions and regulate his or her own emotions, the result is more likely to be that the
deception is detected. In turn, this will negatively impact negotiation outcomes. Jordan,
Ashkanasy and Hartel (2002) suggest that low emotional intelligence leads to higher
levels of negative emotions. We might expect that due to the expression of negative
emotions, those with low emotional intelligence might be more likely to be detected
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when attempting to use deception in negotiation.
Thus, I expect that those who are high in emotional intelligence are better able to
understand the emotions of others and are, consequently, less likely to be caught or
suspected when using deception. Such success in deception should lead to positive
negotiation outcomes.

Proposition 9: Negotiators who are high in emotional intelligence are more likely
to obtain greater distributive outcomes.

Discussion
Research has long established that deception is common in negotiation, as
deception is a phenomenon that occurs because of one party’s desire to hide
preferences and objective from a counterpart (Kelley & Thibaut, 1969). Research
shows that those who are too open or too forthcoming in a negotiation are at a distinct
disadvantage and might be more likely to be exploited (Paese, Schreiber & Taylor,
2003). To date, the social sciences literature has largely explained the use of deception
in terms of a) understanding the dynamic of the negotiation and b) exploring the
characteristics of the negotiator. For example, in the first case, the research literature
has shown that when there is a high power differential, the one that has more power is
more likely to use deception (Olekalns et al., 2014). In addition, when a negotiator’s
goals are specific and unmet, he or she is more likely to use deception (Schweitzer et
al., 1999). In the second arena, research has analyzed negotiator characteristics to
explain deception. For example, those low in trustworthiness (Olekalns & Smith, 2009)
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and those who are high in anger propensity (Tenbrunsel, 1998) are more likely to use
deception.
The area of counterpart characteristics has been largely ignored by the literature.
To address this, in this theoretical exploration, I outline the arguments as to why it is
important for researchers to look at the role of the counterpart, specifically counterpart
reputation. The social science literature is replete with theory suggesting the integral
effects of reputation. While individuals tend to begin relationships, in general, with a
high default level of trust (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996), a reputation, either
positive or negative, can act to circumvent a disposition to trust, and lead an individual
to use such a reputation as a shortcut to evaluate the risk and likelihood that another
person will act in accordance with or violate the trust of another. Thus, a reputation
leads to the reduction in uncertainty regarding the behavior of another person (Spence,
1974).
I suggest that I can use the effects of reputation to predict how a negotiator might
respond to a counterpart with a negative reputation. To do so, I looked at the logical
structure provided by equity theory to argue that, through the lens of fairness heuristics,
a negotiator might be led to believe that because the counterpart is more likely to use
deception, the only logical way to level the playing field will be to use deception in
return. I suggest that this is more likely to occur because, when equity is viewed as
being absent, individuals are more likely to feel that outcomes are not predictable
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Further, I lay out how the relationship between counterpart
reputation and the use of deception might be moderated by values, prosocial
motivation, Machiavellianism, and self-efficacy. Finally, I argue that emotional
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intelligence and political skill are likely to moderate the relationship between the use
of deception and negotiation outcome.
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Chapter 3: Essay 2

COUNTERPART REPUTATION PREDICTS PRINCIPAL USE OF DECEPTION
THROUGH THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF PRINCIPAL BELIEF THAT THE
COUNTERPART IS UNFAIR

ABSTRACT

In this empirical piece, I use equity theory to suggest that the belief that a
counterpart is unfair will explain why a negotiator uses deception. Thus, I argue that a
counterpart’s reputation predicts a negotiator’s use of deception, but that this process is
mediated by the belief that a counterpart is unfair. In this essay, I also explain that
prosocial motivation, negotiation self-efficacy, Machiavellianism, and Schwartz values
will moderate the mediated effects. I use two different studies to test these
relationships. The first is a scenario-based online game, in which participants negotiate
in an international relations scenario. In the second study, participants negotiate in a
one-on-one buyer/ supplier deal. While the results do not support the main hypothesis
that negative counterpart reputation leads to an increase in negotiator use of deception,
the data does support moderation effects of distributive negotiation self-efficacy and
self-transcendence.
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Introduction
That negotiators use deception can be dated back at least to a narrative from the
Old Testament, in which Lavan fools Jacob, his stepson, into believing that if Jacob
works six-years for his stepfather, he will be rewarded by being able to marry Lavan’s
youngest daughter, Rachel. Jacob fulfills his end of the bargain; yet when it comes to
Lavan’s turn to marry off his daughter it becomes clear that he had presented
misinformation from the start. Negotiation scholars have long recognized the use of
deception in negotiation. At its core, deception occurs because the ends of one party
are often at odds with the goals of the counterpart, and because each party’s ends and
desires are dependent on one another, deception emerges as a common tactic. While
deception can be detrimental to the Pareto optimality of a negotiation, an aspect of the
challenge is that it can be difficult to detect. Lax and Sebenius (1985) claim that part of
this difficulty is connected to what they term a “Negotiator’s Dilemma,” such that each
member of the dyad is not clear if the counterpart is engaging in cooperative or
competitive behaviors. Nonetheless, the extent to which one party is able to hide his or
her intentions, bottom line objectives and reserve price, while at the same time come to
unveil such information about a counterpart, the negotiator is at a competitive
advantage in the negotiation process (Kelly & Thubaut, 1969). Likewise, a negotiator
who discloses too much about his or her preferences or bottom line price, is likely to be
at a disadvantage.
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The prevalence of deception has caught the attention of researchers and
practitioners alike. In a controversial, yet highly influential article that appeared in The
Harvard Business Review, Carr (1968) wrote that “most bluffing in business might be
regarded simply as game strategy—much like bluffing in poker, which does not reflect
on the morality of the bluffer” (p. 143). In fact, in a recent study, Jeppeson and Lakhani
(2010) found that over 48% of lawyers surveyed in her study agreed with the statement,
“Deception is a normal part of the negotiation process” (p. 10). When negotiation is
most important—when there are high stakes—the odds that deception will be used
increases. Aquino and Becker (2005) found that when incentives are high, over 55% of
negotiators use active forms of deception. The high prevalence of deception partially
explains the broad interest that researchers across disciplines have had in exploring
deception in negotiation.
Thus far, a rich literature has formed in the assessment of deception. The first
line of research has claimed that the key to understanding who does and who does not
use deception is to understand the characteristics of the individual. These theorists
point to factors such as low trustworthiness (Olekalns, Horan & Smith, 2014) to suggest
that when an individual has an innate distrust of others he or she is less likely to act in a
truthful manner in negotiation. Aggressive personality traits, such as those high in
base-level anger (Tenbrunsel, 1998) and high envy (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008) have
likewise been linked to unethical practices in negotiation.
Moving beyond a trait based analysis of deception, research has suggested that
situational cues are drivers of negotiator deception. For example, in a study on power
imbalance, Olekalns, Horan, and Smith (2014) found that, in negotiations with high
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power imbalance, the more powerful party is more likely to use deception than in
situations in which the power dynamic is more balanced. Likewise, when the stakes are
high (Tenbunsel, 1998) or when negotiator goals are specific and unmet, lying in
negotiation becomes increasingly more likely. Thus, the dynamic of the situation can
help determine the likelihood of this phenomenon.
Nonetheless, there is a third, largely unexplored dynamic, one that has drawn but
little attention from researchers: the reputation of the counterpart. Because negotiation,
by definition, takes place between two different individuals or entities, it might be
worthwhile to explore the way in which the reputation of one’s counterpart might impact
negotiation behavior. Reputation can be thought of as the “combination of salient
personal characteristics and accomplishments, demonstrated behavior, and intended
images presented over some period of time” (Ferris, et al., 2007, p. 213). Reputations
can act as a cognitive shortcut for others, so that the potential behaviors that an
individual might engage in are reduced in the mind of the assessor (Spence, 1974).
Thus, Spence argues, reputation acts as a signaling mechanism that reduces
behavioral uncertainty. For example, let us suppose that a colleague, John, has a
reputation as a gossip. Since it is unlikely that any individual knows the history or
John’s life, his complete characteristics, including genetic and personality tendencies,
the fact that he has a reputation as a gossip will act as a cognitive shortcut for his
colleagues, and his colleagues are likely to behave in such a way that reflects
assumptions based on this reputation. It is not surprising that a positive reputation can
lead to being liked by others (Johnson, Erez, Kiker, & Motowidlo, 2002) and perceptual
thoughts that the person in question is a skilled individual (Gioia & Sims, 1983). In the
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end, those who have positive reputations receive positive reinforcements to continue
to support the behaviors that led to the positive reputation. In contrast, negative
reputations come with a broad array of negative reinforcements from others (Ferris et
al., 2007).
As reputation is central in the social science literature in explaining behavioral
responses of others (Spence, 1974; Ferris et al., 2007), this empirical paper attempts to
draw an important connection between the reputation of a negotiation counterpart and
the decision to use deception by the negotiator. If the hypotheses are supported, this
paper will fill in an important gap in the literature, showing that there is an unexplored
third pillar that explains deception in negotiation. It will help support that claim by
Tinsley, O’Connor, and Sullivan (2002) that very little is understood about the effects
that reputations have on negotiations. For practitioners, the findings in this study will
hopefully enable them to have a better strategic understanding of how their own
reputation might impact the use of deception by a counterpart, as well as a
developmental and introspective understanding of their own actions might be impacted
by an opponent’s reputation. Also, this paper explores important moderating variables
such as value, prosocial motivation, Machiavellianism and negotiation self-efficacy. I
will suggest in this paper that while there is a strong connection between counterpart
reputation and negotiator use of deception, these relationships are strengthened or
weakened depending on the moderating variables.
For this essay, I use equity theory to show why a principal is likely to use
reputation in order to decided whether to act in a deceptive manner. I suggest that
when a counterpart has a reputation for behavior that is considered unethical, the
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principal might be more likely to use deception. I also suggest that the process of
assessing a counterpart as unfair partially mediates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and the use of deception. In addition, I draw on prisoner’s
dilemma as a way to further explain the use of deception. Please see Figure 4 below,
which is the visual model of this paper.

Figure 4: Hypothesized model
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Theory
Progressing from situational variables to counterpart reputation
In this research, the goal is to move beyond the literature, which has, to date,
relied heavily on negotiator characteristics and situational analysis to explain deception.
As an example of a typical study in the extant literature, in an experiment in which the
researchers manipulated states, such that in certain conditions the participants were
negotiating over low stakes ($1) and in other situations the negotiators were dealing
with higher stakes ($100), the authors found that the size of payout had a dramatic
impact on the use of deception (Tenbrunsel, 1998). The authors suggest that research
ought to look into high stakes negotiations to fully understand the phenomena. Other
situational variables, such as outcome uncertainty, have been connected with the use of
deception (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). These studies show that there are common
situations that tend to elicit unethical behavior. Little has been researched concerning
the behavior or characteristics of a counterpart, and how such variables might impact
deception. However, there has been evidence that, when a counterpart is wealthy, the
negotiator is more likely to use deception (Gino & Pierce, 2010). The influence of
counterpart characteristics, especially reputation, ought to extend beyond that
suggested by Gino and Pierce. In addition to some of the evidence discussed earlier in
the paper, reputation has been shown to lead to higher levels of trust between parties
(Whitmeyer, 2002). This is significant as trust has been shown to help facilitate mutual
benefits for both negotiation parties through higher integrative outcomes (Kong, 2015).
Likewise, positive reputation can lead to higher levels of liking (Kim, 1996).
One ought to think of reputation as a manner in which other people consider an
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individual’s behavioral tendencies and characteristics (Ferris, Blass, Douglas,
Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2003). Another way to put it, is that reputation is “the opinion
or view of someone about something” (Sabater & Sierra, 2005). Across research fields,
it has been common to think of reputation as a group-level phenomena, as something
that takes place between organizations or between nations. One focus in strategic
management research has been the effects of corporate reputation (Ali, Lynch, Melewar
& Jin, 2015). In contrast, this discussion of reputation takes place on the individual
level.
In most business contexts, negotiators know one another before the negotiation
takes place. There tends not to be a blank slate situation. In fact, research has shown
that the majority of negotiations take place between people with high default levels of
trust (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996), which might change based on reputation
effects. Dispositional trust can also be impacted by one’s trust orientation (Bianchi &
Brockner, 2012). A more nuanced view of reputation has been suggested by Origgi
(2012), who posited that reputation acts as a cognitive shortcut for individuals in which
to assume that there are enduring characteristics about the person for whom there is a
reputation. In some ways, a reputation can act as a shortcut for knowing someone on a
deeper level. Since one cannot know the complexities that make up the behavior of
other human beings, reputation acts to provide guidance as to what would otherwise be
completely uncertain behavior.

Intent and justice
In order for an action to be considered deceptive, it must be intentional. When
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someone accidentally or unknowingly uses incorrect information, it is a matter of
competence or understanding, not an issue of deception. Bok (1978) goes so far as to
claim that the intent must be obvious, in that the deceiver is well-aware that they are
working with misinformation. While there are many different types of unethical behavior
that can come about in negotiation, such as threats or using bribes (Lewicki & Hanke,
2012), the literature has largely focused on the use of misinformation to gain an upper
hand. For this paper, I have chosen to focus on misrepresentation of information for
several reasons. First, misrepresentation of information has been shown to be the most
common form of deception (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). Prior research has drawn a
distinction between the active and passive forms of deception, also known as sins of
commission and sins of omission, respectively (Olekalns & Smith, 2007). A sin of
commission could be said to occur when someone provides information that is blatantly
false, which they know not to be true. In contrast a sin of omission occurs when
someone fails to disclose information that would be important for the other person to
know. For example, if someone knowingly sold a car with a defective engine and did
not mention the engine issue in the sale, this would be considered a sin of omission.
This is considered material information that the buyer would want to know. In contrast,
sin of commission is typified by a direct misrepresentation of the facts. In our car
example, this would occur if the buyer asks the seller about the condition of the engine
and the seller tells the buyer that it is in very good condition.
One of the most important theories that helps explain individual concern for
fairness, resides in the justice literature, which suggests that people fundamentally
value justice over injustice and that injustice causes a general feeling of dissatisfaction
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(Aquino, Griffeth, Allen & Hom, 1997). The focus on justice stems from early
suppositions of equity theory, originally put forth by Adams (1963) who suggested that
employees look not only at outcomes, but more importantly, at the ratio of inputs to
outcomes. Specifically, Adams’ suggests that employees do so as a reference process
to their colleagues or others who are comparable. At its core, justice in organizational
settings “refers to perceptions of fairness in decision-making and resource allocation
environments” (Colquitt & Rodell, 2011, p1183). Over time, justice allows society and
the individuals in it to operate with a sense of equilibrium and that in the long run, justice
enables human beings to progress in a sustainable manner (Rawls, 1971).
When someone feels that the inequity is due to being taken advantage of or by
being manipulated, one way to restore equity is by getting even or by harming the one
who is perceived as responsible for the inequity (O’Leary & Dengerink, 1973). One
central element in understanding attempts to change inequity is that only those who
think that outcomes are changeable will take action to remedy an inequity (Greenberg,
1990; Mowday, 1991). Responses to inequity can sometimes be drastic. For example,
Cook and Hegtvedt (1986) found that inequity can lead to counterproductive work
behaviors, such as theft, as a means to reverse the state of affairs. Connected to
negotiations, Tripp, Sondak, and Bies (1995) argued that fairness considerations are
essential elements of the negotiation process. Without feelings of fairness, principals act
out in ways that are detrimental to both parties. Principals view an unethical counterpart
as less trustworthy (Boles, Croson & Murnighan, 2000). This results in varying affective
responses at the end of a negotiation, and is supported by the finding that principals are
more satisfied with outcomes if they feel they have been treated fairly than if they feel
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they have been treated unfairly (Schroth, 2008). Thus, when principals feel that a
negotiation has been conducted in an ethical manner, they will feel better about the
negotiation.
Van den Bos, Lind, and Wilke. (2001) discuss the importance of fairness
heuristics, which is the way that people decide whether something is fair or unfair. Their
analysis comes from the prospect that there is a strong link between trust and the
opportunity for exploitation (Lind, Allen & Tyler, 1988). Because of the possibility of
exploitation, individuals quickly assess the likelihood that a counterpart will act in an
exploitative manner. If an agent determines that his or her counterpart is likely to act
exploitatively, then the agent is likely to act in an oppositional manner (Lind, Kulik,
Ambrose & de Vera Park, 1993). In contrast, if someone acts in a way that appears to
be upfront then their counterpart might be unlikely to view it as a threat and will, in turn,
act an a manner that is agreeable.

Hypothesis 1a: When principals negotiate with counterparts with negative
reputations, they are more likely to view the counterpart as an unfair negotiator.

Hypothesis 1b: When principals negotiate with counterparts with negative
reputations, they are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission.

Hypothesis 1c: When principals negotiate with counterparts with negative
reputations, they are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of commission.
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Consequences of Reputation
The social science literature has pointed to broad reaching effects of reputation.
Drawing on face theory, Goffman (1967) suggested that reputations can vary across
individuals in different social dynamics, such that the same person might have a
different reputation among different groups. For example, an investment banker might
have a very professional reputation at work but quite a different reputation among
cycling friends on the weekend. Goffman’s study exhibits some of the negative
consequences of reputation, as such cognitive shortcuts, which can mislead or even
create an overly reductionist point of view about a given individual. History is replete
with examples of the negative consequences of gross generalizations of both
individuals and groups.
Reputation effects can extend over long periods of time. For example, in a study
by McNatt (2010), the author found that professor reputation predating the start of a
course significantly impacts student experience and course evaluations several months
later at the end of a course. Baumeister and Jones (1978) suggested that reputation
takes its form in a cyclical pattern, such that behavioral pattern cause others to assess
reputational elements, and these reputation effects lead to consistent behavior. In sum,
the authors suggest that an established reputation leads to behavior that furthers that
reputation, because individuals tend to behave in ways that are in line with the
expectations that are a part of their reputation.
Turning to negotiation, there are positive consequences to developing a positive
reputation. For example, those with positive reputations are morel likely to have
repeated negotiations with their counterparts due to increased feelings of
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trustworthiness and reliability (Tinsley, O’Connor & Sullivan, 2002). Drawing on
transaction cost analysis, Whitmeyer (2002) suggests that the key long term effect of
reputation is that it leads others to avoid the expensive costs associated with
monitoring, such that integrative outcomes can be increased because of the joint gain
that can be claimed by the cost savings. Negotiators are likely to infer from a
counterpart’s reputation that their past honest behavior is indicative of future honest
behavior (Brockner & Siegel, 1996).

Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner’s dilemma experiments have been adopted in many different forms in a
variety of fields to test topics as diverse as action bidding, political bargaining, nuclear
war negotiations and oligopoly pricing (Rasmusen, 1990). The key attributes of
prisoner’s dilemma can occur when outcomes of two entities or individuals depends on
the mutual choices of both parties and when each participant has preferences among
the outcomes (Gibson, 2003).
The most common form of prisoner’s dilemma scenarios are the two-party type,
in which each participant must make decisions to either defect or cooperate. In all
versions of the prisoner’s dilemma the results or outcomes of one party is dependent on
the actions of the others. The most common forms of prisoner’s dilemma are structured
such that both parties are incentivized and better off by acting in a manner that is
disloyal to the other party.
The basic scenario (Campbell, 1985) supposes that there are two criminals who
are arrested and are taken to the police station for questioning. The two criminals are
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divided into two different rooms so that they can be investigated independent of one
another. The investigator tells the first suspect, “there is enough evidence that even if
you both remain silent, each of you will still spend a year in jail. However, if you confess
to the crime, and help us convict your silent accomplice, we will let you go free. But if
you stay silent and he confesses, then you will serve 10 years in jail and your
accomplice will go free. If both of you confess, then you will both spend 9 years in
prison.”
The whole scenario can be thought of in the following table:

Table 3: Prisoner’s dilemma outcomes

Accomplice 2 stays silent
Accomplice 2 confesses

Accomplice 1 stays silent
Accomplice 2-1 year;
Accomplice 1-1 year
Accomplice 2- go free;
Accomplice 1-10 years

Accomplice 1 confesses
Accomplice 2-10 years;
Accomplice 1-go free
Accomplice 2- 9 years;
Accomplice 1- 9 years

This thought experiment, which has become a classic in the field of economics,
suggest that in every condition, independent of the action of a counterpart, it is in each
participant’s best interest to confess to the crime and betray their fellow accomplice.
Should the accomplice stay silent, the criminal is better off confessing and leaving
without serving any jail time. Let us suppose that the accomplice confesses. In this
case it is still better to confess, because it is better to serve 9 years in jail than it is to
serve 10. Thus, the end result is that both parties are incentivized to confess, bringing
about the worst collective outcome, namely, both serving 9 years in jail.
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Deception and prisoner’s dilemma. We are left with the undertaking to understand
how prisoner’s dilemma might shed light on the broader issue of deception in
negotiation. While prisoner’s dilemma lies in the realm of economics, it could be that
distributive negotiations could be an interesting context to apply this game-theory
paradigm. In order to better understand this let us suppose that there is a negotiation
between two people selling a cell phone. They will meet once in person to exchange
money for the phone. Let us suppose that the buyer does not have any other sellers
from whom to buy the phone and let us suppose that the seller does not have any other
buyers from whom to sell the phone. Both the buyer and seller believe that if they were
to talk about alternative options that they could gain a more favorable situation for
themselves.
Thus, the seller might think, “If the buyer decides to tell the truth, I will be at a
great advantage over the buyer. Should the buyer lie, then I need to lie. I don’t want to
be made a fool.” Likewise, the buyer might face similar trade-offs, thus we can see how
both parties might be inclined to use deception. In this case, both parties are better off
using deception.

Measuring outcomes. It is important for the purpose of this discussion to discuss the
difference between distributive and integrative outcomes in negotiation and how each
might be relevant to the interplay of deception in negotiation. Distributive outcomes are
the type of negotiation outcomes with which most people are familiar. These are
considered “fixed pie,” in that $1 made by the negotiator is $1 lost by the counterpart.
One example if a distributive negotiation would be someone buying an art piece at a
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market. The two parties go back and forth and settle on a price. In contrast,
integrative outcomes are joint outcomes; these take place typically when there are
multiple pieces to a negotiation. A classic example, suggested by Mary Parker Follett
(1940), is the negotiation over an orange. One party would like to eat the fruit while the
other would like to use the orange peel for a recipe. Should the two parties negotiate a
settlement that purely splits the orange in half, there would be much waste, since half
the fruit and half the peel will be thrown away. However, through questions and
discussion, if the parties realize that their interests are aligned, one will take the whole
fruit and the other will take the whole peel.

Retaliation. Another way in which we might understand deception comes from a point
of view of retaliation. To the extent that one believes that a counterpart is operating in
an unfair manner, there is an increased likelihood that such assessments will trigger
retaliation (Van Segbroeck, Pacheco, Lenaerts, & Santos, 2012). Those who feel
wronged in a negotiation are likely to feel angry (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008). At times,
various revenge tactics might be deployed in order to make things more appear to be
fair. Those who feel that there is an unfair justice climate and that rules have been
violated are more likely to use revenge behaviors, which includes the use of deception.
An important element of restoring justice, as suggested by Bies and Tripp (1998), is the
connection to the restoration of self-esteem for the one who has experienced perceived
injustice. Revenge behaviors have likewise been linked to a reversal in treatment to the
aggrieved, such that revenge can act as a means for restorative justice. Revenge
actions are almost always in response or anticipation of wrongdoing by another party

76
(Tripp & Bies, 1997).
Further, the authors suggest that respondents who want to enact revenge relate
feelings of being “enflamed and enraged” and “consumed by the thoughts of revenge.”
We should expect that some negotiators, who believe that their counterparts will act in a
deceptive manner, will likewise experience intense affective emotions and will respond
to such emotions. The foundation of this response will be a belief that acting in a
retributive manner will even the playing field. Lewicki and Litterer (1985) conducted an
interesting experiment, concerning buyers and sellers in negotiation. They showed that
when buyers believe that sellers are making “too much profit” they will cease to buy,
even when it is against their economic best interests. Such buyers are willing to pay a
price to enact revenge on sellers for profit-taking, even at their own expense. Since
justice is at the core of revenge, I expect that principals will use deception as a means
of retribution and to level the playing field.
It is believed that fairness perceptions will be one mediating mechanism that
explains the relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of deception.
However, it is unlikely that fairness perceptions are the only mediating mechanism.
Since other mediators could exist, such as negative affect or negative liking, I am only
hypothesizing that fairness is a partial mediator.

Hypothesis 2a: Principal belief that a counterpart is unfair will partially mediate
the relationship between counterpart reputation and principal use of deception in the
form of sin of omission.
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Hypothesis 2b: Principal belief that a counterpart is unfair will partially mediate
the relationship between counterpart reputation and principal use of deception in the
form of sin of commission.

The power of negotiation self-efficacy. Negotiators come to the negotiation table
with varying levels of negotiation experience and varying levels of self-confidence of
one’s ability to succeed in a negotiation. The key concept that addresses such
confidence is Bandura’s (1977, 1986) self-efficacy theory, which suggests that those
who have higher levels of self-efficacy, or belief in one’s own abilities, will increase the
effort and motivation needed to meet their goals and surpass challenges and
roadblocks. Those strong in negotiation self-efficacy are better able to handle
uncertainty and deal with challenging negotiation situations by not buckling under
pressure. Bandura suggests that “efficacy expectations are a major determinant of
people’s choice of activities, how much effort they will expend, and of how long they will
sustain effort in dealing with stressful situations” (1977, p. 194). Hence, we might
expect that those who are highly efficacious are able to persevere in coping (Bandura,
1982) and might be less likely to need to take short-cuts in negotiation, such as using
deception.
Research has shown that self-efficacy relates to performance in business
contexts in general, as well as in relationship to negotiation specifically. Confidence in
one’s abilities has been shown to increase integrative as well as distributive outcomes
(Miles & LaSalle, 2008). This has been shown to have overlap with internal locus of
control, such success and failure is attributed to internal forces, rather than seeking
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explanation by virtue of external forces (Wilson, 2013: Sierra, 2014). One study
found that in situations in which participants believe that skill determines outcomes, but
that the participant did not have enough skill to succeed, that those higher in internal
locus of control were more likely to cheat. In contrast, when participants believed that
luck was the primary determining factor driving success, it was those who were high in
external locus of control who were more likely to engage in cheating behaviors (Srull &
Karabenick, 1975).
In fact, in a study on cheating behavior, Srull and Karabenick (1975) found that
those who were high in internal locus of control were more likely to cheat when they
believed skill determined outcome, but that they did not have sufficient skill to
accomplish a task, and that externals cheated more when they believed that luck
determined outcomes. More broadly, Eden and Kinnar (1991) found that employee job
performance can be partially predicted by increases in self-efficacy.
In terms of negotiation, the distinction must be made between those who have
self-efficacy regarding their ability to succeed in distributive negotiations (win-lose), in
which a negotiator’s gains come at the expense of the negotiator’s counterpart, verses
integrative negotiations (win-win), in which a negotiator is able to expand the pie so that
both parties can achieve gains in a negotiation.
Sullivan, O’Connor, and Burris (2006) demonstrated that those who have higher
distributive negotiation self-efficacy were more likely to use distributive tactics in
negotiation, such as threats, antagonistic comments and references to alternatives.
Thus, it is expected that such distributive tactics might be more prominent when a
negotiator is negotiating with a counterpart with a bad reputation. Given the propensity
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to use distributive tactics to begin with, someone who has higher levels of distributive
negotiation self-efficacy might recognize the potential threat posed by someone with a
negative reputation and, in turn, be more likely to use deception. In contrast, someone
who has lower levels of distributive negotiation self-efficacy, is less likely to believe in
his or her abilities to utilize distributive negotiation techniques and might thus be less
likely to leverage such capacities against a counterpart with a negative reputation.
By the nature of negotiations, there are often times that negotiators experience
feelings of tension, which has the potential to drive the use of deception. However,
those who have higher levels of integrative self-efficacy might be expected to have
stronger beliefs in their ability to surmount the uncertainty that is inherent in
negotiations. Thus, it is expected that those who are higher in integrative negotiation
self-efficacy will be in a better position to use legitimate negotiation skills rather than
engaging in deception. When someone with higher levels of integrative negotiation selfefficacy faces a counterpart with a bad reputation, they might be less likely to use
deception. In a similar vein, those who have low levels of integrative negotiation selfefficacy might lack the confidence to achieve integrative solutions against a counterpart
with a bad reputation so they might be more inclined to resort to deceptive practices.

Hypothesis 3a: Distributive negotiation self-efficacy moderates the relationship
between counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in
distributive negotiation self-efficacy are more likely to use deception in the form
of sin of omission.
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Hypothesis 3b: Distributive negotiation self-efficacy moderates the relationship
between counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in
distributive negotiation self-efficacy are more likely to use deception in the form
of sin of commission.

Hypothesis 3c: Integrative negotiation self-efficacy moderates the relationship
between counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in
integrative negotiation self-efficacy are less likely to use deception in the form of
sin of omission.

Hypothesis 3d: Integrative negotiation self-efficacy moderates the relationship
between counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in
integrative negotiation self-efficacy are less likely to use deception in the form of
sin of commission.

Prosocial orientation. In recent years Adam Grant and several of his colleagues have
helped develop the concept of prosocial motivation, which suggest that those who
operate at high levels of the construct are, at the core, organizational actors who
engage in helping behavior because doing good for others is fulfilling. Put simply, it
feels good to be helpful (Carlo, Okun, Knigh, and de Guzman, 2005; Grant, 2009;
Williamson & Clark, 1989). Because, more generally people do the things that they
enjoy, those who are prosocially motivated end up spending more time and effort
helping others (Batson, 1987). Such individuals are likely to seek out employment and
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interact with colleagues who value prosocial behavior and who will provide positive
feedback.
Pruitt (1998) used dual concern theory to establish the link between prosocial
motivation and concern for others. Those who are low in prosocial orientation have
overall lower concern for others than those with a prosocial orientation. McClintock
(1998) suggests that the key distinction for these two types of individuals, in regards to
negotiation, is that those who are prosocially oriented have the innate tendency to look
for joint gains, to ensure that both parties are better off (integrative negotiations);
whereas, a low prosocial negotiator is far more concerned with distributive outcomes.
In negotiation, those low in prosocial orientation are more likely to increase competitive
behaviors (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, and Euwema, 2006). This might especially be
the case when negotiating against a counterpart with a bad reputation. Such actions, in
addition to the tendency to show less concern for their counterparts, suggests that low
prosocial negotiators might be more likely to use deception in order to add further to
their chances of maximizing their own outcomes. Camac (1992) suggested that low
prosocial negotiators frequently seek methods to take advantage of the other negotiator.
This can take the form of choosing to withhold information from a counterpart (Olekalns
& Smith, 2003). De Dreu, Weingart and Kwon (2000) found that proself negotiators
were more likely to use confrontational strategies such as threats and demands, in
order to try and gain an advantage over their counterparts. As discussed previously,
the presence of a negative reputation might give a negotiator reason to believe that his
or her counterpart might be more likely to use deception. Thus, since they already have
a tendency to act in a manner that is self-promoting, those who are high in proself

82
orientation might be expected to have a higher likelihood of using deception when
negotiating against a counterpart with a negative reputation.
Those who are highly prosocial in nature have been found to take part in
cooperative negotiations and are more likely to meet the needs of their counterpart and
settle in agreements than are those who are proself (McClintock, 1988; Harinck & De
Dreu, 2011). Further, prosocial negotiators are more interested in finding a fair outcome
that is the best for both sides of the negotiation. In contrast proself negotiators only
want to see their own outcomes maximized (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & Joireman,
1997). For the prosocial individual, when negotiating against a counterpart with a bad
reputation, such a person might give the benefit of the doubt to his or her counterpart
and be more likely to refrain from using deception or other nefarious negotiation
strategies.

Hypothesis 4a: Prosocial motivation moderates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in prosocial
motivation are less likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission.

Hypothesis 4b: Prosocial motivation moderates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in prosocial
motivation are less likely to use deception in the form of sin of commission.

Machiavellianism. Named after Niccolo Machiavelli, a Renaissance era political
philosopher, Machiavellianism has been considered to be a “strategy of social conduct
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that involves manipulating others for personal gain” (Wilson, 1996, p. 295). The social
science literature has found broad reaching implications for the behavior of those who
are found to be high in this trait. Those that express high levels of Machiavellianism
have been shown to engage in higher levels of crime (Tang, Chen & Sutarso, 2008).
Further, the central theme for such individuals is the drive toward self-achievement and
self-promotion, even at the expense of others. High Machs have been shown to use
deception and other forms of unethical behavior in order to achieve their ends (Geis &
Moon, 1981).
Interestingly, the pattern of Machiavellian behavior begins at a young age. In a
study on 10-year-old children, Braginsky (1970) found that to make small amounts of
money, children who are high in Machiavellianism are more likely to convince their
peers to eat bitter cookies than are children who are low in Machiavellianism.
Christie and Geis (1970) identify three contributing factors that help comprise the
construct Machiavellianism, namely, detachment from norms and values,
manipulativeness, and cynicism concerning human nature. In their experiment,
participants engaged in a bargaining activity in which two out of three people will be
able to split $20. Christie and Geis found that by using manipulation and opportunistic
behaviors high Machs were able to outperform those who do not exhibit
Machiavellianism. Other findings in the study include the suggestion that high Machs act
opportunistically and that they are better able to achieve better outcomes in distributive
negotiations. This ties into the findings of Bloodgood, Turnley, and Mudrack (2008), who
suggest that high Machs express the belief that cheating is an acceptable way to get
what they want.
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From this pattern of findings, in combination with the previous discussion on
retaliation (Van Segbroeck, Pacheco, Lenaerts, & Santos, 2012), in which it was
established that individuals might act in an aggressive manner when they perceive the
potential for a counterpart to act opportunistically, it should follow that those who are
high in Machiavellianism will be more likely to increase their use of deception when
negotiating against a counterpart with a bad reputation. Those high in Machiavellianism
will be more attuned to the potential threat that might come about from someone with a
negative reputation and might preemptively use deception.
In contrast, someone with low Machiavellianism is less likely to be aware of
potential threats to his or her self-interest (Wilson, 1996). Such individuals are less
likely to act in an opportunistic manner (Bloodgood, Turnley, & Mudrack, 2008). By
being in the dark concerning the downside risk that a counterpart with a negative
reputation might pose, those who are low in Machiavellianism are less likely to respond
to such reputational effects and are, in turn, less likely to use deception. Thus, we
might suppose that low Machiavellians, in negotiating against a counterpart with a bad
reputation, might engage in lower levels of deception.

Hypothesis 5a: Machiavellianism moderates the relationship between counterpart
reputation and principal deception, such that principals higher in Machiavellianism are
more likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission.

Hypothesis 5b: Machiavellianism moderates the relationship between counterpart
reputation and principal deception, such that principals higher in Machiavellianism are
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more likely to use deception in the form of sin of commission.

Schwartz values. Shalom Schwartz sought to draw on cross-cultural research to
distinguish the relationship between group values and values of individuals. He
suggested that “values (a) are concepts or beliefs; (b) pertain to desirable end states or
behaviors; (c) transcend specific situations; (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior
and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4). These
values act as guiding principles in individual’s lives (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz’s
values include Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction,
Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security. According to Schwartz
and Bilsky (1987), values emerge from three basic human needs, the needs of:
Individuals as biological organisms, coordinated social interaction, and survival of
groups
Schwartz thought of individuals as operating in a manner that tends toward one
end of the spectrum, self-transcendence, or the other end of the spectrum, selfenhancing (Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). At its core, this represents a fundamental
difference in the way in which people are oriented, whether toward promoting one’s own
self-enhancement or toward looking out or the general interests of others.
Schwartz (1992) developed the concept of self-enhancement, which is comprised
by the values of power and achievement. Those who are typified by self-enhancement,
value esteem and superiority (Sawyerr, Strauss & Yan, 2005). Individuals who are high
in self-enhancement are more likely to engage in behaviors that are dominating and rely
on seizing power over others (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz established self-
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transcendence as being comprised of universalism and benevolence. Universalism
can be thought of as “understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the
welfare of all people and for nature” and benevolence can be thought of as
“preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent
personal contact” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 11). I have excluded from this discussion the
Schwartz concepts of conservation, which draws on order, self-restriction and
preservation of the past. Likewise, I decided not to concentrate on the Schwartz value
of openness to change, a set of values that are made up of readiness for change and
independence of thought and action (Schwartz, 2012). Schwartz’s orthogonal value
system is established so that the difference between conservation and openness to
change deal with differing motivations on “change and novelty with the motivation to
maintain things as they are” (Lipponen, Bardi & Haapamaki, 2008, p. 242). These
values are theoretically separate from the self-promotion and self-transcendence
behaviors or moral fortitude priorities that are connected with the discussion of
deception (Pruitt, 1998).
The trend for those high in self-transcendence to care for causes outside of
themselves has been supported by Schwartz (2010), who suggests that this set of
values predicts participation in organizations devoted to eradicating poverty and saving
the environment. In fact, those high in self-transcendence are also more likely to reach
outward and trust individuals and institutions (Devos, Spini, & Schwartz, 2002), as well
as to try actively to help other people (Daniel, Bilgin, Brezina, Strohmeier & Vainre,
2014). Thus, when confronted with a counterpart with a bad reputation it is expected
that someone who is high in self transcendence will operated from a general
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perspective of trust, as is common for individuals high in self-transcendence (Wilson,
1996), and will be less likely to use deception.
In contrast, it is expected that someone who is low in self-transcendence might
view a counterpart with a bad reputation as a potential threat and will consequently be
more likely to use deception. Roccas (2003) tested the relationship between selftranscendence and self-enhancement and how these two constructs predict
identification with group status. In doing so, Roccas suggests that those who are high
in self-transcendence are less likely to be focused on identifying with those who are in
high status groups than are those who are high in self-enhancement. Taken together, it
follows that when negotiating against a counterpart with a bad reputation someone who
is high in self-enhancement will be more likely to use deception than someone who is
low in self-enhancement. It is expected that those who are low in self-enhancement will
operate from a perspective that is less likely to see the counterpart as potentially acting
opportunistically and will thus refrain from using deception.

Hypothesis 6a: Self-transcendence moderates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in selftranscendence are less likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission.

Hypothesis 6b: Self-transcendence moderates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in selftranscendence are less likely to use deception in the form of sin of commission.

88
Hypothesis 6c: Self-enhancement moderates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in selfenhancement are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission.

Hypothesis 6d: Self-transcendence moderates the relationship between
counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those high in selftranscendence are less likely to use deception in the form of sin of commission.

METHOD
Study 1
Participants
Data was collected from a participant pool of undergraduate business majors at a
southeast university in The United States. In all, 246 students in an introduction to
organizational behavior course participated in the study. They had the opportunity to
earn extra credit for class by participating in the experiment. The usable sample was
198. Out of the group that participated, 46 responses were taken out of the sample, 35
of which were due to insufficient attention (surveys completed in less than 2 minutes
were taken out) and 11 were taken out due to exiting the activity before completion. The
35 completed survey, which were done in under 2 minutes, are considered careless
responses. In Meade and Craig’s (2012) article on careless responding, the authors
found that their experiments had a careless response rate around 10-12%, which is
similar to the rates found by Kurtz and Parish (2001). Mead and Craig suggest that
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online studies naturally have higher careless response rates than experiments
conducted in person, as online surveys are more anonymous and create a feeling of
distance from the people conducting the study. However, the authors nonetheless
advocate for more online studies, as the benefits of gathering data online exceed the
cost of higher careless responding. Thus, since Study 1 had a careless response rate
of 15% (35 careless respondents out of 235 surveys), it appears to be marginally higher
than the findings of Meade and Craig. In the usable sample, the average age was 23
years, and 57% of respondents were female. In terms of demographics, 23% reported
that they were Caucasian, 32% African American, 10% Hispanic and 35% Asian.
Participants had an average of 3.5 years of work experience. Participants were asked to
provide demographic variable data and moderator variable data before the experiment
began.

Design
I designed a prisoner’s dilemma type negotiation game using Qualtrics. Students
were able to participate in the entire game-type scenario online. In the game,
participants were told that “a cold war has developed between the US and Gondol
[fictitious country]. Tensions reached their high-point when Mr. Yanken, the prime
minister of Gondol, claimed that he was going to develop a series of high-tech weapons
systems.” The participant was instructed that he or she was to negotiate on behalf of
The United States in regards to the development of weapons systems.
The participant was informed, “You and Mr. Yanken must choose, without
knowing the other's choice, between acting honestly with another and deceiving one
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another.” After each turn, both sides of the negotiation received a certain amount of
token gold coins. These were fake coins that essentially acted as points. There was no
monetary value for these coins. The payout was as follows:

*If both act honestly, then both receive 7 gold coins.
*If one acts honestly, but the other has been deceptive, the deceptive one will
receive 10 gold coins and the honest one 0 gold coins.
*If both act deceptively, then both receive 3 gold coins.

The participants played three rounds of the game, negotiating three different
technologies that will either receive or not receive investment (e.g., nuclear drones). At
the beginning, participants did not know exactly how many rounds there would be. In
addition, the participants did not know that Mr. Yanken behaved in the same manner no
matter the behavior or strategy of the participant. This made it so counterpart’s choices
were the same for each participant. I did not try to convince participants that they were
negotiating against a real person.

Measures
Negotiation self-efficacy
As used by Miles and Maurer (2012), I used the 8-item Sullivan et al. (2006)
negotiation self-efficacy scale, which involves distributive self-efficacy and integrative
self-efficacy. Participants read the following instructions:
Think of negotiation situations in general, not any one specific negotiation.
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Please estimate your level of confidence that, in a typical negotiation, you
could perform effectively in each of the negotiation elements listed below if
that particular element were relevant to the negotiation.
Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5- strongly
agree). An example item for distributive self-efficacy is “convince the other negotiator to
agree with you.” I used an average of the scale to give a total score for distributive
negotiation self-efficacy as well as integrative negotiation self-efficacy, with higher
scores indicating greater levels of negotiation self-efficacy. Sullivan et al. (2006) found
that the overall reliability of integrative negotiation self-efficacy was .80 and distributive
negotiation self-efficacy was .83. The complete measure is provided in Appendix A.

Prosocial motivation
I measured prosocial motivation using the scale developed by Grant and
Sumanth (2008), which has a reliability score of .96 (Grant & Sumanth, 2008).
Participants were instructed, “For each question below, please indicate your extent of
agreement or disagreement.” They answered the 5-item questionnaire on a 5-point
Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree). One sample item is, “I get
energized by working on tasks that have the potential to benefit others.” This prosocial
motivation scale has been featured in the Academy of Management Journal (Grant &
Berry, 2011), as well The Journal of Applied Psychology (Grant & Sumanth, 2009).
Scores were calculated by averaging the five items, with higher scores indicating
greater prosocial motivation. The complete measure is provided in Appendix B.
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Machiavellianism
I measured Machiavellianism using the 16-item scale developed by Dahling,
Whitaker and Levy (2009). Participants were instructed, “For each question below,
please indicate your extent of agreement or disagreement.” They answered on a 5point Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree). One sample item is, “Status
is a good sign of success in life.” It should be noted that I did not use the Mach IV
measures. This is due to the fact that there is too large a range of reliability in the scale
across groups. For example, one study found that the reliability of the Mach IV for
women was .39, but .73 for men (Geis, 1970). In addition, the Mach IV have been
suggested to have reliabilities as high as .79 (Christie & Geis, 1970) or .76 (Hunt &
Chonko, 1984), while others have found it to be as low as .46 (White, 1984). In
contrast, I am more confident about the Dahling scale, as it has a reliability measure of
.82, and has been validated by Mesko, Lang, Czibor, Szijjarto, and Bereczkei (2014).
Further, DeShong, Grant and Mullins-Sweatt (2015) tested the construct and found
reliability scores of .84.
There are four subscales for the Machiavellianism measure, which include
amorality, desire for control, desire for status, and distrust of others. I used an average
of the subscales to give a total score for Machiavellianism, with higher scores indicating
greater levels of Machiavellianism. Averaging the four subscales into a single score
was enacted in a recent study by DeShong et al. (2015). The complete measure is
provided in Appendix C.

Schwartz values
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Schwartz values were measured using the self-transcendence and selfenhancement questions developed by Schwartz (1992). Self-transcendence is
composed of benevolence and universalism. Self-enhancement is composed of
achievement and power. The internal reliabilities are as follows: benevolence .68;
universalism .73; achievement .65; power .66 (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). I chose
Schwartz values, as it is one of the most common methods in the top journals for
assessing values, suggested to have the most robust measures, as indicated in a
recent meta-analysis (Vauclair, Hanke, Fischer & Fontaine, 2011).
Participants were instructed: In this questionnaire you are to ask yourself: "What
values are important to ME as guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less
important to me?" Participants evaluated 24 items, and were asked to rank them from 1 to
5.



1--means you are opposed to this value.



2--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for
you.



3--means the value is important.



4--means the value is very important.



5--means the value is of supreme importance
An example item is equality (equal opportunity for all) and social power (control

over others, dominance).
Scores for self-transcendence and self-enhancement were calculated as averages
across sub-scale items. High raw scores for both self-transcendence and self-
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enhancement were be coded as high levels for the construct. Similarly, low raw scores
translated to low overall levels for the construct. The complete measure is provided in
Appendix D.

Control Variables
Similar to Olekalns, Kulik and Chew (2013), I controlled for work experience (in
years), gender (0 female, 1 male), and age (in years), due to the possibility that these
variables might explain the use of deception.

Deception
Deception was measured by each time the participant chose to act against the
agreement that he or she made. For example, if the participant promised not to develop
a nuclear drone, but then builds one anyway, this choice was coded as deception.
Participants could have deception scores of 0,1,2 or 3, depending on how many times
they use deception. Because there were three iterations, and one can use deception
only once in a negotiation, the highest deception score for each participant was three.
For this study there was only the opportunity for sin of commission.

Manipulation
Reputation was manipulated as a part of the experiment. Through the Qualtrics
randomization function, participants were randomly assigned to either the treatment
group or the control group. Contained in the instructions for the treatment or “bad
reputation” group was the line “Mr. Yanken has a reputation for lying and deceit. Others
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have called him ‘distrustful’ and ‘unpredictable.’” For those in the control group, the
above line was removed.

Manipulation Check
Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, and Mishra (2011) suggest that to show the
validity of an experiment a researcher must demonstrate the two different conditions are
markedly different in the treatment verses the control group. For this reason, at the end
of the experiment participants in both the treatment and control group were asked, “How
would you rate Mr. Yanken’s reputation?” The option is to rank Mr. Yanken’s reputation
from 0 to 100, with 0 being a “really bad reputation” and 100 being a “really good
reputation.” Over the first 10 days of the experiment, 40 respondents responded and
these responses were pilot tested to see if the manipulation was effective. The effects
of this manipulation were supported by subsequent analysis. A one-way ANOVA (F=
8.03, df=38, p<.01,) demonstrated that the mean rating of counterpart reputation was
indeed dramatically different for the group that was told in the beginning of the
negotiation that their counterpart had a negative reputation (M= 30.92) verses the
control group which was given no information about reputation (M=48.73). Likewise, in
the broader sample (n=198), the mean for the treatment group (M=33.71) was
dramatically different (F=18.13, df=187, p<.01) than the mean for the control group
(M=47.18).

Analysis
It should be noted that Study 1 was conducted at the individual level. Since the
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counterpart (Mr. Yanken) response is automated in a pre-programmed format (i.e., no
matter what the participant does, the computer response will be the exact same), there
is no need to analyze these results at the dyad level. For this analysis, all independent
variables were centered to mitigate issues of multicollinearity.

Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliabilities are presented in Table 5. The
means and standard deviations in Table 5 are reported for uncentered variables.

Table 5- Descriptive statistics, correlations and reliability measures.
1. Deception
2. Dist. neg self-efficacy
3. Int. neg self efficacy
4.Machiavellianism
5. Pro social motivation
6. Self-enhancement
7. Self transcendence
8. Prescribed reputation

Mean
1.52
3.65
3.95
2.87
4.10
3.86
4.16
0.51

SD
.88
.60
.39
.56
.67
.58
.58
.50

1
.09
-.04
.08
.05
-.01
-.11
.1

2
0.68
.23**
.23**
.32**
.34**
.26**
-.02

3

0.8
-.01
.34**
.21**
.29**
.01

4

0.85
-.15*
.32**
-.09
-.05

5

0.89
.26**
.50**
.03

6

7

.79
.55**
.03

8

.89
.03

**P<0.01; *P<0.05
Confirmatory factor analysis
For Study 1 I ran a confirmatory factor analysis, in which I created a model with
six factors (distributive negotiation self-efficacy, integrative negotiation self-efficacy,
prosocial motivation, Machiavellianism, self-enhancement and self-transcendence).
The completely standardized loadings can be seen in Table 6. The model is a poor fit
for the data (X2=2644, p<.01, RMSEA=.09, CFI=.68, SRMR=.11). Hu and Bentler
(1995) suggest a cutoff for RMSEA of .06 and CFI of .95. Thus, the fit of the overall
model appears to be poor. It should be noted that much of the poor fit appears to be

-
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due to the measures of Machiavellianism, which has loadings as low as .21. I reran a
CFA taking out Machiavellianism, and by doing so, the CFI improves from .68 to .79, the
SRMR improves to .08. However, the RMSEA does not appear to make significant
improvements.

Table 6- Confirmatory factor analysis, completely standardized solution
Item name

Dist 1
Dist 2
Dist 3
Dist 4
Int 1
Int 2
Int 3
Int 4
Pro 1
Pro 2
Pro 3
Pro 4
Pro 5
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
M11
M12
M13
M14
M15
M16
ST1
ST2
ST3
ST4
ST5
ST6
ST7
ST8
ST9
ST10
ST11
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5

Distributive
negotiation
self-efficacy
.54
.67
.79
.46

Integrative
negotiation selfefficacy

Prosocial
motivation

Machiavellianism

Self
enhancement

Self
transcendence

.83
.61
.77
.65
.79
.82
.78
.77
.76
.61
.62
.73
.73
.60
.41
.54
.25
.40
.26
.21
.38
.54
.59
.39
.56
.63
.58
.51
.63
.52
.65
.73
.53
.54
.73
.75
.19
.44
.44
.66
.82
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SE6
SE7
SE8

.71
.45
.75

Results
Table 6 summarizes my findings. In Table 6, regression weights are
unstandardized. Since Study 1 was not designed to address the mediating effects of
perceived fairness, hypothesis 1a was not tested in Study 1. Also, due to the fact that
there was no opportunity for sin of omission, hypotheses 1b was not tested in Study 1.
Hypothesis 1c predicted that principals who negotiate against a counterpart with a
negative reputation will be more likely to use deception in the form of sin of commission.
Model 1 illustrates the effects of reputation on deception, controlling for gender, age and
work experience. Model 1 is not statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 1c is not
supported.
Since Study 1 did not address sins of omission, hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a and 3c
were not tested in Study 1. Hypothesis 3b predicted that distributive negotiation selfefficacy would moderate the relationship between counterpart reputation and principal
use of deception in the form of sin of commission. Model 2 illustrates the moderating
effects of distributive negotiation self-efficacy. The interaction variable is statistically
significant at the .05 level. Thus, distributive negotiation self-efficacy moderates the
relationship between counterpart reputation and principal deception, such that those
high in distributive negotiation self-efficacy are more likely to use deception. Hypothesis
3b is supported. See Figure 5 for the graph of the moderating effects. The graphed
pattern shows that those with high distributive negotiation self-efficacy are more likely to
use deception against a counterpart with a bad reputation than are those who are low in
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distributive negotiation self-efficacy. The moderating variable for hypothesis 3d, which
claimed that integrative negotiation self-efficacy will moderate the relationship between
counterpart reputation and the use of sin of commission, is shown in Model 3 and is not
significant. Thus, hypothesis 3d could not be supported.
Hypothesis 4a was not tested in Study 1. Hypothesis 4b predicted that prosocial
motivation would moderate the relationship between counterpart reputation and
principal use of deception in the form of sin of commission. Model 4 illustrates the
moderating effects of prosocial motivation. The interaction variable has an
unstandardized beta weight of .027 and is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 4b is
not supported.
Hypothesis 5a was not tested in Study 1. Hypothesis 5b predicted that
Machiavellianism would moderate the relationship between counterpart reputation and
principal use of deception for sin of commission. Model 5 tests the moderating effects
of Machiavellianism. The interaction variable has an unstandardized beta weight of
.347 and is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 5b is not supported. It should be
noted that the direct effect of the beta weight of Machiavellianism is .221, significant at
the .10 level, which suggests a moderate connection between Machiavellianism and the
use of deception. This provides further support for the research by Christie and Geis
(1970), who suggested a connection between Machiavellianism and the use of
deception.
Hypotheses 6a and 6c were not tested in Study 1. Hypothesis 6b predicted that
self-transcendence would moderate the relationship between counterpart reputation and
principal use of deception in the form of sin of commission. Model 6 illustrates the
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moderating effects of self-transcendence. The interaction variable has an
unstandardized beta weight of -.466 and is significant at the p<.01 level. Hypothesis 6a
is supported. The simple slopes are graphed in Figure 6. This figure illustrates that
those who are high in self-transcendence are less likely to use deception against a
counterpart with a bad reputation than are those who are low in self-transcendence.
Hypothesis 6d predicted that self-enhancement would moderate the relationship
between counterpart reputation and principal use of deception. Model 7 illustrates the
moderating effects of self-enhancement. The interaction variable has an
unstandardized beta weight of -.064 and is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 6d is
not supported.

Table 6
Model analysis for predicting sin of commission
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

_________ ________
_________
_________ ________
________
________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control variables
Gender
-.25 .13
-.16 .13
-.23 .13
-.25 .13
-.18 .13
-.27 .13
-.26 .13
Age
-.01 .02
-.01 .02
-.01 .02
-.01 .02
-.01 .02
-.01 .02
-.01 .02
Work experience
.03
.02
.03
.02
.04
.02
.03
.02
.03
.02
.03
.02
.03
.02
Main effects
Prescribed Reputation
.13
.129 .14
.12
.15
.12
.13
.13
.15
.12
.14
.12
.13
.13
Dist negotiation self-efficacy
.08
.10
Int negotiation self-efficacy
-.22 .16
Prosocial motivation
.05
.10
Machiavellianism
.22* .12
Self-transcendence
-.24***.11
Self-enhancement
-.03 .11

Two-way interactions
Dist negotiation self-efficacy*rep
Int negotiation self-efficacy*rep
Prosocial motivation*rep
Machiavellianism*rep
Self-transcendence*rep
Self-enhancement *rep

F
R2
ΔR2

3.0
.07

*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.10
Note: All independent variables are centered

.50** .21
-.46

.33
.02

.20
.34

.23
-.46***.22
-.06

3.2
.10
.03

2.6
.09
.01

2.0
.07
.00

2.9
.09
.01

3.5
.11
.02

.23

2.0
.07
.00

Figure 5: Moderating effects of distributive negotiation self-efficacy on the
relationship between counterpart reputation and deception.

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0
No reputation
Low Dist Self-Efficacy

Bad Reputation
High Dist Self-Efficacy

Note: High condition is one standard deviation above the mean of distributive
negotiation self-efficacy and low condition is one standard deviation below the mean.
For ease of interpretation, variables are not centered. The Y-axis is the number of times
the participant used deception.

103
Figure 6- Moderating effects of self-transcendence on the relationship
between counterpart reputation and deception.

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0
No reputation
Low Self-Transcendence

Bad Reputation
High Self-Transcendence

Note: High condition is one standard deviation above the mean for prosocial motivation
and low condition is one standard deviation below the mean. For Figure 6, for ease of
interpretation, variables are not centered. The Y-axis is the number of times the
participants used deception.
Table 7- General summary of hypotheses and results for Study 1
Hypothesis Result
1a
Tested in Study 2
1b
Tested in Study 2
1c
Hypothesis not supported
2a
Tested in Study 2
2b
Tested in Study 2
3a
Tested in Study 2
3b
Significant at p<.05
3c
Tested in Study 2
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3d
4a
4b
5a
5b
6a
6b
6c
6d

Hypothesis not supported
Tested in Study 2
Hypothesis not supported
Tested in Study 2
Hypothesis not supported
Tested in Study 2
Significant at p<.01
Tested in Study 2
Hypothesis not supported

Study 1 Discussion
In Study 1 I used an online simulated negotiation in which participants acted as
the President of The United States negotiating against a counterpart from a fictitious
country. In this negotiation reputation was manipulated, in that the treatment group was
informed that their counterpart had a negative reputation. The results from Study 1
suggest that those with high distributive negotiation self-efficacy are more likely to use
deception against a counterpart with a bad reputation than are negotiators with a low
distributive negotiation self-efficacy. Sullivan et al. (2006) suggested that the use of
exploitative negotiation techniques, such as antagonism and threats, can be predicted
by those who are high in distributive negotiation self-efficacy but not by those high in
integrative negotiation self-efficacy. This study shows that those high in distributive
negotiation self-efficacy respond to reputation effects by enhancing their aggressive
negotiation responses by increasing the use of deception. In contrast the group that
has low distributive negotiation self-efficacy does not experience a significant change in
the use of deception in the case of a counterpart with a bad reputation. If anything, the
low distributive negotiation self-efficacy group experiences a slight decrease in
deceptive behaviors.
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In terms of self-transcendence, Study 1 showed that when negotiating
against a counterpart with a bad reputation, those who have high self-transcendence
are less likely to use deception than are those with low levels of self-transcendence. My
analysis suggests that there is no difference between the two groups in terms of the use
of deception when negotiating against a counterpart with no mention of reputation. This
suggests that reputation triggers such behavioral responses in a way that the absence
of reputation does not. A study on the relationship between situational power and selftranscendence in ultimatum bargaining (Lonnqvist, Walkowitz, Verkasalo, & Wichardt,
2011), suggested that self-transcendence was activated, and thus impacting bargaining
behavior, only in those who were told that they were in a high power situation. Thus,
the moderation effects for self-transcendence in Study 1 suggest that selftranscendence can activate behavioral differences in deception when there is an
impetus, such as a counterpart with a bad reputation.

Study 2
In Study 1, I used the theory from prisoner’s dilemma to test the effect that
reputation has on the decision to use deception. The results did not suggest that a
negative reputation leads to the use of deception. However, there was support for the
hypotheses that suggest that both distributive negotiation self-efficacy and selftranscendence moderate the relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of
deception. The limitation of Study 1 is that it is a computer-generated test done through
Qualtrics, in which one person is playing against an automated response. It could be
that there is an overall greater or smaller effect of reputation on deception due to the
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nature of the test itself. Further, the moderators could also be impacted by the
virtual element of the online experiment. Because Study 1 was conducted with
automated responses, it is important that I test hypotheses laid out in Study 2 with
human dyads in an experimental scenario. For this reason, Study 2 was a negotiation
that took place between two dyad members. Further, in Study 2, I tested for the
mediation effects of perception of fairness as well as for both sin of omission and sin of
commission. In Study 1, I did not test for fairness, nor did I test for sin of omission.

Participants
Data were collected from the population of undergraduate students taking a
management course at a large southeastern university in the United States. Students
from 6 sections were offered extra credit for participating in the study. Total participants
were 144 or 72 dyads. One dyad did not finish the activity, thus there is a usable
sample of 71 dyads. Of the participants, 53% identified as female, and the average age
was 23.40 (SD =4.95). Participants identified as Caucasian (27%), African-American or
black (37%), Hispanic (8%), Asian American or Asian (21%), Other or no response
(7%). Average full-time work experience was 2.02 years (SD=1.46).

Design
In this study, participants negotiated in a simulated negotiation, which is an
adapted version of “General Automotive,” developed by Aquino (1998). Permission was
granted by Aquino to adapt his negotiation case for this study and to use it for the
purposes of this dissertation.
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In this negotiation subjects were randomly assigned the role of either a
representative of a large car manufacturer, General Automotive, or as the president of a
metal parts firm. The negotiation activity takes place at the end of a longer negotiation
process between the two sides, which would enable the small firm to have a multi-year
agreement to produce aluminum hoods for the car manufacturer. The participants must
negotiate a single, final price for the price of each delivered aluminum hood. Both the
representative of the car manufacturer and the president of the small firm were given a
confidential set of instructions that explains their own, unique agenda.
In confidence, the General Automotive representative was provided with
information that could potentially elicit deceptive behaviors. Specifically, he or she was
told that “ (a) improvements in design will make the aluminum hood obsolete in three
years and (b) General Automotive planned to produce the new design in-house.”
Representatives for General Automotive were likewise informed that the contract
resulting from the negotiations could be nullified by General Automotive at any point that
the company chooses. Therefore, the contract negotiated could be nullified and no
longer valid three years from the time of the negotiation. They were also informed that
the supplier does not know this information. In short, the representative knows that his
or her company will likely nullify the contract in three years and that his or her
counterpart does not know this information. The representative for General Automotive
is the focal negotiator for this experiment and is the only one in the dyad that has the
opportunity to engage in deception. The supplier is not of interest in this study.
Representatives for General Automotive were also told that the target price was
$25 per hood. According to the profit scenario (see Appendix G) this would result in a
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$1.5 million loss for the supplier over three years, but would be a $7.5 million profit if
the contract ran nine years.
There were two different versions of the General Automotive representative
confidential instructions. In the treatment group, the representatives were told that their
counterpart (the supplier) has a bad reputation, specifically, that they have a history of
lying in negotiations. In the control group, there was no information given about the
counterpart.
The supplier was also provided with a confidential sheet. This information
indicated that the supplier was eager to settle an agreement with General Automotive,
in order that the supplier can become a major player in the industry. The supplier is
informed that this contract is considered a good first step in their broader, long-term
strategy.
The supplier received information about profits at various price levels in a graph
(see Appendix H). This chart shows that the supplier is aware that if the contract were to
be terminated before 3 years, any price lower than $30 per hood will cause the supplier
to take significant losses. In their scenario write-up, the supplier was informed that the
reason for this loss is the high start-up costs that will come about due to the
manufacturing capital expenditures that must be built to produce the aluminum hoods.
Before the negotiation began, participants were asked to provide information that
includes demographic information as well as the measures for negotiation self-efficacy,
prosocial motivation, Machiavellianism, and Schwartz values.

Manipulation check
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At the end of the negotiation, participants were asked “what is the reputation
of your counterpart?” They were given the option of bad, moderately bad, neither good
nor bad, moderately good and good, 1 to 5, respectively. I pilot tested the first 10 dyads
to see if the manipulation was effective. The effects of this manipulation were
supported by subsequent analysis. A one-way ANOVA, (F= 12.50, df=9, p<.01)
demonstrated that the mean rating of counterpart reputation was indeed dramatically
different for the group that was told in the beginning of the negotiation that their
counterpart had a negative reputation (M=1.60) as opposed to the control group, which
was given no information about reputation (M=3.60). Likewise, in the broader sample
(n=71), the mean for the treatment group (M=1.91) was dramatically different than the
mean for the control group (M=3.61), F=11.83, df=70, p<.01.

Dependent Variable
As did Aquino (1998), I tested deception by asking, not the representative, but rather
the supplier “Did the agent tell you how many years they will need you to make hoods
for them?” and “If so, how many?” This allowed me to code for sins of commission for
lying about the length of the contract and for sins of omission by not being forthright
about the contract being canceled in three years. Thus, if a General Automotive
representative does not mention how many years that they will be buying aluminum
hoods (honest answer is three years), then this qualifies as sin of omission, since it is
material information that is vital to the supplier. If the General Automotive representative
says that the contract will be for nine years, then this is sin of commission or direct
deception, because the representative knows that it will be only three years.
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Measures
For Study 2, I used the same measures for Schwartz values, prosocial
motivation, Machiavellianism and negotiation self-efficacy that I used for Study 1.

Perception of fairness of a counterpart
To answer if the participant viewed the counterpart as being a fair negotiator,
participants were asked the three-item measure developed by Zapata-Phelan, Colquitt,
Scott, & Livingston (2009). A sample item is, “In general, my counterpart was fair.”
Participants answered these questions on a 5-point Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5strongly agree). Perception of fairness measure can be found in Appendix G.

Control Variables
Similar to Olekalns, Kulik and Chew (2013), I initially controlled for work
experience (in years), gender (0 female, 1 male), and age (in years), due to the possibility
that these variables might explain the use of deception. However, when I tested the
models with the control variables in, none of the control variables were statistically
significant. Therefore, I removed the control variables from the model, and present the
model without the use of control variables. This is in line with a recent article by Spector
and Brannick (2011) who suggested that one should reconsider using control variables
that are not connected to the statistical model.

Analysis
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It should be noted that Study 2 was conducted at the individual level. The
only relevant measurements for the study were the measurements for the buyer in the
negotiation, such that all data regarding sellers are not relevant to the analysis. In
addition, there is a lack of group level data to analyze. Thus, it was determined that all
data should be analyzed at the individual level. For this analysis all independent
variables were centered to mitigate issues of multicollinearity. I used same-person
mean replacement for missing data.

Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliabilities are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics, correlations and reliability measures. 1

Treatment
Fairness
Integrative Selfefficacy
Distributive Selfefficacy
Pro-social
motivation
Machiavellianism
Selftranscendence
Selfenhancement
Sin of omission
Sin of
commission

Mean
0.51
3.85

SD
0.5
0.69

1
-0.10

2

3

4

5

6

3.68

0.60

-0.08

0.36**

.59

3.76

0.63

-0.15

0.31**

0.38**

.61

3.95

0.64

-0.18

0.55**

0.51**

0.32**

.85

2.92

0.47

0.00

-0.26*

-0.08

0.09

-0.17

3.86

0.99

-0.04

0.43**

0.48**

0.33**

0.47**

3.54
0.42

1.07
0.50

0.07
0.07

0.48**
-0.10

0.44**
-0.10

0.40**
-0.09

0.37**
-0.15

.72
0.03
0.02
0.15

0.44

0.50

0.04

0.15

0.09

0.25*

0.10

0.21

7

8

9

0.70**
0.03

.85
0.08

-

0.21

0.16

-0.41**

.75

.89

**P<0.01; *P<0.05
Confirmatory factor analysis

1

10

The means and standard deviations reported are for uncentered variables.

-
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For Study 2 I ran a confirmatory factor analysis, in which I created a model
with seven factors (fairness, distributive negotiation self-efficacy, integrative negotiation
self-efficacy, prosocial motivation, Machiavellianism, self-enhancement and selftranscendence). The completely standardized loadings can be seen in Table 8. The
model is a poor fit for the data (X2=1558, p<.01, RMSEA=.06, CFI=.48, SRMR=.12). Hu
and Bentler (1995) suggest a cutoff for RMSEA of .06 and CFI of .95. While the
RMSEA value appears to be within the cutoffs set by Hu and Bentler, the CFI shows
misfit. Thus, the fit of the overall model appears to be poor. It should be noted that
much of the poor fit appears to be due to the measures of Machiavellianism, which has
loadings as low as .19. I reran a CFA without Machiavellianism and found that the
RMSEA did not improve overall. However, the CFI improved to .69 and the SRMR
improved to .10.

Table 8: Confirmatory factor analysis, completely standardized solution
Item

Fairness

Fair 1
Fair 2
Fair 3
Dist 1
Dist 2
Dist 3
Dist 4
Int 1
Int 2
Int 3
Int 4
Pro 1
Pro 2
Pro 3
Pro 4
Pro 5
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6

.85
.78
.72

Distributive
negotiation
self-efficacy

Integrative
negotiation selfefficacy

Prosocial
motivation

Machiavellianism

.53
.79
.56
.25
.46
.63
.62
.40
.77
.69
.71
.75
.74
.46
.55
.66
.61
.40
.44

Self
enhancement

Self
transcendence
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M7
M8
M9
M10
M11
M12
M13
M14
M15
M16
ST1
ST2
ST3
ST4
ST5
ST6
ST7
ST8
ST9
ST10
ST11
SE1
SE2
SE3
SE4
SE5
SE6
SE7
SE8

.56
.40
.66
.30
.33
.22
.20
.37
.23
.19
.61
.74
.60
.50
.62
.69
.59
.64
.65
.62
.63
.33
.66
.63
.68
.64
.69
.67
.72

Results
Table 8 and Table 9 summarize the findings of Study 2. It should be noted, that I
removed the control variables of age, gender and work experience, because when I ran
the analysis, these variables were not significant. Hypothesis 1a stated that, when
principals negotiate with counterparts with negative reputations, they are more likely to
view the counterpart as an unfair negotiator. I ran a one-way ANOVA to test this
hypothesis, which resulted in F=1.10, df=70, p<.40. Thus, hypothesis 1a could not be
supported.
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Hypothesis 1b stated that when principals negotiate with counterparts with
negative reputations, they are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of
omission. I ran a one-way ANOVA to test this hypothesis, which resulted in F=.33,
df=70, p<57. Thus hypothesis 1b could not be supported.
Hypothesis 1c suggested that when principals negotiate with counterparts with
negative reputations, they are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of
commission. I ran a one-way ANOVA to test this hypothesis, which resulted in F=.12,
df=70, p<.74. Thus hypothesis 1c could not be supported.
Hypothesis 2a and 2b suggested that the principal belief that a counterpart is
unfair will partially mediate the relationship between counterpart reputation and principal
use of deception in the form of sin of omission and sin of commission. In order to
establish mediation effects there must be a significant relationship between the
mediating and the dependent variable (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). Using linear
regression, the relationship between fairness and sin of omission (F=.03, df=70, p<.87)
as well as fairness and sin of commission (F=.28, df=70, p<.60) could not be supported.
Thus neither hypothesis 2a nor 2b could be supported.
Hypotheses 3a (see Model 2 in Table 8) and 3b (see Model 2 in Table 9) suggest
that distributive negotiation self-efficacy moderates the relationship between counterpart
reputation and principal deception, such that those high in distributive negotiation selfefficacy are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission and sin of
commission. For sin of commission, the moderating effects of distributive negotiation
self-efficacy had an unstandardized beta value of -.331 but were not statistically
significant. When running the model without the moderating effects, distributive
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negotiation self-efficacy has main effects of .212, which is significant at the .05 level.
Hypotheses 3c and 3d (see Model 4 in Table 9) suggest that integrative negotiation selfefficacy moderates the relationship between counterpart reputation and principal
deception, such that those high in integrative negotiation self-efficacy are less likely to
use deception in the form of sin of omission and sin of commission. These hypotheses
could not be supported.
Hypotheses 4a (see Model 3 in Table 8), 4b (see Model 5 in Table 9), 5a (see
Model 4 in table 8), and 5b (see Model 6 in Table 9) suggested that prosocial motivation
and Machiavellianism moderated the relationship between prescribed reputation and
use of deception. These hypotheses could not be supported.
Hypotheses 6a (see Model 5 in Table 8), 6b (see Model 7 in Table 9), 6c (see
Model 6 in Table 8) and 6d (see Model 8 in Table 9) suggested that self-transcendence
and self enhancement moderates the relationship between counterpart reputation and
principal deception, such that those high in self-transcendence are less likely to use
deception in the form of sin of omission and sin of commission and that those high in
self-enhancement are more likely to use deception in the form of sin of omission and sin
of commission. However, the moderating effects of both self-transcendence and selfenhancement could not be supported, neither for sin of commission nor sin of omission.

Table 8
Model analysis for predicting sin of omission
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
_________ ________
_________ _________ _________ _________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Main effects
Prescribed Reputation
.07
.12
.06
.12
.06
.12
.04
.12
.07
.11
.07
.12
Dist negotiation self-efficacy
-.05 .10
Prosocial motivation
-.08 .10
Machiavellianism
.12
.10
Self-transcendence
.10
.13
Self-enhancement
.02
.06
Two-way interactions
Dist negotiation self-efficacy*rep
.14
.20
Prosocial motivation*rep
-.07 .20
Machiavellianism*rep
-.16 .19
Self-transcendence*rep
-.41 .26
Self-enhancement*rep
-.01 .12

F
.33
.41
.50
.76
F p-value
.56
.74
.61
.51
R2
.01
.02
.01
.03
2
ΔR
n/a
.01
.00
.01
*** p< 0.01 level; ** p< 0.05 level; * p< 0.10 level
Note: There are no overall models that are statistically significant at the p<.05 level

1.48
.23
.06
.03

.13
.94
.01
.00
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Table 9
Model analysis for predicting sin of commission
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
_________ ________
_________ _______
________
________
________
________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
____________________________________________________________________________________
Main effects
Prescribed Reputation
.04
.12
.08
.11
.07
.12
.04
.12
.05
.12
.04
.12
.05
.12
.02
.12
Dist negotiation self-efficacy
.21** .10
.18* .10
Int negotiation self-efficacy
.08
.10
Pro social motivation
.08
.10
Machiavellianism
.26** .13
Self-transcendence
.11* .06
Self-enhancement
.11
.11
Two-way interactions
Dist negotiation self-efficacy*rep
-.26 .19
Int negotiation self-efficacy*rep
-.04 .20
Pro social motivation*rep
-.18 .19
Machiavellianism*rep
.22
.26
Self-transcendence*rep
-.01 .12
Self-enhancement*rep
-.02 .21

F
.11
2.44
2.31
.24
F p-value
.73
.09
.08
.86
R2
.00
.10
.09
.01
ΔR2
n/a
n/a
.03
.00
*** p< 0.01 level; ** p< 0.05 level; * p< 0.10 level
Note: There are no overall models that are statistically significant at the p<.05 level

.62
.60
.02
.01

1.33
.27
.06
.02

1.12
.34
.05
.00

.48
.69
.02
.00

Study 2 Discussion
In Study 2, I tested the same hypotheses as I did in Study 1 with the addition of
testing the mediation effects of fairness perceptions as well as incorporating sin of
omission in addition to sin of commission. Study 2 moved beyond a simple online
negotiation to a dyadic negotiation between participants playing the role of buyer or
supplier for an automotive company. Overall none of the hypotheses could be
supported. However, it should be noted that for sin of commission, the moderating
effects of distributive negotiation self-efficacy had an unstandardized beta value of -.331
but was significant at the .11 level. Further, when running the model without the
moderating effects, distributive negotiation self-efficacy has main effects of .212, which
is significant at the .05 level. In regards to negotiation self-efficacy, the findings from
Study 2 appear to support the findings from Study 1, which had a sample size of 198.
However, Study 2 appeared to show no support for the role of self-transcendence
neither as a direct effect nor as an interaction effect with reputation.

General Discussion
Much of the discussion on deception in negotiation has centered on negotiator
characteristics (Olekalns et al., 2014l Tenbrunsel, 1998) and characteristics of the
negotiation itself (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Lewicki, Poland, Minton, & Sheppard,
1997). This stream of research has yet to include empirical or theoretical studies that
examine the characteristics of a negotiator’s counterpart, specifically the role of
counterpart reputation. In this paper I conducted two experiments that looked at the
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relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of deception. The following
are the conclusions that seem warranted from these studies.
First, unfortunately these two studies were unable to demonstrate a significant
direct connection between counterpart reputation and the use of deception. While for
both studies, the manipulation check demonstrated that the treatment group, in fact,
understood that their counterpart had a bad reputation, their resulting behavior did not
lead to a change in the use of deception. These insignificant results, in both Study 1
and Study 2, also limited the possible mediating effects of perceived fairness, which
was tested in Study 2. One possible explanation for the nonsignificant results is the
inherent limitations of negotiation experiments, which stands in contrast to field studies.
It is common in negotiation experiments for participants to understand a manipulation
but not to act on the manipulation presented (Miles & Schatten, 2015). Thus, future
research ought to incorporate field experimentation to see if, in actual negotiation
settings, there is a connection between counterpart reputation and the use of deception.
Another explanation is that perhaps the experience of the negotiator matters and that by
conducting experiments with undergraduate students who are less likely to have
significant negotiation experience, the direct effects between counterpart reputation and
use of deception might be muted. One possible remedy is to run future studies with
MBA students or to conduct negotiation training before such experiments take place.
This will make it more likely that the participants will be more mindful about the
counterpart and will draw on analytical frameworks. In the end, reputation might feel
more salient and will be more likely to have main effects.
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Second, these two studies largely confirmed the significant role of distributive
negotiation self-efficacy in the relationship between counterpart reputation and the use
of deception. In Study 1, I showed that distributive negotiation self-efficacy moderates
the relationship between counterpart reputation and the use of deception. This confirms
the theoretical considerations discussed concerning prisoner’s dilemma, namely that
someone is more likely to act in an aggressive manner when facing off against a
counterpart who is viewed as likely to act in an aggressive manner (Campbell, 1985).
These results suggest that those who believe strongly that they are capable at
distributive negotiations (win-lose) might recognize that an individual with a negative
reputation is more likely to act in an aggressive manner and thus, use deception in
return. While the moderation effects of distributive negotiation self-efficacy for Study 2
were not significant (only significant at the p<.11 level), there is good reason to believe
that findings of Study 2 would confirm the findings in Study 1 should I collect more data
in the future. Further, Study 2 was able to confirm the direct effects of distributive
negotiation self-efficacy on the use of sin of commission. As sin of commission is
considered the direct form of deception (Olekalns et al., 2014), it is not surprising that
distributive negotiation self-efficacy was found to lead to sin of commission but not sin of
omission.
Third, my difficulty in finding significant results appears to stand in contrast to
other studies on deception in negotiation. Other studies appear to confirm that certain
characteristics, such as power or perception that a counterpart is benevolent, activate
deception (Olekalns, Horan & Smith, 2014; Olekalns & Smith, 2007). However, in these
studies, I was unable to support the hypothesis that counterparts with a bad reputation
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lead to a negotiator to use deception. One possible explanation is that this might
occur due to the fact that counterpart characteristics are not as salient an effect as
negotiator characteristics or characteristics of the negotiation.
Fourth, the results from Study 1 found that self-transcendence moderates the
relationship between reputation and the use of deception. These results suggest that
those who are high in self-transcendence are less likely to use deception against a
counterpart with a bad reputation than are those who are low in self-transcendence.
Unfortunately, these results were not confirmed in Study 2. There are two important
reasons why this might have occurred. First, the in person negotiation for study two
relied on longer introductory readings by participants and a more in-depth negotiation
than did the simple online negotiation. There are inherent limitations in relying on
undergraduate students for negotiation experiments. For this experiment,
unenthusiastic student participation may have hindered the overall effects. A second
explanation could be the fact that the option to use deception was overtly stated in
Study 1 (participants chose explicitly to either use deception or to act honestly). The
effects of self-transcendence might have been more pronounced when participants
were asked whether they wanted to act deceptively or act honestly.
Practical Implications
For practitioners, negotiators should be aware of the way in which their own
reputation might impact the behavior of their counterparts. Specifically, if a negotiator
knows that he or she has a bad reputation, they should be keenly aware if their
counterpart has high levels of distributive negotiation self-efficacy. If this is the case, the
negotiator should be on guard for potential increased likelihood that such a counterpart
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will engage in deceptive practices. Likewise, should a counterpart appear to have
low levels of self-transcendence, they should be on heightened alert for counterpart use
of deception.
Second, negotiators negotiating against a counterpart with a bad reputation
should be aware of their own potential to lapse into unethical behaviors such as the use
of deception. A negotiator should know that if they have high levels of distributive
negotiation self-efficacy, that they are more likely to use deception when negotiating
against a counterpart with a bad reputation. By acknowledging this possibility, such a
negotiator can draw on other negotiation skills that fall within the realm of ethical
negotiations. Further, negotiators should know that if they have a relatively low level of
self-transcendence, that they are more likely to use deception. Again, understanding
such potential behavioral changes might lead to guarding against the use of deception.
Future research
In addition to gathering more data to address some of the limitations of Study 2,
future research should extend this work to incorporate ascribed reputation. This paper
explored prescribed reputation, in which I looked at individual responses to being told
that another person has certain reputation characteristics. Love and Kraatz (2009)
suggest that a second type of reputation, ascribed reputation plays an important role.
Ascribed reputation is the reputation that an individual internalizes about another
person. We can imagine that there are distinct differences between the ways in which
an individual responds to what they are told about another person’s reputation versus
what they actually think about that person’s reputation. Thus, there could be dramatic
differences in the use of deception between ascribed and prescribed reputation.
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Further, as discussed previously, the use of field data might find a stronger
connection between ascribed reputation and the use of deception.
In this paper I looked exclusively at the effects of negative reputation. I
recommend that future research examine the role of positive reputation and its effects
on counterpart use of deception in negotiation. One avenue would be to test for
affective responses to positive reputation, seeking to understand if negotiator positive
affect comes about as a response to counterpart positive reputation, and that this, in
turn, decreases the use of deception. Drawing on the extensive work of Grant on
prosocial motivation (see Grant & Mayer, 2009; Grant, Parker & Collins, 2009; Grant &
Sonnentag, 2010), future studies should test way in which positive reputation impacts
ethical decision making for those with varying levels of prosocial motivation. A stream
of research on positive or virtuous cycles and the impact on the use of deception could
have an impact on practitioners, especially how negotiation is taught in undergraduate
and MBA courses.
Additionally, future research might also further investigate the role of reputation,
specifically addressing the possibility that reputation might have multiple dimensions,
and that these varying dimensions could evoke different responses. For instance, in
this study I looked exclusively at negative reputation; however, other dimensions, such
as reputation for aggression or reputation for altruism. In each, research might show
differing outcomes concerning the use of deception.

Conclusion
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In these studies I tested the impact that counterpart reputation has on the use
of deception. While I could not find support for the main proposition, that negotiators are
more likely to use deception when negotiating against a counterpart with a bad
reputation, support could be garnered for the moderating effects of distributive
negotiation self-efficacy and self-transcendence.
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Chapter 4: Essay 3

DECEPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES

ABSTRACT

In this essay, I use leakage theory to suggest the case that negotiation outcomes
are impacted by principal use of deception and that these effects are moderated by
emotional intelligence and political skill. Also, I argue that deception is positively related
to distributive outcomes but negatively related to integrative outcomes. I test my
hypotheses with a negotiation experiment. While the main effects could not be
supported, I was able to find moderating effects of emotional intelligence and political
skill.
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Using deception in negotiation is inherently a risky proposition. It involves a
person or a group of people intentionally misleading another individual or another group
of people, often in a matter that is of significance, or concerning situations in which
much is at stake. Those who use deception often do so at their own peril. Over time,
the repeated use of deception can lead to a negative reputation, which can be difficult to
reverse (Goffman, 1967). Discovery of deception can destroy business relationships
(Lewicki & Hanke, 2012) and can lead to the unraveling of negotiations (Olekalns &
Smith, 2007), producing a lose-lose situation for both negotiation parties. In addition to
business and reputation effects, those who use deception run the risk of debilitating
legal consequences. In fact, The United States Supreme Court (NLRB v Truitt
Manufacturing Company, 1956) established an “Honest Claim” doctrine, which
mandates that parties in labor negotiations should operate under good faith, in that
“claims made by either party should be honest claims.” For many negotiations, the
variable that is the subject of deception (i.e. delivery date, promised quality, number of
employees that will be devoted to a project, etc.) can be verified and used as evidence
in lawsuits filed against the deceiver (Reilly, 2015). With such relatively known risks, it
might be surprising to find that deception in negotiation, far from on the retreat, can be
seen with great regularity. Researchers found that over 55% of negotiators use active
forms of deception when there are high incentives to lie (Aquino & Becker, 2005). Even
those with extensive negotiation experience have been shown to use deception, with
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one study suggesting that experienced negotiators use deception in at least a third
of negotiations (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999).
According to Bok (1978) the key to differentiating deception from non-deception
is that with deception there is a deliberate attempt to mislead. In fact, the very reason
that many negotiators use deception is the belief that the negotiator will not get caught
(Schweitzer, DeChurch & Gibson, 2005; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). The use of deception
has been connected to attaining an information imbalance, which can thus be used to
achieve better negotiation outcomes (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013; Bazerman, Curhan,
Moore and Valley, 2000). Lax and Sebenius (1985) noted that negotiation has
elements of competition and cooperation—that the two are inherent to negotiations, and
that the difficulty in knowing when to be competitive and when to be cooperative was
appropriately called the “Negotiator’s Dilemma.”
Schweitzer and Croson (1999) claim that research has yet to explore specifics of
deception in negotiation, such as how deception impacts distributive verses integrative
outcomes. There has been little account for how certain personality traits might impact
the relationship between deception and negotiation outcomes. It is important for
research and practice to fill in these gaps. By understanding how deception impacts
distributive and integrative negotiations, researchers will more broadly better account for
what leads to the most efficacious negotiation strategies. Further, certain personality
characteristics could be important in this analysis. For practitioners, it is important to
understand how best to guard against deceptive practices, and this study will hopefully
identify some of those implications.
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In this paper, I suggest that leakage theory helps explain why some use of
deception results in positive negotiation outcomes while some deception does not.
Further, I argue that political skill and emotional intelligence are two key moderating
variables that explain the connection between deception and negotiating outcomes.
This relationship is visualized in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Hypothesized Model
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Theoretical Development: Deception in Negotiation
Why use deception?
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The most common form of deception occurs through the intentional
misrepresentation of information (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). One example of this is if,
in an employment contract negotiation, a hiring representative informs the prospective
employee that they have five other competitive candidates when, in fact, they do not
have other competitive candidates. Such misrepresentation of information, in this case,
is used to change the power balance to be in the hiring agent’s favor. Such information
signals that the hiring representative will be less likely to grant concessions, due to
falsely claimed information. There have been two different types of deception that have
been noted in the literature, that of sin of omission and sin of commission (Olekalns &
Smith, 2007). Sin of omission occurs when an individual withholds information that
would otherwise be important for a counterpart to know. This is an indirect form of
deception. Sin of commission occurs when someone directly presents or tells knowing,
false information. This form of deception is considered a direct form of deception.
Leakage theory
Leakage theory suggests that there are clues that unconsciously come out during
the use of deception that make it more likely that the deceptive attempt will be noticed
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969). For example, Hancock, Curry, Goorha, and Woodworth
(2008) found that liars are more likely to speak in the third person than are those who
are telling the truth. Part of this is connected to the fact that it is more cognitively taxing
to engage in deception as opposed to telling the truth. Because of this, deceivers have
more difficulty controlling their verbal and nonverbal behaviors (Buller, Stiff, & Burgoon,
1996). Buller, Stiff and Burgoon suggest that deceivers are more likely to use strong
emotion than are those who are telling the truth. Leakage can also arise due to
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emotional cues from the deceiver, which can occur, for example, when the deceiver
experiences emotions such as guilt or fear, which is the antithesis of the emotion that
the deceiver is attempting to show (Ekman, 2001). Even though an individual might
attempt to control their felt emotions, such emotions can lead to counterparts doubting
the veracity of the principal negotiator (Ekman & Friesen, 1969).
Research has also shown that individuals with experience in employment that
inherently involves elements of deception are more effective in using deception across
areas, including negotiation (Kraut & Poe, 1980). One example given by Ekman and
Friesen (1974) is that of a nurse who must regularly conceal his or her emotions
concerning a patient’s medical condition; this, in turn, makes the nurse more adept at
deception in negotiation. Similarly, we might expect that politicians, who frequently
disguise their private thoughts, feelings and emotions, might build up deceptive skills
that will make them less likely to be detected using deception in negotiation. Part of this
skill might emerge from less leakage.
Negotiators respond differently when they are caught in a lie, which can occur
through high levels of leakage (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Verbal skills are often used to
mitigate the damage that can come about from a counterpart detecting deception. For
example, Lewicki and Hanke (2012) show that principals caught in a lie will use verbal
strategies such as, “It was an accident” or “I’m really sorry; I got carried away, and I will
never do this again.” The deceiver will often try to convince the counterpart that the
explanation or apology is legitimately reflecting authentic regret. It has been suggested
that accepting responsibility is paramount if a negotiator is caught in a lie (Kim, Ferrin,
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).
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This is significant for the purpose of this discussion because there are certain
individual characteristics that might moderate the way in which leakage is or is not likely
to be noticed by a counterpart. Later in this paper I explore the way in which high and
low levels of political skill and emotional intelligence might impact the relationship
between the use of deception and integrative and distributive negotiation outcomes.
Since leakage can occur at varying levels (Ekman & Friesen, 1969), this might explain
why we might find strong moderation effects of political skill and emotional intelligence.
Deception predicting distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes
For this discussion, it is important to draw distinctions between distributive and
integrative negotiation outcomes. In a distributive negotiation, the results are typically of
a “fixed-pie” or zero-sum situation, in which the gains for one person are an equal loss
for the other. One example of this would be a negotiation that takes place over the
price of a used car, in which every dollar that is saved by the buyer is a dollar that is lost
by the seller. In contrast, in an integrative negotiation, or a “win-win” negotiation, there
are items to be negotiated that can collectively enhance the outcomes of both parties.
The classic example is that of an orange, put forth by Mary Parker Follett (1940). In a
distributive negotiation the parties might split the orange down the middle. However, in
an integrative negotiation, it might turn out through asking questions that one party
wants the peel for decorative purposes and the other wants the fruit. Thus, by giving
one party the peel and the other the fruit, both benefit optimally. For this paper, I test
and discuss both distributive and integrative outcomes.
While the previous discussion illustrates why an individual might act or not act in
a deceptive way, and how leakage theory might lead to a negotiators’ deception being
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detected, it is essential to understand how such decisions might influence
negotiation outcomes. In negotiation, using deception, while unethical in nature, is but
one type of behavior that is considered to be competitive in nature. There are other
negotiation behaviors, such as using an aggressive opening offer or leveraging opacity
concerning one’s bottom line, which are common and still considered within the realm of
acceptable negotiation behavior (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). These behaviors are used
in order to give a negotiator an advantage. Thus, both those behaviors that are
considered ethical and unethical fit into what Kelly and Thibaut (1969) considered
information asymmetry, in which one party has a distinct informational advantage over
the other, which is a key to establishing a dominant position within negotiation. While a
negotiator might use deception in order to gain an upper hand in a negotiation, one
potential negative impact that might occur is an increase in distributive outcomes as a
consequence of decreasing integrative outcomes. Integrative outcomes are increased
through realizing join-gains, which is often achieved through asking questions and
exploring the ways in which both sides can benefit. However, when an individual acts in
a deceptive manner it is unlikely that they will promote the welfare of their counterpart;
thus, we might expect that integrative outcomes might be impacted in the process.
Deception often includes the attempt to act opportunistically and take advantage
of a given situation. There are times that this ambition arises out of a feeling of
desperation (Lewicki & Stark, 1996). The result is a feeling of increased power. This
can be felt by both the deceiver and the counterpart (Shapiro & Bies, 1994). This would
imply that, even if a counterpart does not detect the deception, per se, they are more
likely to feel that they have less power than they would in a situation in which deception

133
was not being used. This could in turn have a positive impact on distributive
outcomes and a negative impact on integrative outcomes.
There have been, thus far, a few studies that have looked at deception and
negotiation outcomes. For example Schweitzer and Croson (1999) found that those
who lack negotiation experience are particularly ineffective when using deception. Yet
Zhou, Sung and Zhang (2013) suggest that experience in using deception leads to
negative outcomes. Aquino (1998) conducted a study with MBA students that examined
the relationship between ethical organizational climate and deception. A part of the
conclusion of this study contained the finding that those who used deception achieved
higher distributive outcomes than those who negotiated ethically. Aquino suggested
that at its core those who used deception had informational advantages over those who
did not, both for those using sins of omission and sins of commission. The findings of
Aquino is supported by the work of Bazerman et al. (2000), who suggested that
information control is central to achieving a competitive advantage in negotiation.
Thus, the bulk of research points to deception as largely being an effective
strategy. However, little has been conducted in regards to the difference between
distributive and integrative outcomes. I suggest that deception will operate differently
for integrative and distributive outcomes. Research has found that deception, while
delivering higher distributive outcomes, can lead to an overall decrease in trust
(Olekalns, Kulik & Chew, 2014). This can hamper integrative outcomes since
integrative outcomes are connected to trust (Kong, Dirks & Ferrin, 2014; Kong, 2015).
Further, the increase in power that comes from the use of deception (Lewicki & Stark,
1996), might be leveraged in such a way that distributive outcomes are increased while
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integrative outcomes are decreased; thus harming the interests of a counterpart
who is negotiating in an ethical manner.
In the end, distributive gains by the deceiver might result in decreased shared
integrative outcomes. Hence, I believe that deception will result in decreased
integrative outcomes, yet increased distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 1a: Negotiator use of deception, including sins of omission and sins
of commission, is positively related to distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 1b: Negotiator use of deception, including sins of omission and sins
of commission, is negatively related to integrative outcomes.

At this point, this discussion will navigate from the direct effects that deception
has on negotiation outcomes and pivot to a discussion of relevant moderators.

Political skill. The social science literature has recently devoted significant attention
the important of political skill in a broad array of areas, from its impact on social
networks (Fang, Chi, Chen, & Baron, 2015) to its role in buffering the relationship
between aggression and strain in the workplace (Zhou, Yang & Spector, 2015). One
can think of political skill as “the ability to effectively understand others at work, and to
use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one’s personal
and/or organizational objectives” (Ferris et al., 2005, p. 127).
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Individuals who are able to leverage their ability to understand and predict
human behavior are able to further their own, personal objectives as well as the
objectives of the organization (Ferris, et al., 2005). By using their knowledge and deep
understanding of human beings, those with high political skill find themselves better
able to achieve their own personal and professional objectives (Ferris et al., 2005).
Andrews, Kacmar and Harris (2009) suggested that political skill is amplified in cases in
which there is high ambiguity and low procedural justice, which is often the case in
negotiations. Those high in political skill are better able to understand the position,
ideas, needs and wants of the other party and are able to impact the behavior of their
counterparts to reach agreement. Thus, when those high in political skill use deception
they might be less likely to be discovered, and might have better outcomes in
negotiation. In addition, those who are high in political skill are able to use persuasion
to convince a counterpart to see complex issues from their perspective. This results in
convincing a counterpart to join their side (Ferris et al., 2007). A large contributing force
is the fact that those high in political skill are able to appear honest, forthright and
genuine (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewe, 2005).
Buller, Stiff and Burgoon (1996) suggest that a key component in the success or
failure of one who uses deception is the ability to use strong communication skills, as
communication lies at the heart of coming across as behavior that is normal. Such skills
tie in with the Ferris et al. (2007) concept of political skill, which centers on the ability to
manage information and behavior. Likewise, Burgoon, Buller and Guerrero (1995)
maintain that effective deceivers use positive affect and composure, but also an
appropriate amount of hesitancy, in order to manage the reactions of their counterparts.
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Thus, if someone who is high in political skill engages in deception, it might follow
that the result will be higher levels of distributive negotiation outcomes, since distributive
outcomes reflect the self-interest of the focal negotiator.
Because those with political skill are better able to frame and manage high-stress
relationships (Perrewe, Zellars, & Ferris, 2004), it is expected that those who do engage
in deception in negotiation will be less likely to be detected. For example, those with
high political skill taking part in ingratiation are more likely to be viewed as likable and
less likely to be viewed as manipulative (Treadway, Ferris, Duke, Adams, & Thatcher,
2007). Such detection avoidance will make it more likely that politically skilled
individuals will better achieve their own self-enhancement ends in a negotiation context.
Research also demonstrates that those who are high in political skill are better able to
conceal their bottom line or their genuine intentions, as well as keep up higher levels of
impression management (Harris & Harris, 2007). In contrast, those who are low in
political skill might be less effective in the use of deception in negotiation. They may be
less likely to manage high stress situations (Perrewe, Zellars, & Ferris, 2004) and be
more likely to be detected by their counterpart. The result would be a decrease in
distributive negotiations.
In integrative negotiations, a key component that is crucial to increasing
integrative outcomes is that of effective communication and information exchange
(Thompson, 1991). Since effective communication is at the heart of political skill (Ferris
et al., 2005), it might follow that even when using deception those who are high in
political skill are better adept at using effective communication that results in higher
levels of integrative outcomes. In contrast, those who are low in political skill might be
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expected to have the opposite impact: namely, that due to lesser skill in
communication and information exchange, when engaging in deception that the result
might be lower levels of integrative outcomes.
Ferris et al., (2005) distinguish between four different dimensions of political skill:
networking ability, interpersonal influence, social astuteness, and apparent sincerity.
According to the authors, social astuteness is the capacity for those who have political
skills to be in observance of other people, especially in social contexts. Such
individuals are able to understand the meaning of what people say and how they
behave in social situations. By understanding other’s social tendencies those who have
social astuteness are better position to achieve their own objectives. As a second
dimension, Ferris et al., (2005) discuss the impact of interpersonal influence, which is
that those who have strong political skills are better able at using their own personality
to impact and influence others in their sphere. Such individuals strategically change
their own behavior in order to elicit targeted behavior from a counterpart. The third
dimension is that of networking ability. Politically skilled individuals are strong at
leveraging friends, family, acquaintances and their larger network to achieve their own
ends and objectives. Further, such individuals are capable of fostering networks and
drawing on them to meet organizational and personal objectives. Finally, the Ferris et
al. (2005) final component of political skill is called apparent sincerity. Those who have
strong political skills are able to come across as having integrity and genuineness. By
appearing to have sincere concern for others, those high in political skill are more
successful in influencing other people.
Taking the above points together, there is strong evidence that for each
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dimension of political skill, those who are high in political skill will, when engaging in
deception, be less likely to be detected and, therefore, be more likely to obtain higher
distributive outcomes. Thus, those higher in political skill will execute deception more
effectively than those lower in political skill.
Hypothesis 2a: Networking ability moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high networking ability are more likely to
obtain greater distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 2b: Interpersonal influence moderates the relationship between the
use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high interpersonal influence are more likely
to obtain greater distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 2c: Social astuteness moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high social astuteness are more likely to
obtain greater distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 2d: Apparent sincerity moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high apparent sincerity are more likely to
obtain greater distributive outcomes.
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Hypothesis 2e: Networking ability moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high networking ability are more likely to
obtain greater integrative outcomes.

Hypothesis 2f: Interpersonal influence moderates the relationship between the
use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high interpersonal influence are more likely
to obtain greater integrative outcomes.

Hypothesis 2g: Social astuteness moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high social astuteness are more likely to
obtain greater integrative outcomes.

Hypothesis 2h: Apparent sincerity moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those with high apparent sincerity are more likely to
obtain greater integrative outcomes.

Emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is “the ability to carry out accurate
reasoning about emotions and the ability to use emotions and emotional knowledge to
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enhance thought” (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008, p. 21). Emotional intelligence
has been shown to be a cause of higher general performance in the workplace (Cote ́ &
Miners, 2006; O’Boyle, Humphrey, Pollack, Hawver, & Story, 2011) as well as general
outcomes in negotiation. Those who are high in emotional intelligence are able to better
understand the motivations of others, as it connects with others’ need for achievement,
need for affiliation and need for power (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Another
suggestion came from Fulmer (2004) who framed the idea that emotional intelligence
leads to greater negotiation outcomes, because emotional intelligence is linked to
“information acquisition, decision making, and tactical choices.” This occurs because of
the simultaneous ability of someone with high emotional intelligence both to respond to
the emotions of others as well as to control their own emotions.
Along with intuitiveness, which leads to understanding counterpart motivations,
emotional intelligence has been shown to be connected with problem solving (Salovey
& Mayer, 1990). For this reason it might follow that those with high emotional
intelligence who use deception in negotiation might be less likely to be detected by a
counterpart. By being better able to understand and predict the behaviors of others,
those high in emotional intelligence might evade detection. Thus, it is expected that
when using deception, those with high emotional intelligence will achieve higher levels
of distributive outcomes. Likewise, because those with high emotional intelligence have
been shown to have greater abilities of problem solving (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), it is
expected that such individuals, even when engaging in deception, will be better
equipped to achieve greater integrative negotiation outcomes.
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In contrast to those with high levels of emotional intelligence, low levels of
emotional intelligence have been connected with bringing out negative emotions from
others (Jordan, Ashkanasy & Hartel, 2002). Deceivers have been noted to use social
skills and interpersonal communication to confuse other people (Buller, Stiff, & Burgoon,
1996). The authors note that two ways that this is done is through the use of positive
affect and controlling expressed anxiety. Thus, when engaging in deceptive practices,
those with low levels of emotional intelligence are expected to be less effective at
deception and more likely to be discovered by their counterparts. This, in turn, will lead
to lower distributive outcomes. In addition, due to a lesser ability to communicate, those
who are low in emotional intelligence might also have lower integrative outcomes.
Wong and Law (2002) divided emotional intelligence into four different
dimensions: self emotional appraisal, others’ emotional appraisal, regulation of emotion,
and use of emotion. The authors suggest that those who have high self emotional
appraisal are able to better understand and express their own emotions. Others’
emotional appraisal involves the ability to understand the emotions of other people.
Such individuals are more empathetic and can intuitively understand how others are
feeling. Those who are high in regulation of emotion are able to control their own
emotions, especially in times of uncertainty or duress. Finally, use of emotions is
centered on the capacity to leverage one’s emotions to achieve higher levels of
performance.

Hypothesis 3a: Self-emotional appraisal moderates the relationship between the
use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
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negotiation outcomes, such that those high in self-emotional appraisal are more
likely to have higher distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 3b: Other’s-emotional appraisal moderates the relationship between
the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those high in other’s-emotional appraisal are more
likely to have higher distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 3c: Use of emotions moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those high in use of emotions are more likely to have
higher distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 3d: Regulation of emotions moderates the relationship between the
use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and distributive
negotiation outcomes, such that those high in regulation of emotions are more likely to
have higher distributive outcomes.

Hypothesis 3e: Self-emotional appraisal moderates the relationship between the
use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those high in self-emotional appraisal are more likely to
have higher integrative outcomes.
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Hypothesis 3f: Other’s-emotional appraisal moderates the relationship
between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and
integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those high in other’s-emotional appraisal are
more likely to have higher integrative outcomes.

Hypothesis 3g: Use of emotions moderates the relationship between the use of
deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those high in use of emotions are more likely to have
higher integrative outcomes.

Hypothesis 3h: Regulation of emotions moderates the relationship between the
use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and integrative
negotiation outcomes, such that those high in regulation of emotions are more likely to
have higher integrative outcomes.

Method
Participants
Data were collected from the population of undergraduate students taking a
management course at a large southeastern university in The United States. The total
sample was 67 dyads or 134 unique participants. Of all respondents, 54% identified as
female, average age was 22.90 (SD =4.20). Participants identified as Caucasian (23%),
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African-American or black (37%), Hispanic (9%), Asian American or Asian (16%),
Other or no response (14%). Average full-time work experience was 2.33 years (SD
=1.44).

Stimulus materials
An employment contract negotiation scenario was based on Margaret Neale’s
New Recruit case (permission granted by Dr. Neale), which has been used extensively
in the negotiation literature (e.g. Naquin, 2003; Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006; Miles &
Clenney, 2012; Belkin, Kurtzberg & Naquin, 2013).
In the instructions, participants were told that they were either acting as the
employer or job candidate. The participants read about the negotiation context as well
as the outcomes (points) that could be achieved based on various negotiated issues.
The employer and candidate were instructed to try to reach agreement on eight different
issues. These are the only issues that were discussed, and each negotiation was the
exact same in its structure. Each party had one issue that was an indifference issue,
which had no value to them. Indifference issues have been shown to lead to the use of
deception in negotiation (Olekalns, Horan, & Smith, 2014). Before the negotiation
began, participants completed self-report measures for emotional IQ, political skill, as
well as demographic information.
Participants were instructed to maximize their own outcomes. While the original
New Recruit case allows for integrative and distributive negotiation, my adapted version
converts two distributive issues into indifference issues, in which one party is indifferent
(all possible options will generate 0 points) and the other has a payoff preference.
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These issues are for the area of job assignment and starting date. I used these
because it is not obvious what the preference of the other side would be. In contrast, if
for example salary were to be an indifference issue, it would be clear right away what
the preference of the other side would be. For issues such as job assignment and startdate, it is not clear. In this case, it takes more determination and forethought to use
deception, since the participant must first assess the preference of the counterpart
before using deceptive practices. Thus, bonus, vacation days, moving expense
reimbursement and insurance coverage are integrative issues. Job assignment and
starting date are indifference issues, and location and salary are distributive issues.

Measures
Emotional intelligence
In order to test emotional intelligence, I used the Wong and Law (2002) 16-item
Emotional Intelligence Scale. In recent years, this measure has been used extensively
in social science research (e.g., De Clercq, Bouckenooghe, Raja, & Matsyborska, 2014;
Kafetsios, Konstantinos, & Zampetakis, 2008; Lassk & Shepherd, 2013; Zacher,
McKenna, & Rooney, 2013). The scale has four subscales, which address the four key
components of emotional intelligence, as described by Mayer and Salovey (1997) and
described in detail earlier in this paper. The four main aspects are self-emotional
appraisal, other’s emotional appraisal, use of emotion and regulation of emotion, which
had reliability estimates of .89, .85, .88 and .76 respectively (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Participants answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree).
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One sample item is, “I have good understanding of the emotions of people around
me.” The complete measure is provided in Appendix E.

Political skill
In order to test political skill, I used the 18-item measure from Ferris et al. (2005).
In recent years, there has been strong research support for this measure, including
publications from Brouer, Duke, Treadway, and Ferris (2009), Semadar, Robins and
Ferris (2006), and Treadway et al. (2007). The scale has four subscales, which include
networking ability, apparent sincerity, social astuteness, and interpersonal influence,
and the reliability coefficients were .87, .81, .79, and .78, respectively. Participants
answered on a 5-point Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree). One
sample item was, “I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around
me.” The complete measure is provided in Appendix F.

Deception
In order to measure deception, I used the method that was used by Olekalns et
al. (2014). All negotiations were audio recorded with a digital recorder. Recordings
were transcribed. Previous research has differentiated between passive and active
forms of deception (Olekalns & Smith, 2007), otherwise known as sins of omission and
sins of commission. Active deception (sins of commission) occurs when a negotiator
gives false information; whereas passive deception occurs when a negotiator withholds
information that would be pertinent to disclose (sins of omission).
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As operationalized by O’Connor and Carnevale (1997), as well as Olekalns
and Smith (2007), sins of omission were coded as an occurrence each time a negotiator
uses an indifference issue to leverage desired ends in another area. For example, if an
employee, who does not care which division he or she will be placed (each offer 0
points), uses division placement to achieve desired ends in another area, this would be
coded as a sin of omission. In contrast, sins of commission were coded when a
negotiator claims that the indifference issue is significant. For example, if the employer
claims that an October 1 start date is very important, this would be coded as a sin of
commission.
Table 4- Coding examples
Direct quotes

Deception type

Recruiter: You want New York, then you are going to

Sin of omission

get the worst option for starting date.
Candidate: Sept 15 and my bonus are really
important to me.
Recruiter: Look, if I give you Sept 15, then I need
the 6% bonus.
Recruiter: Okay, your starting date, how about

Sin of commission

October 15, this is important to me.
Recruiter: So if I were to let you start on September
15th, would you be willing to take my preferred
insurance?

Sin of omission
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Recruiter: I don’t think we can budge, October

1st,

it’s Sin of commission

the earliest we can start.

Negotiation outcome
Negotiation outcome was measured by the negotiation points achieved as a part
of the payoff schedule listed in the negotiation chart. Distributive outcomes were
calculated as the total points achieved in negotiation activities that were distributive
(location and salary). Integrative outcomes were calculated as the total points achieved
by both participants summed together for negotiation activities that had integrative
potential (bonus, job assignment, vacation days, starting date, insurance, and moving
expense reimbursement). The complete payoff schedule appears in Table 5.
Table 5: Recruiter and candidate payoff schedule
Bonus

Candidate Recruiter

10%
8%
6%
4%
2%

4000
3000
2000
1000
0

Vacation Days

Candidate Recruiter

30
25
20
15
10

1600
1200
800
400
0

0
400
800
1200
1600

0
1000
2000
3000
4000

Moving
Candidate Recruiter
expense
reimbursement
100%
3200
0
90%
2400
200

Job
Assignment
Division A
Division B
Division C
Division D
Division E

Candidate Recruiter

Starting
Date
15-Sep
1-Oct
15-Oct
1-Nov
15-Nov

Candidate Recruiter

Insurance
coverage

Candidate Recruiter

Blue cross
Prudential

800
600

0
0
0
0
0

2400
1800
1200
600
0

2400
1800
1200
600
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
800
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80%

1600

400

70%
60%

800
0

600
800

Salary
$90,000
$88,000
$86,000
$84,000
$82,000

Candidate
0
-1500
-3000
-4500
-6000

Recruiter
-6000
-4500
-3000
-1500
0

health
Kaiser
prepaid
health
CIGNA
Insure
America
Location
New York
Boston
Chicago
Atlanta
San
Francisco

400

1600

200
0

2400
3200

Candidate
1200
900
600
300
0

Recruiter
0
300
600
900
1200

Data Analysis
It should be noted that this study was conducted at the individual level. The only
relevant measurements for the study were the measurements for the employer in the
negotiation, such that all data from candidates is not relevant to the analysis. In
addition, there is a lack of group level data to analyze. Thus, it was determined that all
data should be analyzed at the individual level. For this analysis, all independent
variables were centered to mitigate issues of multicollinearity. I used same-person
mean replacement for missing data, which occurred infrequently. I used moderated
regression analysis for the results that are discussed in the following section.
Results
Two different coders coded the transcripts for sins of omission and sins of
commission. After the two coders completed the coding, I used Cohen’s Kappa to test
for inter-rater reliability. For sins of commission the inter-rater reliability value was .77,
while for sin of omission the inter-rater reliability value was .86. Landis and Koch (1977)
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suggest that inter-rater reliabilities between .60 and .80 are considered substantive,
while inter-rater reliabilities between .81 and 1.00 are considered near perfect
agreement.
The descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 6. From the
correlations we can see that there are connections between sins of omission and
regulation of emotion as well as interpersonal influence.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics and correlations
1. Omission
2.
Commission
3. Reputation
4. Self
emotion
appraisal
5. Other
emotional
appraisal
6. Use of
emotion
7. Regulation
of emotion
8. Networking
ability
9.
Interpersonal
influence
10. Social
Astuteness
11. Apparent
Sincerity
12.
Distributive
outcomes
13. Integrative
outcomes

Mean
0.56

SD
0.90

1
-

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.28
3.18

0.59
1.61

**.34
*-.25

-.15

-

4.21

0.96

-.09

-.04

.00

.84

3.80

0.77

-.17

-.06

.01

**.64

.83

4.10

0.79

-.10

.06

.07

**.58

**.78

.85

3.88

0.93

*-.25

-.05

.20

**.57

**.62

**.70

.89

3.75

0.85

-.18

-.01

.00

**.56

**.60

**.66

**.73

.87

3.21

0.72

*-.27

-.04

.18

**.55

**.68

**.71

**.80

**.87

.85

3.86

0.91

-.20

-.03

.22

**.52

**.70

**.72

**.70

**.79

**.84

.75

3.93

1.12

-.12

.01

.19

**.47

**.60

**.56

**.56

**.63

**.75

**.66

.93

3776
1403
8

1723

.11

.12

.00

-.16

-.12

-.01

.12

-.11

-.08

.00

-.09

-

1684

.01

-.01

.19

-.20*

-.15

-.14

-.02

-.09

-.06

.09

-.17

.16

13

-

** p< 0.01; * p< 0.05

Confirmatory factor analysis
For Study 1 I ran a confirmatory factor analysis, in which I created two different
models, each with four factors (Model 1: networking ability, apparent sincerity,
interpersonal influence and social astuteness; Model 2: self emotional appraisal, other’s
emotional appraisal, use of emotions, and regulation of emotions). For Model 1 the
completely standardized loadings can be seen in Table 7. The model is a poor fit for
the data (X2=224, p<.01, RMSEA=.10). Hu and Bentler (1995) suggest a cutoff for
RMSEA of .06. Thus, the fit of the overall model appears to be poor. The completely
standardized loadings for Model 2 can be seen in Table 8. The model is a moderate fit
for the data (X2=157, p<.01, RMSEA=.08, CFI=.88, SRMR=.08). While both the RMSEA
and CFI values appear to be beyond the cutoffs set by Hu and Bentler, both values
come very close to their limits and suggest that the fit is mediocre.
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Table 7: Confirmatory factor analysis, completely standardized solution, Sin of
Commission, Political skill
Item
Networking 1
Networking 2
Networking 3
Networking 4
Networking 5
Networking 6
Networking7
Interpersonal
influence 1
Interpersonal
influence 2
Interpersonal
influence 3
Interpersonal
influence 4
Apparent
sinc. 1
Apparent
sinc. 2
Apparent
sinc. 3
Apparent
sinc. 4
Social
astuteness 1
Social
astuteness 1
Social
astuteness 1

Networking
Ability
.65
.55
.65
.52
.39
.67
.59

Interpersonal
Influence

Social
Astuteness

Apparent
Sincerity

.75
.77
.74
.42
.51
.63
.73
.68
.76
.47
.51

Table 8: Confirmatory factor analysis, completely standardized solution, Sin of
commission, Emotional intelligence
Item

Self emotional
appraisal

Sea1
Sea2
Sea3
Oea1
Oea2
Oea3
Oea4
Uoe1
Uoe2
Uoe3
Uoe4
Uoe5
Roe1
Roe2
Roe3

.77
.90
.59

Other’s
emotional
appraisal

Use of
emotions

Regulation of
emotions

.61
.60
.46
.79
.56
.67
.59
.77
.58
.59
.93
.58
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Roe4

.84

I ran the analysis for 32 different models, which varied by eight different
moderators (four different political skill moderators, four different emotional intelligence
moderators), sin of omission and sin of commission, as well as for integrative and
distributive outcomes. Results for these models can be seen in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Table 8 features sins of omission as the independent variable and distributive
negotiation outcomes as the dependent variable. Table 9 features sins of omission as
the independent variable and integrative negotiation outcomes as the dependent
variable. Table 10 features sins of commission as the independent variable and
distributive negotiation outcomes as the dependent variable. Table 11 features sins of
commission as the independent variable and integrative negotiation outcomes as the
dependent variable. Table 7 gives an overview of the hypotheses, models and findings.
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Table 7- Summary of Models
Hypoth.
1a

Model
Location
N/A

Independent
variable
Omission

Moderator
variable
N/A

Moderator
Family
N/A

Dependent
variable
Distributive

1a

N/A

Commission

N/A

N/A

Distributive

1b

N/A

Omission

N/A

N/A

Integrative

1b

N/A

Commission

N/A

N/A

Integrative

2a

Table 7,
model 5
Table 9,
model
21
Table 7,
model 6
Table 9,
model
22
Table 7,
model 7
Table 9,
model
23
Table 7,
model 8
Table 9,
model
24
Table 8,
model
13
Table
10,
model
29
Table 8,
model
14
Table
10,
model

Omission

Networking
ability
Networking
ability

Political
skill
Political
skill

Distributive

Interpersonal
influence
Interpersonal
influence

Political
skill
Political
skill

Distributive

Social
astuteness
Social
astuteness

Political
skill
Political
skill

Distributive

Apparent
sincerity
Apparent
sincerity

Political
skill
Political
skill

Distributive

Omission

Networking
ability

Political
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Commission

Networking
ability

Political
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Omission

Interpersonal Political
influence
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Commission

Interpersonal Political
influence
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

2a

2b
2b

2c
2c

2d
2d

2e

2e

2f

2f

Commission

Omission
Commission

Omission
Commission

Omission
Commission

Distributive

Distributive

Distributive

Distributive

Results

Graph

Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Not
significant
Significant
at p<.05
Not
significant

Figure 1

Significant
at p<.05
Significant
at p<.05

Figure 2
Figure 3
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2g

2g

2h

2h

3a

3a

3b

3b

3c

3c

3d

3d

3e

3e

30
Table 8,
model
15
Table
10,
model
31
Table 8,
model
16
Table
10,
model
32
Table 7,
model 1

Omission

Social
astuteness

Political
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Commission

Social
astuteness

Political
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Omission

Apparent
sincerity

Political
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Commission

Apparent
sincerity

Political
skill

Integrative

Not
significant

Omission

Selfemotional
appraisal
Selfemotional
appraisal
Other’semotional
appraisal
Other’semotional
appraisal
Use of
emotions

Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e

Distributive

Significant
at p<.05

Figure 4

Distributive

Significant
at p<.05

Figure 5

Distributive

Significant
at p<.05

Figure 6

Distributive

Not
significant

Distributive

Significant
at p<.05

Figure 7

Distributive

Significant
at p<.05

Figure 8

Distributive

Not
significant

Distributive

Not
significant

Integrative

Not
significant

Integrative

Not
significant

Table 9,
model
17
Table 7,
model 2

Commission

Table 9,
model
18
Table 7,
model 3

Commission

Table 9,
model
19
Table 7,
model 4

Commission

Use of
emotions

Omission

Regulation
of emotions

Table 9,
model
20
Table 8,
model 9

Commission

Regulation
of emotions

Omission

Table
10,
model

Commission

Selfemotional
appraisal
Selfemotional
appraisal

Omission

Omission
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25
Table 8,
model
10
Table
10,
model
26
Table 8,
model
11
Table
10,
model
27
Table 8,
model
12
Table
10,
model
28

3f

3f

3g

3g

3h

3h

Other’semotional
appraisal
Other’semotional
appraisal

Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e

Integrative

Not
significant

Integrative

Not
significant

Omission

Use of
emotions

Integrative

Not
significant

Commission

Use of
emotions

Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e

Integrative

Not
significant

Omission

Regulation
of emotions

Integrative

Not
significant

Commission

Regulation
of emotions

Emotional
intelligenc
e
Emotional
intelligenc
e

Integrative

Not
significant

Omission

Commission

Hypotheses 1a predicted that sins of omission and sins of commission would be
positively related to distributive outcomes. Controlling for gender, age and work
experience, I regressed distributive outcomes on sins of omission, which gave an
unstandardized beta coefficient of 189, but was not statistically significant. I regressed
distributive outcomes on sins of commission, which gave an unstandardized beta
coefficient of 401, but was not statistically significant. Thus hypothesis 1a could not be
supported.
Hypothesis 1b predicted that negotiator use of deception, including sins of
omission and sins of commission, would be negatively related to integrative outcomes.
Controlling for gender, age and work experience, I regressed integrative outcomes on
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sins of omission, which gave an unstandardized beta coefficient of 19, but was not
statistically significant. I regressed integrative outcomes on sins of commission, which
gave an unstandardized beta coefficient of 34, but was not statistically significant. Thus
hypothesis 1b could not be supported.
Hypotheses 2a and 2e predicted that networking would moderate the relationship
between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of commission, and
distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those with high networking
ability are more likely to obtain greater distributive and integrative outcomes. Table 8model 5 and Table 10-model 21 show the analysis for distributive outcomes as the
dependent variable and Table 9-model 13 and Table 11-model 29 show the regression
analysis for integrative outcomes. Since the interaction effects were not statistically
significant, hypotheses 2a and 2e could not be supported.
Hypotheses 2b and 2f predicted that interpersonal influence would moderate the
relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those with
high interpersonal influence are more likely to obtain greater distributive and integrative
outcomes. Table 8- model 6, Table 9-model 14, Table 10-model 22, and Table 11model 30 demonstrate the regression analysis for interpersonal influence. Since the
interaction effects were not statistically significant, hypotheses 2b and 2f could not be
supported.
Hypotheses 2c and 2g predicted that social astuteness would moderate the
relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those with

158
high social astuteness are more likely to obtain greater distributive and integrative
outcomes. For the model drawing on the interaction effects between social astuteness
and sin of omission as a predictor of distributive outcomes, the interaction
unstandardized beta value is 1273 and is significant at the p<.05 level. This model had
an R2 of .19, significant at the .05 level. Thus, hypothesis 2c is supported. The simple
slopes are graphed in Figure 1. For Figure 1, I modeled the simple slopes of the eight
moderators that were statistically significant at p<.05. The moderator is shown at a high
level, which is one standard deviation above the mean, and a low level, which is one
standard deviation below the mean. This same graphical method applies to all other
graphs in this paper. For Figure 1, this pattern suggests that when those who are high
in social astuteness use sins of omission, they are more likely to achieve increased
distributive outcomes than those who are low in social astuteness. Table 9-model 15,
Table 10-model 23, and Table 11-model 31 demonstrate the regression analysis for
social astuteness. Since the interaction effects were not statistically significant,
hypothesis 2g could not be supported.
Hypotheses 2d and 2h predicted that apparent sincerity would moderate the
relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those with
high apparent sincerity are more likely to obtain greater distributive and integrative
outcomes. For hypothesis 2h, which centered on integrative outcomes, the interaction
effects were not statistically significant. This can be seen in Table 9-model 16 and
Table 11-model 32. Thus, hypothesis 2h could not be supported. However, for
distributive outcomes, both the models for sins of omission and sins of commission
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were significant at the .05 level. For sins of omission (see Table 8, model 8), the
interaction effect has an unstandardized beta value of 1329, significant at the p<.05
level. The simple slopes are graphed in Figure 2. This model has an R2 of .21 and is
significant at the p<.05 level. These results suggest that when using sins of omission,
those who are high in apparent sincerity have higher distributive negotiation outcomes
than those with low apparent sincerity. For sins of commission (see Table 10, model
24), the interaction effect has an unstandardized beta value of 1955, significant at the
p<.05 level. The simple slopes are graphed in Figure 3. This model has an R2 of .20
and is significant at the .05 level. These results suggest that when using sins of
commission, those who are high in apparent sincerity have higher distributive
negotiation outcomes than those with low apparent sincerity.
Hypotheses 3a and 3e predicted that self-emotional appraisal would moderate
the relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those high
in self-emotional appraisal are more likely to have higher distributive and integrative
outcomes. For hypothesis 3e, which centered on integrative outcomes, the interaction
effects were not statistically significant. This can be seen in Table 9-model 9 and Table
11-model 25. Thus, hypothesis 3e could not be supported. However, for distributive
outcomes, both the models for sins of omission and sins of commission were significant
at the p<.05 level. For sins of omission (see Table 8, model 1), the interaction effect
has an unstandardized beta value of 727, significant at the p<.05 level. This model has
an R2 of .22 and is significant at the p<.05 level. The simple slopes are graphed in
Figure 4. These results suggest that when using sins of omission, those who are high
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in self-emotional appraisal have higher distributive negotiation outcomes than those
with low self-emotional appraisal. For sins of commission (see Table 10, model 17), the
interaction effect has an unstandardized beta value of 1475, significant at the p<.05
level. This model has an R2 of .22 and is significant at the p<.05 level. The simple
slopes are graphed in Figure 5. These results suggest that when using sins of
commission, those who are high in self-emotional appraisal have higher distributive
negotiation outcomes than those with low self-emotional appraisal.
Hypotheses 3b and 3f predicted that other’s-emotional appraisal will moderate
the relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those high
in other’s-emotional appraisal are more likely to have higher distributive and integrative
outcomes. For hypothesis 3f, which centered on integrative outcomes, the interaction
effects were not statistically significant. This can be seen in Table 9-model 10 and
Table 11-model 26. Thus, hypothesis 3f could not be supported. For sins of omission
predicting distributive outcomes (see Table 8, model 2), the interaction effect has an
unstandardized beta value of 1055, significant at the p<.05 level. The simple slopes are
graphed in Figure 6. This model has an R2 of .22 and is significant at the p<.05 level.
These results suggest that when using sins of omission, those who are high in other’s
emotional appraisal have higher distributive negotiation outcomes than those with low
other’s emotional appraisal.
Hypotheses 3c and 3g predicted that use of emotions would moderate the
relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those high
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in use of emotions are more likely to have higher distributive and integrative
outcomes. For hypothesis 3g, which centered on integrative outcomes, the interaction
effects were not statistically significant. This can be seen in Table 9-model 11 and
Table 11-model 27. Thus, hypothesis 3e could not be supported. However, for
distributive outcomes, both the models for sins of omission and sins of commission
were significant at the p<.05 level. For sins of omission (see Table 8, model 3), the
interaction effect has an unstandardized beta value of 1182, significant at the p<.05
level. This model has an R2 of .23 and is significant at the p<.01 level. The simple
slopes are graphed in Figure 7. These results suggest that when using sins of
omission, those who are high in use of emotion have higher distributive negotiation
outcomes than those with low use of emotion. For sins of commission (see Table 10,
model 17), the interaction effect has an unstandardized beta value of 1823, significant
at the p<.05 level. This model has an R2 of .22 and is significant at the p<.05 level. The
simple slopes are graphed in Figure 8. These results suggest that when using sins of
commission, those who are high in use of emotion have higher distributive negotiation
outcomes than those with low use of emotion.
Hypotheses 3d and 3h predicted that regulation of emotions would moderate the
relationship between the use of deception, including sins of omission and sins of
commission, and distributive and integrative negotiation outcomes, such that those high
in regulation of emotions are more likely to have higher distributive and integrative
outcomes. Table 8- model 4, Table 9-model 12, Table 10-model 20, and Table 11model 28 demonstrate the regression analysis for interpersonal influence. Since the
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interaction effects were not statistically significant, hypotheses 3d and 3h could not
be supported.
Taken together, the data does not seem to support the relationship between
deception and negotiation outcomes. However, there is support for moderation effects
of two political skill dimensions: social astuteness and apparent sincerity. In addition,
there is support for moderation effects of three emotional intelligence dimensions: selfemotional appraisal, others’ emotional appraisal, and use of emotions. The significant
results can be found in Table 12.
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Figure 1: Moderation effects of social astuteness on the relationship between sin of
omission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Figure 2: Moderation effects of apparent sincerity on the relationship between sin of
omission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Figure 3: Moderation effects of apparent sincerity on the relationship between sin of
commission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Figure 4: Moderation effects of self-emotional appraisal on the relationship between
sin of omission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Figure 5: Moderation effects of self-emotional appraisal on the relationship between
sin of commission and recruiter distributive outcomes

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

.3

.5
.7
Sin of Commission

Low self emotional appraisal

.9

High self emotional appraisal

168
Figure 6: Moderation effects of other’s emotional appraisal on the relationship
between sin of omission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Figure 7: Moderation effects of use of emotion on the relationship between sin of
omission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Figure 8: Moderation effects of use of emotion on the relationship between sin of
commission and recruiter distributive outcomes
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Table 8: Model analysis for sin of omission predicting recruiter distributive negotiation outcomes
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
_________ ________
_________ _________ _________ _________ _______
________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control variables
Gender
-890** 349 -748** 7342 -611* 342 -681* 371 -791** 359 -669* 365 -691* 348 -636* 349
Age
427 293 568* 299 481 292 431 310 347 319 357 307 376 302 393 294
Work experience
-259 169 -358** 169 -299* 168 -299 181 -278 182 -294* 176 -307* 174 -263 170
Main effects
Sin of omission
237 226 406 246 433* 233 257 236 175 232 80
231 165 221 242 219
Self-emotional appraisal -564* 333
Other-emotional appraisal
-156 343
Use of emotion
106 330
Regulation of emotion
233 372
Networking ability
-448 394
Interpersonal influence
-365 504
Social astuteness
195 380
Apparent sincerity
-68
396
Two-way interactions
Self-emot. appr. *omis.
727** 345
Other-emot. app.*omis.
1055**431
Use of emotion* omis.
1182***406
Regul. of emot. * omis.
586 497
Networking ability* omis.
158 366
Interpersonal infl.* omis.
855 569
Social astuteness* omis.
1273**569
Apparent sincerity* omis.
1329** 528
F
2.79
2.82
2.97
1.64
1.63
2.00
2.35
2.74
P-value
.02
.02
.01
.15
.15
.08
.04
.02
R2
.22
.22
.23
.14
.14
.16
.19
.21
2
ΔR
.06
.08
.11
.02
.00
.03
.06
.08
*** P< 0.01; ** P< 0.05 * P< 0.10
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Table 9: Model analysis for sin of omission predicting integrative negotiation outcomes
Model 9
Model 10
Model 11
Model 12
Model 13
Model 14
Model 15
Model 16
_________ ________
_________ _________ _________ _________ _______
________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control variables
Gender
-506 349 -405 345 -351 353 -389 362 -363 353 -288 361 -353 348 -323 348
Age
708** 294 804***302 718** 301 759** 303 628** 314 667** 303 739** 302 704** 293
Work experience
-402** 170 -465***171 -421** 173 -468***176 -398** 179 -424** 173 -465***174 -401** 169
Main effects
Sin of omission
2
227 28
248 64
240 60
231 -5
228 -61
228 13
221 51
218
Self-emotional appraisal -622* 334
Other-emotional appraisal
-505 346
Use of emotion
-334 340
Regulation of emotion
-183 363
Networking ability
-285 387
Interpersonal influence
-310 498
Social astuteness
-304 380
Apparent sincerity
-411 394
Two-way interactions
Self-emot. appr. *omis.
299 346
Other-emot. app.* omis.
274 436
Use of emotion* omis.
284 418
Regul. of emot. * omis.
464 485
Networking ability* omis.
264 360
Interpersonal infl.* omis.
679 562
Social astuteness* omis.
516 569
Apparent sincerity* omis.
813 526
F
2.14
1.98
1.63
1.66
1.51
1.74
1.78
2.25
F p-value
.06
.08
.15
.14
.19
.13
.11
.05
R2
.17
.16
.14
.14
.13
.15
.15
.18
2
ΔR
.01
.00
.01
.01
.01
.02.
.01
.03
*** P< 0.01; ** P< 0.05 * P< 0.10
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Table 10: Model analysis for sin of commission predicting recruiter distributive negotiation outcomes
Model 17
Model 18
Model 19
Model 20
Model 21
Model 22
Model 23
Model 24
_________ ________
_________ _________ _________ _________ _______
________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control variables
Gender
-859 348 -746* 349 -620* 346 -695* 367 -670* 371 -753** 367 -656* 362 -594 361
Age
498* 297 504 303 414 295 425 308 404 304 459 308 495 310 466 298
Work experience
-288* 169 -322* 172 -314* 169 -327* 180 -290 174 -326* 176 -360** 178 -320* 170
Main effects
Sin of commission
469 350 581 372 224 337 255 353 349 344 262 365 417 346 481 341
Self-emotional appraisal -517 333
Other-emotional appraisal
-247 323
Use of emotion
31
331
Regulation of emotion
208 360
Networking ability
-189 431
Interpersonal influence
-460 508
Social astuteness
32
374
Apparent sincerity
-53
409
Two-way interactions
Self-emot. appr. *comm. 1475**717
Other-emot. app.* comm.
1518* 851
Use of emotion* comm.
1823***687
Regul. of emot. * comm.
1145 833
Networking ability* comm.
1355 1042
Interpersonal infl.* comm.
969 1186
Social astuteness* comm.
1426 905
Apparent sincerity* comm.
1955**907
F
2.81
2.37
2.79
1.81
2.02
1.81
1.95
2.51
F p-value
.02
.04
.02
.11
.08
.11
.09
.03
R2
.22
.19
.22
.15
.17
.15
.16
.20
2
ΔR
.05
.04
.09
.03
.02
.01
.03
.06
*** P< 0.01; ** P< 0.05 * P< 0.10
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Table 11: Model analysis for sin of commission predicting integrative negotiation outcomes
Model 25
Model 26
Model 27
Model 28
Model 29
Model 30
Model 31
Model 32
_________ ________
_________ _________ _________ _________ _______
________
Steps and variables
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control variables
Gender
-490 350 -373 344 -295 349 -372 358 -297 370 -301 360 -329 357 -244 354
Age
721** 299 791 299 700** 297 742** 301 691** 303 734** 302 783** 306 745** 293
Work experience
-414** 170 -454 169 -427** 170 -491***176 -424** 174 -447** 172 -487***176 -438** 167
Main effects
Sin of commission
9
352 135 367 -19
340 -59
345 35
344 -85
358 75
341 140 335
Self-emotional appraisal -609* 335
Other-emotional appraisal
-463 339
Use of emotion
-319 334
Regulation of emotion
-160 352
Networking ability
-105 429
Interpersonal influence
-304 498
Social astuteness
-361 369
Apparent sincerity
-335 401
Two-way interactions
Self-emot. appr. *comm. 481 721
Other-emot. app.* comm.
882 840
Use of emotion* comm.
1046 693
Regul. of emot. * comm.
1098 813
Networking ability* comm.
809 1039
Interpersonal infl.* comm.
1290 1164
Social astuteness* comm.
633 893
Apparent sincerity* comm.
1578* 891
F
2.08
2.11
1.99
1.84
1.53
1.70
1.72
2.40
F p-value
.07
.06
.08
.11
.18
.14
.13
.04
R2
.17
.17
.16
.15
.13
.14
.15
.19
2
ΔR
.01
.02
.03
.03
.01
.02
.02
.04
*** P< 0.01; ** P< 0.05 * P< 0.10

Table 12: Summary of significant findings
Hypothesis Model
Location
2c
Table 7,
model 7
2d
Table 7,
model 8
2d
Table 9,
model 24
3a
Table 7,
model 1
3a

Table 9,
model 17

3b

Table 7,
model 2

3c

Table 7,
model 3
Table 9,
model 19

3c

Independent Moderator
variable
variable
Omission
Social
astuteness
Omission
Apparent
sincerity
Commission Apparent
sincerity
Omission
Selfemotional
appraisal
Commission Selfemotional
appraisal
Omission
Other’semotional
appraisal
Omission
Use of
emotions
Commission Use of
emotions

Dependent Results
variable
Distributive Significant
at p<.05
Distributive Significant
at p<.05
Distributive Significant
at p<.05
Distributive Significant
at p<.05

Graph
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4

Distributive Significant Figure 5
at p<.05
Distributive Significant Figure 6
at p<.05
Distributive Significant Figure 7
at p<.05
Distributive Significant Figure 8
at p<.05
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Discussion
Using deception in negotiation is a risky undertaking, both ethically and
strategically. My main hypotheses predicted that the use of deception, both sins of
omission and sins of commission, would lead to higher distributive negotiation outcomes
and lower integrative negotiation outcomes. I also hypothesized that these effects
would be moderated by political skill and emotional intelligence. To test these
hypotheses, I ran a negotiation experiment with 68 dyads in which the participants in the
recruiter condition were placed in a position in which they might decide to use
deception. While I was unable to show direct connection between the use of deception
and negotiation outcomes, the study yielded several important findings.
Before exploring the specific moderators that impact the relationship between
deception and negotiation outcomes, it should be noted, from a broad level, that this
study largely demonstrates that both emotional intelligence and political skill moderate
the relationship between deception and distributive outcomes. In this study, I found
eight different moderation effects for distributive outcomes. However, I was unable to
show moderation effects for integrative outcomes. One possible reason for this
disparity is that deception has been shown to be used for personal gain (Lewicki &
Hanke, 2012), not as a means to increase joint gains. Thus, I found that those who
have high political skill and high emotional intelligence are more effective at the use of
deception and thus, produce larger distributive outcomes.
In terms of moderation effects, this study found that self-emotional appraisal,
others’ emotional appraisal and use of emotion moderate the relationship between sins
of omission and distributive outcomes. Further, this study found that self-emotional
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appraisal and use of emotion moderates the relationship between sins of
commission and distributive outcomes. The first interaction effect that was found was
that of use of emotion. Those who are better skilled at using their emotions to facilitate
higher degrees of task performance (Wong & Law, 2002) are more likely to achieve
higher distributive outcomes when using sins of omission as well as sins of commission.
This suggests that such individuals are able to leverage their high emotional intelligence
levels to increase their share of the negotiation outcomes when using deception.
Interestingly, in the absence of deception, the distributive negotiation scores are similar
between individuals who are high in use of emotion and individuals who are low in use
of emotion, suggesting that use of emotion does not impact distributive outcomes in
negotiations in which deception is not used. Second, this study found that selfemotional appraisal moderated the relationship between both sins of omission and sins
of commission and distributive negotiation outcomes. These results suggest that those
who are better able to understand their own emotions and how they express their own
emotions use such understanding to increase their distributive outcomes in negotiations
in which they use deception. It should be noted, that the graphs from the simple slopes
indicates that in the absence of deception, those high in self-emotional appraisal
actually underperform those with low self emotional appraisal. These findings support
the research of Cote ́ and Miners (2006) and O’Boyle et al. (2011), who found that
emotional intelligence leads to higher task performance. Third, this study establishes
moderation effects of others’ emotional appraisal as a moderating factor. In this
dimension, those who understand the feelings of others and are empathetic with the
feelings of others have higher levels of distributive outcomes in negotiation when using
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sins of omission. The hypothesis that this relationship would hold for sins of
commission could not be supported. Nonetheless, this finding suggests that, at least for
the passive form of deception, understanding other’s emotions increases distributive
outcomes.
The second type of moderation effects emerged from the interaction effects of
political skills, specifically the dimensions of social astuteness and apparent sincerity. I
hypothesized and found that social astuteness moderates the relationship between sins
of omission and distributive negotiation outcomes. It should be noted that the data did
not support the hypothesis that centered on sins of commission, only that of sins of
omission. Thus, those who understand social situations and the social needs of others
attain higher distributive outcomes when using sins of omission. This connects with the
suggestion that those with higher levels of political skill are better able to handle highstress relationships (Perrewe, Zellars, & Ferris, 2004), which can be triggered when
deception is being used. Second, the dimension of apparent sincerity acted as a
moderator for both sins of omission and sins of commission. This finding supports the
hypothesis that those with high political skill are often able to appear that they are acting
in a genuine manner and that this skill will lead to higher levels of distributive negotiation
outcomes when an individual uses deception. This suggests that those who appear
sincere are more effective deceivers than those who do not know how to appear in a
sincere manner. Thus, in negotiations, we might expect that those who are low in
apparent sincerity are more likely to be exposed as deceivers and less likely to attain
higher distributive outcomes.
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It was also interesting that neither sins of omission nor sins of commission
led to higher integrative outcomes. All eight moderation effects show that various
dimensions of emotional intelligence and political skill lead to more distributive
outcomes, but not integrative outcomes. Thus deception, which is an inherently selfish
action, only acts to support the individual but does not act to help the dyad. While this
result is not surprising, it does further support the stream of literature that suggests that
deception in negotiation is largely a selfish phenomenon (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998;
Lewicki & Stark, 1996).
One possible explanation for the lack of direct effects between deception and
negotiation outcomes might come from the fact that the participants in this study were
undergraduate students with limited negotiation experience. Perhaps in future studies I
will open this up to MBA students or prior to the negotiation, offer students negotiation
training. The goal of this would be to enable the participants to be more thoughtful in
considering the negotiation situation and to draw on an analytical framework to allow
them to better understand their negotiation strategy. A second idea would be to
increase the stakes of the negotiation by allowing participants to win small amounts of
money or some prize that would encourage them to be invested in the outcomes of the
negotiation.
Implications for Practice
Broadly speaking, this study found that when using deception, those who have
high political skills and those who have high levels of emotional intelligence are more
likely to achieve higher negotiation results for themselves than those who are low in
political skills or low in emotional intelligence. In short, those who are politically adept
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and strong in emotional intelligence are more successful deceivers. Negotiators
should be cognizant that if a counterpart who is politically skilled or has a high level of
emotional intelligence, uses deception, that they will be more likely to achieve higher
distributive gains in negotiation. One way to counteract this is to ask direct questions
about areas of interest in which a negotiator is concerned that a counterpart might act
deceptively, as research has shown that direct questioning, as opposed to indirect
questioning or refraining from questioning, is more likely to bring about an honest
answer (Lewicki & Hanke, 2012).

Limitations and future research
This essay has several limitations, which should be noted. First, the negotiation
experiment was conducted in a lab, which can have issues of external validity and
generalizability (Miles & Schatten, 2015). It is recommended that future research test
these hypotheses in a field study to ensure that the findings are generalizable. Using
multiple methods is the strongest way to ensure that suggested findings are reflected in
the external world (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Another limitation of this study is the
oversimplification of sin of omission and sin of commission. While I followed precedent,
so that my results could be readily compared to other studies, in reality these are much
more complex than simple coding of the presence and absence of deception. For
example, hypothesis 1b claims that negotiator use of deception, including sins of
omission and sins of commission, is negatively related to integrative outcomes. The
test of this hypothesis assumes that sin of omission is either present or absent, when in
reality one cannot truly test for all of the possible sins of omission in a negotiation as for
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each individual there are opportunities for sins of omission that cannot be captured
in a post-experiment survey.
One key area for future research will be to extend this research to a field study to
see if the moderation effects of political skill and emotional intelligence hold in a field
setting. Further, researchers could benefit by conducting further studies into the
relationship between sins of omission, as well as sins of commission, and negotiation
outcomes. This study does not support the findings of O’Connor and Carnevale (1997),
who found that deception leads to increased distributive outcomes. Thus, future
research should continue to test the relationship between deception and distributive
outcomes in order to more fully understand deception in negotiation.
One of the key findings of this paper was the moderating effect of use of
emotions on the relationship between sins of omission and sins of commission and
distributive negotiation outcomes. Future research might investigate the way in which
the use of emotion impacts specific negotiation behaviors, such as perspective taking,
or the way in which regulation of emotion in a negotiator impacts the emotional states,
such as positive affect, of a counterpart. Further research could also extend into other
negotiation actions such as brinksmanship or the use of threats and deception.
Conclusion
In this study I suggested that the use of sins of omission and sins of commission
would lead to higher distributive outcomes and lower integrative outcomes. While the
negotiation experiment did not support these hypotheses, the data supported the finding
that various dimensions of political skill and emotional intelligence moderates the
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relationship between sins of omission and distributive negotiation outcomes.
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Appendix A
Measure of Negotiation Self-Efficacy

To what extent does each of the following statements accurately describe you? Please
indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each of the following
statements
Integrative Questions
In a negotiation I believe that I can…
Find tradeoffs that benefit both parties
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Exchange concessions
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Look for an agreement that maximizes both negotiators’ interests
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Establish a high level of rapport with the other negotiator
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Distributive questions
In a negotiation I believe that I can…

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Convince the other negotiator to agree with you
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Appendix B
Measure of Prosocial Motivation
For each question below, please indicate your extent of agreement or disagreement.”

I get energized by working on tasks that have the potential to benefit others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I like to work on tasks that have the potential to benefit others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I prefer to work on tasks that allow me to have a positive impact on others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I do my best when I’m working on a task that contributes to the well-being of others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

It is important to me to have the opportunity to use my abilities to benefit others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Appendix C
Measure of Machiavellianism
To what extent does each of the following statements accurately describe you? Please
indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each of the
following:

I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my
benefit.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own goals.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I like to give the orders in interpersonal situations

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I enjoy having control over other people.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I enjoy being able to control the situation.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Status is a good sign of success in life.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Accumulating wealth is an important goal for me.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I want to be rich and powerful someday.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

People are only motivated by personal gain.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I dislike committing to groups because I don't trust others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Team members backstab each other all the time to get ahead.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

If I show any weakness at work, other people will take advantage of it.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of the situation at my
expense.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Appendix D
Measure of Schwartz Values

In this questionnaire you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME as
guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?"
Use the rating scale below:

1--means you are opposed to this value.
2--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3--means the value is important.
4--means the value is very important.
5--means the value is of supreme importance

AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:

opposed
to my
values
1

of
not
important
2

important
3

VALUES LIST I

very

supreme

important

importance

4

5
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1

EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)

2

SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)

3

PLEASURE (gratification of desires)

4

WEALTH (material possessions, money)

5____A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)

6____UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)

7____WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

8____AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)

9____A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)

10____SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)

11____LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)

12____AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
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13____BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)

14____PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)

15____INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)

16____CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)

17____HONEST (genuine, sincere)

18____PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "face")

19____HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)

20____ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)

21____RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)

22____FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)

23____SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
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24____SELF-INDULGENT (doing pleasant things)
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Appendix E
Measure of Emotional Intelligence

To what extent does each of the following statements accurately describe you? Please
indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each of the following
statements

Self emotion appraisal
I have a good sense of why I have certain feelings most of the time.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I have good understanding of my own emotions.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I know whether or not I am happy.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Others’ emotion appraisal
I always know my team members’ emotion from their behavior.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am a good observer of other’s emotions.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral
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I am sensitive to the feelings and emotions of others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I have good understanding of the emotions of people around me.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Use of emotions
I always set goals for myself and then try my best to achieve them.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I always tell myself that I am a competent person.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I am motivated to do a task without needing pressure from other people.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I have good understanding of the emotions of people around me.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I would always encourage myself to try my best.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral
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Regulation of emotions
I am able to control my temper and handle difficulties wisely.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am quite capable of controlling my own emotions.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I can always calm down quickly when I am angry.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I have good control of my own emotions.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral
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Appendix F
Measure of Political Skill

To what extent does each of the following statements accurately describe you? Please
indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each of the following
statements

I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

It is easy for me to develop good rapport with most people.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I understand people very well.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.
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Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.

I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I am good at getting people to like me.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I try to show a genuine interest in other people.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen at work.
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Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I have good intuition or savvy about how to present myself to others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

I always seem to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

I pay close attention to people’s facial expressions.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work whom I can call
on for support when I really need to get things done.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Appendix G
Measure of Assessment of fairness

In general, my counterpart was fair.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4

5

Agree

Strongly Agree

4

5

Agree

Strongly Agree

Overall, I felt that that my counterpart acted fairly.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

If asked, I would tell other students that my counterpart was fair.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4

5

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Appendix H
General Automotive Case
General Automotive Corporation is a major manufacturer of passenger cars and
light trucks. Two of General’s most popular vehicles are the mid-sized Venus and the
mid-sized Pluto. The vehicles’ steel bodies are almost identical, however minor aspects
of the trim and interior are different. Each of the two autos is sold through a different
division of General, and is targeted at a different consumer group.

For General, vehicles with similar body styles are part of a platform. The Venus
and Pluto comprise the

G car platform. By making the autos similar, General reduces

costs by using the same production equipment and parts for a larger number of
vehicles.

Environmental concerns have been driving a change in the automotive industry.
The U.S. Government has been passing increasingly stringent environmental
legislation. The Government has been pressing manufacturers to produce vehicles that
get better gas mileage.

The required weighted average fuel economy of a

manufacturer’s fleet of vehicles (corporate average fuel economy, CAFE) has
increased.

This saves fuel and also reduces noxious emissions.

The CAFE

requirement has just increased from 27.5 MPG to 32.0 MPG.

One way manufacturers can increase the fuel efficiency of an auto is to decrease
its weight. Aluminum weights 1/3 less than steel, however, it also costs 3 times as
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much.

Though it is not cost effective to produce a vehicle made entirely of

aluminum, substitutions can be made for certain strategic parts. This can significantly
lower a vehicle’s weight to sufficiently increase its gas mileage and satisfy CAFE
requirements.

Pat Moldauer is a purchasing representative for General. He has been working
for the company for seven years. Pat has been having preliminary discussions with
Midwest Stamping (Midwest) regarding a supply arrangement whereby Midwest would
produce an aluminum hood for General’s G platform. General not only produces parts
internally, but also out-sources them from suppliers like Midwest depending on internal
capacity constraints.

Chris Sava is the President and owner of Midwest. Midwest is a small stamper
of large metal parts for the appliance and office furniture industry.

Midwest also

manufactures mall piece parts for second tier automotive suppliers. Chris has been
actively trying to grow Midwest. Securing the G car hood business would be a major
accomplishment that would greatly enhance Midwest’s reputation and visibility in the
automotive industry. The auto manufacturers are among the largest users of stamped
parts in the country.

The G car platform is integral to General’s product line.

The G car was

introduced three years ago and General is in the midst of redesigning the platform for a
new G car style that will be introduced in three years. General’s intention was to use
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the aluminum hood in the redesigned G car, but the unexpected tightening of the
CAFE requirements has forced General to immediately incorporate the hood into the
present version.
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The press needed to produce the aluminum hood is somewhat specialized
and costs $6,000,000. Midwest does not currently have such a press and would have
to purchase one to produce the part for General. G car production is projected to
average 100,000 units per year for at least the next 9 years.

A preliminary agreement has been reached between General and Midwest on all
substantive aspects except price. Chris and Pat are meeting today to settle on price.
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CHRIS SAVA’S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

You are anxious to do business with General. In fact, you have been calling on
them for five years waiting for an opportunity like this.

In addition to this specific

contract, you feel that you could do a lot more work for General and would like to
establish a long-term relationship.

In your business a high quality rating from this manufacturer is deemed very
important. It is so important in fact that not having such a rating has prevented you from
getting contracts with other manufacturers. You are confident that if you are given the
chance to produce this part for General you will receive a high quality rating from them,
which will enhance your overall business prospects.

You are aware that many of your competitors could produce this part equally well
for Genera, and would jump at the opportunity to bid on this contract. As a result, you
are wary of playing hardball on price during the negotiations. You would be willing, if
necessary, to accept a substandard return for this project. Your usual rate of return for
a project of this size is 13.0%.

The $6,000,000 press cost is highly significant for Midwest. Though you are a
smaller company you have the resources to finance the necessary equipment
purchases and other costs necessary to complete this project. Your evaluation of the
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total profits available to Midwest over a nine year horizon (three more years for the
current design and six years for the redesign) based on a variable cost per unit of $10,
along with the associated returns on investment are presented in Exhibit A. Assume that
these figures are accurate and based on your best estimates of projected net profit
taking all costs into account.

Option

Price

Profit/ (Loss) if 3 Profit/ (Loss) Profit/ (Loss)
years

if 6 years

if 9 years

A

$35.00 $1,500,000

$8,000,000

$16,500,000

B

$32.00 $800,000

$7,000,000

$13,800,000

C

$30.00 $0

$6,000,000

$12,000,000

D

$25.00 ($1,500,000)

$4,000,000

$7,500,000

E

$20.00 ($3,000,000)

$0

$3,000,000

F

$16.67 ($4,000,000)

($2,000,000) $0
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PAT MOLDAUER’S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
(treatment group)

You have heard this morning that due to other planned improvements to the G
car redesign due out in three years, the aluminum hood will no longer be necessary to
maintain CAFE standards. You are certain that Midwest does not have this information.
A steel hood has been recommended by engineering for the future design and,
furthermore, General intends to produce this steel hood in house. An aluminum hood is
still needed on the current G car for the remaining three-year period.

You know that General has the ability to unilaterally cancel contracts if material
modifications are made to a given part.

Therefore you realize that the nine year

contract you sign today will not be binding in three years. Midwest most likely does not
know this given that they have never dealt with General before.

After seven years with General, you are finally up for your first big promotion.
However, so is one of your counterparts in another purchasing department. As a result
of recent tightening in the budget you believe that only one of you can receive this
promotion this year. You could greatly improve your personal track record by sourcing
this important part at a favorable price.

You have investigated the track record of Midwest and believe them to be a
reliable, high quality supplier. However, the person you will be negotiating with, Pat
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Mouler, has a really bad reputation. He has a track record of using deception and
acting in a manner that is considered unethical. You searched his name in Google and
confirmed that his bad reputation was well warranted.

The hood project is critical to General’s achievement of the CAFE requirements.
As a result, you have the authority to pay whatever price is necessary to source this
part.

Though you will be commended for a low purchase price, you will not be

reprimanded in any way for paying too much.

The finance and engineering departments at General have studied the costs and
associated paybacks of this project under several different part price scenarios. Given
today’s decision to replace the aluminum hood in three years, the table below shows
that price options D,E, and F will result in certain losses for Midwest. Assume that these
figures are accurate and based on your best estimate of net profits taking all costs into
account.
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ANNUAL UNIT VOLUME 100.000 units/yr
VARIABLE COST/UNIT
PRESS COST

Option Price

$6,000,000

(ACTUAL
PROFIT

$10.00

POTENTIAL PROFIT POTENTIAL PERCEIVED
TO

MIDWEST BY MIDWEST

GIVEN
INFORMATION)

BASED ON OLD

NEW INFORMATION
Profit/ (Loss) if 9 years

Profit/ (Loss) if 3 years
A

$35.00 $1,500,000

$16,500,000

B

$32.00 $800,000

$13,800,000

C

$30.00 $0

$12,000,000

D

$25.00 ($1,500,000)

$7,500,000

E

$20.00 ($3,000,000)

$3,000,000
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F

$16.67 ($4,000,000)

$0

Purchasing has established a target price of $25 per part for the hoods
based on past purchases of similar parts. You do not have another supplier lined up
from whom you could purchase the part at that price.

Though you have never personally done it, it is not frowned upon by General to
withhold facts of

stretch the truth with a supplier to get them to produce a unique or

difficult part. At general, the company motto has always been profits are King.

You must come up with an agreement with Midwest on onse of the six price
options in the chart in order to complete this contract; no other solutions are acceptable.
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PAT MOLDAUER’S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
(control group)

You have heard this morning that due to other planned improvements to the G
car redesign due out in three years, the aluminum hood will no longer be necessary to
maintain CAFE standards. You are certain that Midwest does not have this information.
A steel hood has been recommended by engineering for the future design and,
furthermore, General intends to produce this steel hood in house. An aluminum hood is
still needed on the current G car for the remaining three-year period.

You know that General has the ability to unilaterally cancel contracts if material
modifications are made to a given part.

Therefore you realize that the nine year

contract you sign today will not be binding in three years. Midwest most likely does not
know this given that they have never dealt with General before.

After seven years with General, you are finally up for your first big promotion.
However, so is one of your counterparts in another purchasing department. As a result
of recent tightening in the budget you believe that only one of you can receive this
promotion this year. You could greatly improve your personal track record by sourcing
this important part at a favorable price.

You have investigated the track record of Midwest and believe them to be a
reliable, high quality supplier. The hood project is critical to General’s achievement of
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the CAFE requirements. As a result, you have the authority to pay whatever price is
necessary to source this part. Though you will be commended for a low purchase price,
you will not be reprimanded in any way for paying too much.

The finance and engineering departments at General have studied the costs and
associated paybacks of this project under several different part price scenarios. Given
today’s decision to replace the aluminum hood in three years, the table below shows
that price options D,E, and F will result in certain losses for Midwest. Assume that these
figures are accurate and based on your best estimate of net profits taking all costs into
account.
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ANNUAL UNIT VOLUME 100.000 units/yr
VARIABLE COST/UNIT
PRESS COST

Option Price

$6,000,000

(ACTUAL
PROFIT

$10.00

POTENTIAL PROFIT POTENTIAL PERCEIVED
TO

MIDWEST BY MIDWEST

GIVEN
INFORMATION)

BASED ON OLD

NEW INFORMATION
Profit/ (Loss) if 9 years

Profit/ (Loss) if 3 years
A

$35.00 $1,500,000

$16,500,000

B

$32.00 $800,000

$13,800,000

C

$30.00 $0

$12,000,000

D

$25.00 ($1,500,000)

$7,500,000

E

$20.00 ($3,000,000)

$3,000,000

F

$16.67 ($4,000,000)

$0

Purchasing has established a target price of $25 per part for the hoods
based on past purchases of similar parts. You do not have another supplier lined up
from whom you could purchase the part at that price.
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Though you have never personally done it, it is not frowned upon by General to
withhold facts of

stretch the truth with a supplier to get them to produce a unique or

difficult part. At general, the company motto has always been profits are King.

You must come up with an agreement with Midwest on onse of the six price
options in the chart in order to complete this contract; no other solutions are acceptable.

